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ABSTRACT
Despite an increasing awareness in the field of international relations of 
the importance of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the 
process of European integration, few models have been devised to explain its 
role. Moreover, those models which have been formulated fail to withstand 
rigorous analysis. The current thesis examines several of the existing models, 
critiquing their respective weaknesses. Employing rational choice analysis, this 
research develops an alternative model, designated the architect’s compromise 
model, to explain the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in European 
integration and the acceptance of its judgements by the Member States.
In addition to the general assumption that the Treaties of the European 
Communities do not form a constitution for the Communities, five assumptions
form the foundation of the architect’s compromise model. First, the key actors
in the model are the ECJ and the Member States. Second, the actors are
assumed to be rational, as defined as undertaking purposeful actions. Third, the 
ECJ is recognised as a strategic actor, employing a teleological approach to the 
Treaties of the European Communities. Fourth, the decisions of the ECJ 
usually conform to the long-term interests of the Member States as defined by 
the Treaties. Fifth, the Member States can be expected to abide by decisions of 
the European Court of Justice if its decisions conform to these long-term
interests.
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To test these assumptions and the architect’s compromise model of 
European integration, the thesis examines the doctrine of supremacy. After 
analysing supremacy in general, the thesis undertakes case studies on the 
acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy by the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Through the testing of the model, the research concludes that the architect’s 
compromise offers an appropriate means of explaining the European Court’s 
role in the process of European integration.
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Chapter I
The European Union, the Court of Justice of the European Communities1 and
Rationalism
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and 
which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or 
Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. . . .
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows 
necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted 
away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes 
renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to 
him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he 
can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably 
annexed thereunto.2
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
We are creating a model, admittedly by reference to inherited principles, 
but in circumstances so extraordinary that the end result will be unique, 
without historical precedent. We owe much to the strength of our 
institutions because our Community is a Community based on the rule of 
law. And the condition for success is the joint, transparent exercise of 
sovereignty.3
Jacques Delors, “A Necessary Union”
What depths of illusion or prejudice would have to be plumbed in order 
to believe that European nations forged through long centuries by 
endless exertion and suffering, each with its own geography, history, 
language, traditions and institutions, could cease to be themselves and 
form a single entity?4
Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope
1 Throughout this study, the Court of Justice of the European Communities will also be 
referred to as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or simply the Court (distinguished 
from other courts examined in this research by being capitalised).
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 127.
3 Jacques Delors, “A Necessary Union,” The European Union: Readings on the Theory 
and Practice of European Integration, eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 56.
Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, trans. Terence Kilmartin (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1971), 189.
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There has been perhaps no event—in the absence of conquest—as 
significant to the sovereignty of European states than the process of integration 
which has taken place over the past fifty years. In this, the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities has played a pivotal role, and an increasing body of 
literature has sought to explain the impact, the rationale and the significance of 
the Court’s actions. While prior research has added to the overall
understanding of legal integration, both friends and foes of the Court concede 
that critical examination of the behaviour, jurisdiction and decision-making of 
the European Court of Justice is indeed limited.5 Moreover, the few critical 
examinations of the Court which have been undertaken have often been met
with hostile rebuttals which appear to defend the integrity of the Court while
not clearly addressing the underlying criticisms. Nevertheless, it is true that
much of the criticism aimed at the Court consists of thinly veiled attacks on 
European integration at large. Regardless of this academic posturing, the
current research will argue that Court has not only maintained its standing, but 
also has carefully constructed the legal framework which has underpinned the
success of the European Communities. However, the continued success of the 
Court depends upon unbiased debate on both its strengths and limitations. 
Ignoring any weaknesses associated with the Court would eventually undermine 
its legitimacy, leading possibly, in the end, to serious repercussions for the entire 
European integration process.
See, for example, T. Koopmans, “Judicial Decision-making,” Legal Reasoning and 
Judicial Interpretation of European Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, 
eds. Angus I. L. Campbell and Meropi Voyatzi (Gospor, Hampshire: Trenton Publishing, 
1996), 93-104; and Patrick Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in 
Judicial Activism (London: European Policy Forum, Frankfurter Institut, 1995).
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It must be stated first and foremost that it is not the intent of this
research project to analyse the actions of the Court based on legal analysis. On 
the contrary, this study is concerned with analysing a legal institution based on 
political science methodology. The purpose in undertaking such an approach is 
to supplement an area of study that has been largely ignored by political 
scientists who lack the legal tools possessed by lawyers. Based on the 
importance of the European Court of Justice throughout the history of 
European integration and on its continuing pivotal role in the growth of the 
Communities, political scientists can no longer take refuge from critical analysis 
of the Court based on a perceived lack of legal training. Moreover, this 
research project will illustrate that although the Court is first and foremost a 
legal institution, it nonetheless exhibits a strong political influence on the 
process of European integration. Therefore, we proceed, possibly in a markedly 
diverse direction from lawyers, but at the very least, it is the hope of this project 
that it opens the door to more analysis of the Court by political science.
In light of these concerns, this research project strives to objectively 
provide a rigorous model of European integration which appreciates the 
political dynamics that undoubtedly underscore the manoeuvrings of the Court. 
This model, which will be termed the architect’s compromise, seeks to explain 
the Court through a rational choice analysis which focuses on the interaction of
the Member States and the Court itself. To assess the soundness of such an
approach, the model will be tested against selected cases dealing primarily with
6
the doctrine of supremacy of European law.6 This research will argue that the 
architect’s compromise model lends itself particularly well to such analysis as it 
recognises the bargaining process between the ECJ and the Member States, 
which plays a significant role in the process of European legal integration. 
Through this examination, the research will conclude that the architect’s 
compromise model offers the most promising model of integration in this area 
to date amongst those examined by this research project. Case studies on the 
United Kingdom and Germany will further verify the strength of the architect’s 
compromise model as a means of explaining European legal integration. Finally, 
the research will conclude with a discussion of the challenges facing the Court 
and European integration, identified with the aim of providing both policy 
prescriptions and areas of further research.
Before the model can be developed, however, it is necessary to first 
trace the development of the Communities and the philosophical foundation 
upon which the architect’s compromise is based. With that in mind, the first 
section of this present chapter sketches the historical events which led to the 
development of the European Communities, followed by an examination of the 
Court of Justice as an institution. Following a summary of theories of European 
integration, the chapter will address the potential of rational choice analysis for 
explaining the process of integration. To develop the foundation for deriving 
such a model, this chapter will then examine rationalism according to its 
philosophical roots, its applicability to co-operation and its relevance to
6 Throughout this research, the law of the European Communities will also be referred to 
as European Community law, EC law and simply European law.
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international relations. Having explored rationalism, the chapter will then 
examine game theory vis-a-vis international relations and decision-making. 
Thereafter, the chapter will examine the ability of a game-theoretic, rational
choice analysis to explain the role of the European Court in the process of 
integration. The final section concludes that such a rational choice analysis 
provides a rigorous tool for explaining legal integration and introduces the 
model which will be subsequently developed in Chapter II.
European Integration and Disintegration
Through the centuries, Europe has been characterised by wide political 
fragmentation. Charlemagne, the Hapsburgs and Napoleon represent but a 
handful of those who have led campaigns of military conquest in Europe. While 
the idea of a single Europe has been espoused by imperialistic motives
associated with the battlefield, many of the great minds of the continent have 
also mused upon the idea of a unified Europe with more humanitarian 
intentions. Drawing upon the apparent civilising effect of the Roman Empire
centuries earlier, Pierre Dubois, during the fourteenth century, envisioned a 
permanent council of European monarchs dedicated to Christian moral 
workings to ensure peace. With the dawn of the Enlightenment, scholars 
challenged the divine right of monarchs with its inherent assumption of 
inequality; moreover, notions of democracy and liberalism provided a new 
means for European integration based on co-operative and social structures 
rather than conquest, particularly expressed in the ideas of William Penn,
8
Jeremy Bentham, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Henri Saint-Simon and Victor Hugo. 
Nevertheless, power politics continued to dominate international relations, and 
as a result, the idea of a unified Europe was unrealised.7
Much later, this century’s two World Wars exposed the brutality and 
inhumanity inherent in the traditional nation-state power politics which has 
dominated international relations since the Peace of Westphalia.8 Following the 
widespread destruction of World War I, the first earnest attempts were made to 
change the nature of this traditional power politics style.9 Furthermore, the high 
ideals that characterised the Paris Peace Conference (1919) and subsequently
led to the formation of the League of Nations “engendered almost limitless 
hopes and expectations in the minds of a traumatized population craving for 
assurances that peace would endure.”10 Such high ideals were soon refuted 
with the rise of nationalism in the 1930s, sowing the seeds of the destruction of 
the following decade, when the Second World War painfully illustrated the 
dreadful devastation which could be caused by a European conflict fought with 
modern weapons. Moreover, World War II clearly illustrated Europe’s 
“drastically altered” position in a world where the global importance of the 
continent was declining relative to that of the United States and the Soviet
7 Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 
1945 (London: Longman, 1991), 1-3.
8 Martin Wight asserts that the Peace of Westphalia (1648) provided the state system a 
legal foundation. For a fuller discussion, see Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press in Association with The London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 1977), 113-114.
9 Walter Hallstein, United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), 5.
10 William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), 74-75.
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Union. The idea of a unified Europe emerged not only as an attractive 
alternative to the divisions which had plagued Europe through the centuries, but 
also as a practical means of retaining political and economic influence in a new 
global power structure.11 Echoing such thoughts in Zurich on 19 September 
1946, Winston Churchill12 optimistically speculated on the possibility of a united 
Europe as he remarked, “If Europe were once united in the sharing of its 
common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity 
and glory which its three or four hundred million people would enjoy.”13 
Although Europe’s economies suffered as a result of the massive destruction of 
infrastructure sustained during the Second World War, their production
capacities, while severely damaged, were in many cases not as devastated as 
was frequently described by historians. Indeed, many had countries reached 
pre-War levels by 1950. Nevertheless, by the late 1940s, a sharp decline in 
Europe’s balance of payments, coupled with a poor harvest, helped to mobilise 
American economic support in the form of the Marshall program, providing 
nearly $12.5 billion for European development.14 It was against this 
background, along with the deteriorating relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, that French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 
1950 outlined a plan for pooling together the French and German coal and steel
11 Hallstein, 5.
12 Ibid., 8.
13 Winston S. Churchill, “The Tragedy of Europe,” Winston S. Churchill: His Complete 
Speeches, 1897-1963, vol. 7, 1943-49, ed. Robert Rhodes James (Chelsea House 
Publishers: New York, 1974), 7379.
14 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe (London: Fontana Press, 1995), 4-8.
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industries, thus making war “not merely unthinkable, but materially 
impossible.”15
The Schuman Plan became the foundation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), the Treaty for which was signed in April 1951. 
Along with France and West Germany; Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands formed the initial Community of six, establishing the organisation’s 
headquarters in Luxembourg.16 The Preamble broadly outlines the purpose of 
the ECSC, which is:
To substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; 
to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a 
broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody 
conflicts; and to lay the foundation for institutions which will give 
direction to a destiny henceforward shared.17
Practically, the Treaty called for a common market for coal and steel, sought the 
establishment of rules and regulations for the market and laid the institutional 
framework for the organs of the ECSC.18 Included in this framework were a 
High Authority, a Common Assembly, a Special Council of Ministers and a 
Court of Justice,19 institutions which were to mirror those later established 
under the Treaty of Rome.
15 Robert Schuman, “The Schuman Declaration,” The European Union: Readings on the 
Theory and Practice of European Integration, eds. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. 
Slubb (London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 12.
16 Roy Pryce, The Politics of the European Community (London: Butterworths, 1973), 1.
17 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Preamble.
18 Pryce, 5.
19 ECSC, Title 2, Article 7.
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■Further integrative initiatives were forged among the Members of the
ECSC in the latter half of the decade. On 25 March 1957 in Rome, the same six
countries signed both the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), which formally established the institutions on 1 January 
1958.20 Envisioning the potential benefits of atomic energy, the Euratom 
Treaty set out to co-ordinate the development of the nuclear industries in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy21 
Likewise, the EEC Treaty’s aims as outlined in Article 2 are quite formidable:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member 
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard 
of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.22
Given the limited political power and authority delegated to the European 
institutions at that time, the achievement of the lofty aspirations of the Treaties 
would be dependent upon the political will, co-operation and actions of the 
signatory states.
With the adoption of the three Treaties, the foundation was laid for a 
Community of European states, and subsequent Treaties23 have functioned to 
modify what has since become the European Union. On 8 April 1965 in
20 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 3.
21 Treaty Establishing the European Alomic Energy Community (Euratom).
22 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Article 2.
23 The other treaties include the Merger Treaty, the Single European Act, the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty.
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Brussels, the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of 
the European Communities, or the Merger Treaty, was signed. Becoming 
effective on 1 July 1967, the Merger Treaty established one Commission and 
one Council for the three Communities. In subsequent years, the membership of 
the European Communities has grown with the acceptance to full member status 
of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom on 1 January 1973; of Greece in 
1981 ;24 of Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986;25 and of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden on 1 January 1995.26 In February 1986, the Single European Act, 
which aimed to clarify constitutional provisions, revitalise the Community and 
modify certain decision-making procedures, was signed by the Member States 
although it did not become effective until mid-1987.27 The Treaty on European 
Union was signed on 7 February 1992 in Maastricht28 and contains three 
“Pillars.” Title I, Article A of the Treaty is responsible for transforming the 
European Communities into the “European Union” by formally assigning the 
name and outlining its aims, structure and character. The first pillar of the 
Maastricht Treaty includes the designation of “European Community” as the 
official name of the EEC (although all three Communities remain separate 
entities) and reflects the desire by the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty “that the 
EC should gradually become transformed from an economic community into a
24 Hartley, 4-5.
25 D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, 6th ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1994), 17.
26 “Happy on the margins,” The Economist (3 December 1994): 54.
27 Neill Nugent, William E. Paterson and Vincent Wright, eds., The Government and 
Politics of the European Union, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1994), 49-50.
28 See European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1994), 8-9.
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political union.”29 The second pillar calls for the gradual development of a 
common foreign and security policy although the importance of inter­
governmental co-operation is recognised given that “foreign and security 
policy. . . is traditionally an area where the Member States insist on retaining 
sovereignty.”30 The third pillar focuses on “cooperation in the fields of Justice 
and Home Affairs,” and calls for inter-governmental co-operation particularly in 
policies among Member States concerning immigration, asylum, drug 
trafficking, international fraud, customs breaches and international crime and 
civil matters.31 Finally, the most recent treaty, signed on 2 November 1997, is 
the Amsterdam Treaty, which seeks to address those concerns which have 
subsequently arisen from Maastricht. Having briefly sketched the historical 
development and political structure of the Communities, this study will now 
proceed with its examination of the European Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities
The Court of Justice was founded by the ECSC Treaty32 and 
subsequently modified in the Euratom Treaty,33 the EEC Treaty34 and 
successive Treaties. Although its permanent location was not officially
29 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, European Integration: The Origins and Growth of the European 
Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1995), 59.
30 Ibid., 60.
31 Ibid., 62.
32 ECSC, Articles 31-45 and Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Coal and Steel Community.
33 Euratom, Articles 136-160 and Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Atomic Energy Community.
34 EEC, Articles 164-188 and Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Economic Community.
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designated until 1992, the Court has always convened in Luxembourg, which “is 
one factor in helping to give the Court a strong espirit de corps”35 As the 
Member States wished to limit duplication of institutional tasks and structure 
among the Communities,36 the Convention on Certain Institutions Common to 
the European Communities was signed on 25 March 19 5 7.37 Article 3 is 
responsible for establishing a single Court of Justice for the EEC and Euratom,38 
and the first paragraph of Article 4 states that:
Upon taking up its duties, the single Court of Justice referred to in
Article 3 shall take the place of the Court provided for in Article 32 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. It shall 
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon that Court by that Treaty in 
accordance with the provisions thereof.39
Thus, the European Court of Justice, which presently consists of fifteen judges 
and nine advocates general, has from the beginning been a single institution 
common to all three Communities. The judges, with terms of six years, are 
appointed by the unanimous consent of the Member States,40 which helps ensure 
impartiality and credibility from the judges.
The responsibilities of the Court lie in ensuring “the interpretation and 
application” of the three treaties.41 Having had its remit enlarged by the Treaty 
on European Union, the Court derives its responsibilities solely through the
35 Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law: The Essential Guide to the Legal 
Workings of the European Community, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 155.
36 Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, Preamble.
37 Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, Final 
Provisions, Article 8.
38 Ibid., Section II, Article 3.
39 Ibid., Section II, Article 4.
40 Weatherill and Beaumont, 155.
41 ECSC, Article 31; EEC, Article 164; and Euratom, Article 136.
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collective Treaties that form the European Communities. Thus, the 
Communities’ jurisdiction is derivative in nature, in contrast to that of the 
Member States, whose authority is characteristically attributed to their 
respective peoples or parliaments. However, Lasok and Lasok maintain that 
“. . . the Court may feel justified in adopting a broad interpretation of attribution 
and behave like a supreme court of a federal state which occasionally has to 
make a political decision whilst interpreting the constitution,”42 to fulfil its role 
of “filling in the gaps” of the Treaties. Through such landmark rulings as Van 
Gend en Loos,43 which established the principle of “direct effect” (national 
courts must enforce the obligations or recognise the rights implicit in European 
legislation); Francovich v. Italy44 which recognised the rights of citizens to 
receive financial compensation should they be adversely affected by the failure 
of a Member State to enact a particular directive in a certain amount of time; 
and Cassis de Dijon,45 which established the principle of “mutual recognition” 
(lawfully manufactured and traded products of any particular Member State 
must be recognised by any other Member State), the Court has greatly enhanced 
the prestige of European Union law in the process of European integration.46 
Thus, the Court has functioned as an engine of European integration, playing a
fundamental role in the process.
42 Lasok and Lasok, 251.
43 Case 26/62, ML Algemene Transport—en Expedite Ondernetning Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, European Court Reports (1963): 1-30.
44 Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Andrea Francovich and Another v. The Republic (Italy), Common 
Market Law Reports 2 (1993): 66-116.
45 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, European 
Court Reports 1 (1979): 649-675.
46 See further Nugent, Paterson and Wright, 219-222.
16
Theories of Integration
European integration has traditionally been explained through the 
theories of federalism, functionalism or neofunctionalism. While it is not the 
intention of this study to simply repeat old ground, it is useful to roughly sketch 
these well-known theories of integration, which will enable us to identify their 
respective weaknesses, illustrating the necessity for a more robust explanation. 
According to the ideas of Altiero Spinelli, European integration would best be 
achieved through federalism. Correspondingly, Spinelli envisioned an 
autonomous “movement for the European federation” that would, through 
popular support, achieve such unification “by the free decisions of democratic 
national governments.”47 Furthermore, Spinelli argued that integration could 
only be achieved through a popularly elected European assembly, rather than 
through inter-governmental methods, which reflected his scepticism of 
functionalism.48 Federalism is of importance to this research since many experts 
on the ECJ, including Joseph Weiler, assume that the European legal system is
federal in structure. This research refutes such rigid a classification based on the
reasons which will be developed throughout this study, particularly relating to
the Communities’ lack of a true constitution, as will be explored at length in
Chapter III.
47 Sergio Pislone, “Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe,” 
Altiero Spinelli and Federalism in Europe and in the World, ed. Lucio Levi (Milan: 
Franco Angeli, 1990), 133-134.
48 Ibid., 133-140.
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In contrast to Spinelli, David Mitrany argues that both a federation and a 
loose confederation would be impractical as a means of reorganising the 
international system. With regard to his arguments as to the unsuitability of a 
loose confederation, Mitrany cites the example of the League of Nations’ 
“attempt to universalize and codify the rules” of international conduct despite its 
lack of political support from the leading members.49 Moreover, with regard to 
a federation, Mitrany is equally sceptical, stressing that federations require close 
association, which might be appropriate for provincial units seeking to form a 
national unit, but inappropriate for those regions where “none of the elements of 
neighbourhood, of kinship, of history, are there to serve as steps.”50 Convinced 
that neither federation nor confederation provides a practical alternative, 
Mitrany argues that functionalism, or integration by sector, is more promising. 
Applying such reasoning with regard to the Communities, Mitrany states, “A 
constitutional pact could do little more than lay down certain elementary rights 
and duties for the members of the new community. The community itself will 
acquire a living body not through a written act of faith but through active 
organic development.”51 In this way, Mitrany argued that functionalism would 
bring co-operation in the functional tasks among states and thus make peace 
more likely.52 Despite Mitrany’s faith in the functionalist explanation, it was not 
long before analysts were once again formulating alternative notions as to the 
best path towards integration.
49 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development 
of International Organization (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), 8.
50 Ibid., 6.
51 Ibid., 10.
52 Ibid., 19-56.
18
Recognising the shortcomings of functionalism, Leon Lindberg 
advanced the theory of neofunctionalism specifically for European integration. 
According to neofunctionalism, central political actors pursue an active role in 
encouraging integration. Member States must then embrace the desire to 
integrate, with spillovers (integration in one sector leading to integration in 
another) playing an important role in integration.53 Neofunctionalism assumed a 
sectoral approach to integration at a regional level, in which an organic growth 
of institutions would eventually bring about the integration of several states. As
with federalism and functionalism, neo functionalism came under severe scrutiny
because conditions in Europe did not reflect the predictions of the theory. 
While neofunctionalism has contributed immensely to understanding European 
integration, it falls short of providing a definitive theory. According to A. J. R.
Groom,
. . . this sustained intellectual effort by scholars in the United States to 
elaborate and test neofunctionalism has been one of the major 
achievements in the study of international relations since the war. It is 
one of the principal reasons why integration theory has been a growth 
area in the discipline [;however,j ... the model is a good explanation of 
the Western European integration process of the fifties and early sixties, 
but it is less applicable to the more recent experience in Europe and 
elsewhere.54
Even Ernst Haas, one of the pioneers in developing neofunctionalism, declared 
integration theory (read neofunctionalism) “obsolescent” as a means of 
explaining “the behavior patterns actually displayed by governments active in
53 Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1963), 3-13.
54 A. J. R. Groom, “Neofunctionalism: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” Political Science 30, 
no. 1 (July 1978): 21.
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regional organizations.”55 Briefly, as the weaknesses will be examined more 
fully in Chapter II, it is sufficient to note that Haas attributes the obsolescence 
of neofunctionalism to the fact that several of its primary assumptions were no 
longer valid.56 Whilst the above theories are the most acknowledged theories in 
European integration,57 it has been demonstrated by a number of analysts (most 
spectacularly, Haas) that these models suffer from inadequacies in explaining the 
integration of the European Communities. In light of these concerns, there is a 
necessity for alternative explanations. This research proposes one such 
alternative: rational choice analysis, and the remainder of the chapter will
examine the suitability of this model for analysing the ECJ and the manner in 
which the Member States accept EC law into their domestic legal systems.
Towards a Rational Choice Analysis
Since its origin, the European Court of Justice has forged an impressive 
body of Community law and has formalised the basic doctrines of its 
jurisdiction, most notably, for this analysis, those of direct effect and supremacy. 
At different times throughout its lifetime, the Member States have displayed 
enthusiasm, apathy and hostility towards the Court with regard to its stated 
obligation of interpreting the Treaties. Yet, despite the periodic tensions 
between the Court and the Member States, European law has nonetheless
55 Ernst B. Haas, “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International 
Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 173.
56 Ibid.
57 For an overview of European integration theory, see Charles Pentland, International 
Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973).
20
functioned as a motor of European integration, as this study will demonstrate. 
The Court, however, has experienced limitations to its authority. In particular, 
the political significance of its decisions has often functioned to prevent the 
Court from actively engaging in the judicial activism of which it has so 
spectacularly been accused.58 Much of traditional integration theory focuses on 
the organic growth of the Communities along the neofunctionalist view that 
growth in one sector leads to growth in another. As Geoffrey Garrett points 
out, the idea of a seif-perpetuating Union alone does not adequately explain 
integration. According to Garrett:
Conventional theories of international cooperation are not well suited to 
analyzing the internal market. More importantly, analysts have tended 
to assume a functional orientation, arguing that the agreements and 
institutions which emerge represent uniquely efficient solutions to 
common problems. The lexicon of collective action problems is helpful 
in delineating both the general environment in which cooperative 
solutions may emerge and the general institutional forms that such 
solutions may take. This approach, however, downplays the 
fundamental political nature of most bargaining over cooperative 
agreements.59
More realistically, this bargaining between the actors (the Member States and 
even the Court itself) reflects a self-interest by all actors in which each attempts
to achieve the greatest payoff through rational decisions. In contrast to many 
integration theories which focus an inordinate amount of attention on 
institutional dynamics, one of the primary arguments of this research project is
58 See, for example, Hjalte Rasmussen, “Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial 
Policy for the European Court,” European Law Review 13 (1988): 28-38; and Patrick 
Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism (London: 
European Policy Forum, 1995).
59 Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European 
Community’s Internal Market,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 
559.
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that the most appropriate model of European integration vis-a-vis the Court and 
the Member States should focus on their interactions and upon the political
limitations under which the Court operates. To provide such an explanation,
this research will derive a game-theoretic, rational choice model which
incorporates such political concerns that undoubtedly face the Court. Before 
this particular approach is applied to the role of the European Court of Justice, 
however, the concept of rationality as it applies to rational choice theory and 
game theory will be defined to provide a foundation upon which to subsequently
construct the model.
The Philosophical Roots of Rationalism
The concept of rationality rests upon rich philosophical foundations, of 
which at least a rudimentary discussion is warranted. Without prior knowledge,
humans seek order through adding intellect to perception. Through perception 
and intellect, humans identify basic concepts of the natural world, including 
substance, quality, quantity, cause, space and time. Moreover, intellect allows 
humans to perceive themselves and those around them. The concepts of “I” and 
“mine” contrast with the concepts of “you” and “yours.” Thus, intellect adds an 
awareness of individuals and the larger world to human perceptions.60
Likewise, the concept of freedom proceeds from reason. With the 
appreciation of their individuality coupled with an understanding of the
60 Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 56-57.
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individuality of those around them, humans recognise their freedom of action. 
However, reason also functions to restrict freedom because from reason, 
humans recognise a moral law—one accepted by free will. Accordingly, 
humanity generally accepts this moral law since reason gives rise to a 
recognition of the legitimacy of others, and adherence to the moral law protects 
freedom, while violation of the moral law results in the enforcement of its 
penalties upon the violator.61
Although the concept of morality can be defined in fundamentally 
different manners, the “morality of individuality” as explained by Michael 
Oakeshott is particularly relevant to rationalism. Oakeshott explains that the 
individual possesses the “disposition to make choices for oneself to the 
maximum possible extent, choices concerning activities, occupations, beliefs, 
opinions, duties and responsibilities,” and morality is the approval of this “self­
determined conduct” for humans; hence, they strive towards “the conditions in 
which it may be enjoyed most fully.” Therefore, morality, at the lowest level, 
consists of following one’s own self-interests and fully respecting the right of 
others to do the same.62 In this manner, morality is linked to the respect for 
others that rationality demands.
By its very nature, Oakeshott’s explanation of morality cultivates a 
culture of individuality. According to Oakeshott, by the seventeenth century,
61 Ibid., 57.
62 Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: The Harvard Lectures, ed. 
Shirley Robin Letwin (London: Yale University Press, 1993), 20-21.
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“almost all ethical writing. . . begins with the hypothesis, not of a community of 
human beings, but of an individual human being choosing and pursuing his own 
directions of activities and belief.” Consequently, the task was to explain the 
nature of interaction among the separate humans and any obligations inherent in 
such interaction. Finally, Oakeshott summarises that “the moral law is to 
acknowledge each man as an independent personality and to regard him not as a 
means but as an end in himself.”63 Hence, such recognition of individuality and 
free will translates into the assumption that humans will pursue the actions
which best maximise their respective goals.
Rationalism: A Means to Co-operation
To fully understand rationality, the ideas of John Locke and Immanuel 
Kant and, subsequently, the social contract, in particular, deserve mention. 
Along with the concept of freedom, rationality implies the idea of the equality of 
humankind. Cicero acknowledges that “nothing is so one to one similar, so 
equivalent, as all of us are to each other.”64 Evidence of this equality lies in the 
sheer idea of power. Thomas Hobbes points out that humans have the same 
ability to kill each other, separated solely by who is stronger and who is weaker. 
Recognising this vulnerability, no doubt, provides compelling evidence for the 
equality of humanity. Such an appreciation of both freedom and equality forms 
the basis of society and its moral law,65 a moral law “radiating] from a source
63
64
65
Ibid., 21-23.
Donelan, 57.
Ibid.
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that transcends earthly power,” which human reason recognises the necessity to 
obey.66 John Locke explains that humanity is “equal and independent” and thus 
“ . . no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.” 
Immanuel Kant argues that freedom and equality are the very values that 
suggest humans should act towards others in the manner in which they desire to 
be treated themselves.67 Locke further argues that since men and women are 
reasonable, even without a common authority, or government, they live by the 
rules of reason.68 Hence, morality can be thought to flow from the, particularly 
Kantian, idea that humans reason it to be in their best interests to treat others in 
the manner in which they would like to be treated.
Hence, although rationalism concedes that man or woman is “manifestly 
a sinful and bloodthirsty creature,”69 the reliance of humanity on reason 
cultivates a “harmony of interests.”70 Rawls explains human nature as primarily 
self-serving and that one works “to achieve his own greatest good, to advance 
his rational ends as far as possible.”71 Rawls not only identifies the individual as 
an appropriate level of analysis for assuming that one works to achieve one’s 
greatest good, but he also argues that the same logic holds for groups.72 
Conflict, consequently, is a negative force since it impedes progress, and
66 Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, eds. Gabriele Wight and 
Brian Porter (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991), 14.
67 Donelan, 57.
68 Wight, International Theory, 14. .
69 Ibid., 13.
70 Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 54.
71 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 23.
72 Ibid., 23-24.
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rationalists argue that the progress of one ultimately has beneficial effects upon 
others. Thus, dissidence is “unreasonable” and “impoverishes” humanity.73 
Moreover, human beings, while possessing no objective obligations to one
another except those assumed in their best interests, refrain from injuring others, 
which cultivates the “harmony of interests.”74
Rationalism and International Relations
In a wider sense, the idea of a “harmony of interests” spills over into
international relations. Rationalism is immensely concerned with “the element 
of international intercourse” in the anarchic world.75 However, the rationalist 
does not adhere to a world government as compatible with the “harmony of 
interests.” Rather, diversity is celebrated as a means to protect freedom and 
equality since different societies each formulate their own designs for the 
protection of liberty. Likewise, the existence of many distinct societies guards 
against the seizure of a single world government by irrational humans.76
Moreover, an appreciation for the political process is inherent in the 
rationalist idea of governance. All members of the society have the
responsibility to ensure that freedom and equality are not impeded. Thus, each 
person makes rational choices to maximise his or her position within society vis- 
a-vis the social contract.77 While the members of society have the responsibility
73 Donelan, 58.
74 Ibid., 58-59.
75 Wight, International Theory, 13.
76 Donelan, 59.
77 Ibid., 60.
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to obey the moral law, they also possess the intellect to reason which actions 
they should pursue in order to achieve the greatest benefits.
Likewise, the separate actors within the international community make
rational choices to maximise their positions. For example, the reasoning that 
underlies the notion of a Prisoners’ Dilemma78 in game theory may be used to 
examine the decisions faced by states. In this well-known illustration, two
suspects are apprehended by the police and questioned separately concerning
the same crime. According to their behaviour under questioning, they can
expect certain outcomes. Should they both deny the allegations or remain silent
under questioning, they can expect that the maximum sentence they would
receive is one for vagrancy, which would result in 30 days in the local jail.
However, if both confess, they could expect to be sentenced for four to six
years, with the possibility of parole after the fourth year. Conversely, if one
remains silent while the other confesses they both committed the crime, the
confessor would receive a sentence of six months whilst the other would serve
eight years in the state penitentiary. Hence, the ideal situation (from the 
suspects’ point of view) would be to both remain silent under questioning or to 
deny the charges as this would result in a 30 day sentence. Yet, one important 
aspect of the Prisoners’ Dilemma model is that the prisoners are not allowed to
communicate. Without communication, one cannot have confidence that the
other will remain silent. The prisoners, therefore, reason that, by confessing, 
they will limit their sentences to a maximum of six years, rather than risking the
78 For a basic examination of Prisoners’ Dilemma, see William Poundstone, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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possibility of serving eight years. By doing so, they forego the possibility of the 
optimal sentence (30 days) and are thus guaranteed a more unfortunate fate as a 
result of the uncertainty inherent in the rules of the game.79
Using the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a model, states--faced with 
international anarchy and competing interests--act in a manner that will bring the 
greatest returns. Furthermore, states, directed by their separate self-interests, 
do co-operate, if collective actions also maximise their position.80 Thus, 
rationalism does not solely regard international relations as a zero-sum game. 
Rather, it is assumed in rationalism that states seek the greatest possible payoff, 
whether it can be obtained unilaterally or through international co-operation.
At the heart of this whole argument is exchange theory,81 which 
concentrates on scarcity and competition between rational actors. Such logic 
offers a justification for international institutions since states agree to co-operate 
with one another only for potential gains. The proliferation of international 
institutions suggests that apparent benefits are derived from membership in such 
organisations. However, the costs involved—chiefly compromising sovereignty­
-must be weighed against the potential benefits. While even a minor retreat of 
state autonomy as the prerequisite to membership in an international institution 
often proves difficult for states to accept, international organisations provide
79 The Prisoners’ Dilemma illustration is adapted from James E. Dougherty and Robert L. 
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive 
Survey, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 512-513.
80 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and 
the Neoliberalism Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 158-159.
81 For a discussion of exchange theory, see Anthony Heath, Rational Choice and Social 
Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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stimuli for co-operation by limiting transaction costs and minimising uncertainty. 
Specifically, international organisations foment co-operation by providing 
channels of communication and institutionalising networks of interaction
between member countries. Before these issues can be further explored, it is 
necessary to examine the pertinence of game theory to international relations. 
This will enable us to subsequently construct the alternative model based on 
rational choice assumptions for explaining the ECJ and the reception of EC law
by the Member States.
The Relevance of Game Theory in International Relations
As states vie for an elevated position in world politics, each individual 
government can be described as being engaged in a political and economic game 
for superiority. A game-theoretic analysis of such behaviour has its roots in the 
pioneering work by Zermelo 1913, Borel in 1921, von Neumann in 1928, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 and scholars at Princeton University during 
the Second World War.82 Von Neumann and Morgenstern have shown “that 
for any rational decision-maker there must exist some way of assigning utility 
numbers to the various possible outcomes that he cares about, such that he 
would always choose the option that maximizes his expected utility,” a central 
assumption of game theory.83 Myerson defines game theory “as the study of 
mathematical models of conflict and co-operation between intelligent rational
82 Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 1.
83 Ibid., 2-3. Actually, Bernoulli established the initial groundwork for von Neuman and 
Morgenstern two hundred years earlier.
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decision-makers.”84 With regard to international relations, these models can be 
used to analyse the games countries play to achieve the greatest political and 
economic positions. Underlying this whole approach is the idea that the game is 
“any social situation involving two or more individuals,” while those engaged in 
the game are known as the players, who are assumed to be both rational and 
intelligent to the extent that they make “decisions consistently in pursuit of. . . 
[their] own objectives.”85
To fully understand game theory, it is necessary to establish the basic 
assumption of instrumental rationality. In short, instrumental rationality implies 
that individuals have preferences over particular choices and that decisions are 
regarded as rational because the individuals select the choices which appear to 
maximise their preferences. Heap and Varoufakis explain that “rationality is
cast in a means-end framework with the task of selecting the most appropriate 
means for achieving certain ends (i.e. preference satisfaction); and for this 
purpose, preferences (or ‘ends’) must be coherent in only a weak sense that we 
must be able to talk about satisfying them more or less.”86 While game theory is 
characteristically associated with instrumental rationality (decisions of groups or 
institutions are the results of bargaining between individuals),87 it is also possible 
to identify other actors, such as governments, institutions and organisations, as 
the level of analysis for game theory. As long as an actor has a consistent set of
84 Ibid., 1.
85 Ibid., 2.
86 Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, Game Theory: A Critical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 5.
87 See Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1.
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preferences, it is possible to assume instrumental rationality.88 Since this 
research will derive a model to examine European integration and the European 
Court of Justice based on game-theoretic assumptions, it is necessary to explore 
such conventions of game theory more thoroughly.
Decision-making in Game Theory
Implicit in game theory is the notion that the players are independent 
although their conduct carries ramifications for the entire group. Hence, the 
actions of one player are interpreted not only according to that actor’s desired 
goals, but also in relation to the entire group. Since the actor is faced with a 
series of separate choices, it is possible to denote the set of possible actions as 
A, where az represents one of the possible actions within the set. Thus, the 
possible conduct of the actor is represented where A = {ai , a2, . . . az, . . . }. 
Finally, it should be noted that each action within the set A is both exhaustive, 
in the sense that one action must be chosen, and mutually exclusive, with 
respect that only one action can be selected.89
Players engage in purposeful actions to produce desired outcomes. This 
will subsequently be illustrated with regard to the ECJ and the Member States; 
however, for the moment, it is necessary to further explore the notation of such 
an approach. As with actions, outcomes can also be represented by a set, where
88 Heap and Varoufakis, 5. See also note in Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies 
of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1994), 16.
89 Ordeshook, 2-3.
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O = {oi, o2, . . . , oz, . . . ). In such a set, a particular outcome is represented 
by oz, and, as with actions, outcomes within the set are both mutually exclusive 
(only one element in the set corresponds with the outcome) and exhaustive (the 
set must contain all possible outcomes, of which one must occur). Additionally, 
the data in both sets A and O can be represented geometrically. Through 
plotting the contents of sets A and O graphically, conclusions may be drawn 
upon the courses players pursue.90
While the descriptions of sets A and O illustrate the range of decisions 
faced by players, it is necessary to know the nature in which A and O are linked. 
Providing the correlation between the action and outcome, and ultimately 
answering which outcome results when a particular action is undertaken, is the 
state of nature. In short, the state of nature refers to all the possible factors that 
surround the decisions of players as they deliberate their actions. As with
actions and outcomes, the state of nature can also be represented by a set,
where S = {si, S2, . . . , sz, . . . }. Once again, the contents of set S are both 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive.91 With regard to international relations, 
adopting such notation allows a particular model to account for a range of 
different political circumstances. Taken together, the sets O, A and S provide a 
useful means to predict the courses of action players adopt and the outcomes 
that are thus produced. This methodology lies at the foundation of the model
90 Ibid., 4-5. For an explanation and example of graphing actions and outcomes, see pages 
4-9.
91 Ibid., 9.
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which this research will derive in Chapter II to analyse the European Court of
Justice’s role in European integration.
As can be assumed from the above discussion, the actions of one player
often affect the others, determining whether it will be a zero-sum or a non-zero- 
sum game. Specifically, a zero-sum game contains both a definite winner and a
definite loser, since the gains and losses must equal zero. In terms of state 
behaviour, the concept of a zero-sum game can be conveniently illustrated in the
case of a military conquest in which one side gains territory at the expense of 
the other. While one might argue that the casualties sustained appear to negate 
the idea of a zero-sum, game theory differentiates between the payoff, or the 
“value attached by a player to an outcome,” and the outcome, which can be 
described as either “win, lose, or draw.”92
Conversely, there are games in which one player’s gains do not equal 
another’s losses. These non-zero-sum games involve two or more players and 
can be characterised by co-operation or conflict or by both. At each step of the 
game, all players might make gains, and the end of the game could bring gains 
for each player. Frequently, non-zero-sum games are characterised by a variety 
of payoffs, which sometimes vary considerably. With regard to international 
relations, such non-zero-sum games may occur when several countries enter a 
co-operative arrangement in which they may all receive benefits. The nature of 
these payoffs is related to the level of either co-operation which is achieved or
92 Dougherty and PfallzgrafT, 508.
33
conflict that exists between the players.93 Having reviewed the fundamental 
elements of game theory, it is now appropriate to examine its relevance to the 
European Court of Justice.
Game Theory as a Means of Analysing the European Court
Since the theoretical framework of a particular game can be designed to
mirror the structure of the institutional framework in which the ECJ and the
Member States interact, game theory is able to reflect the constraints of the
relations between the Court and the Member States. Moreover, Schlenker and
Bonoma have noted that game theory embodies four major similarities to 
reality.94 First, each situation holds several alternatives for each actor, and these 
choices are finite, which implies the actor must choose one of the alternatives. 
Second, each player can reasonably estimate the impact of his or her decisions 
on certain matters; however, he or she cannot know the eventual outcomes the
interaction might produce. Thus, the actor must pursue the action which 
appears to maximise his or her goals. Third, the decisions of one player are 
directly influenced by the actions of others, which explains the existence of 
uncertainty amongst the players. This implies that the actions of each player are 
largely determined “by the intersection of the behavioral strategies elected by 
each.” Fourth, rules are established to restrict the behaviour of the players vis­
93 Ibid., 511.
94 Barry R. Schlenker and Thomas B. Bonoma, “Fun and Games,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 22, no. 1 (March 1978): 11. These four assertions form the basis for a later 
discussion of the suitability of evaluating the interactions between the Member States and 
the ECJ through game theory.
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a-vis the group. Thus, the actors’ choices of action are further limited by either
the formal or informal rules or norms that characterise their interaction.
Through sharing these basic—yet important—qualities, games and society can be 
regarded as quite similar, and thus game theory can go a long way to explaining 
relations amongst states.95 More specifically, the interactions between the ECJ 
and the Member States are reflective of these four propositions since they are 
engaged in a two stage process in which the Member States initially determine 
the broad guidelines for European Community law, while the ECJ is responsible 
for filling in the gaps of this broad blueprint.
In evaluating the merits of rational choice theory, the European Court of
Justice provides an interesting study. Geoffrey Garrett has employed a 
particular rational choice model for examining the Court,96 and while the current 
research will outline the weaknesses and deviate from Garrett’s specific 
assumptions and reasoning in Chapter II, Garrett’s overall approach is 
nonetheless appropriate as a means to examine the European Court of Justice. 
Hence, an examination of Garrett’s justification for employing such an approach 
is warranted. According to Garrett, the laws of the European Communities do
exert a more significant constraint upon the Member States than most other 
types of international law. Garrett states that legal scholars may argue that the 
importance of EC law has come as a result of inattention by the Member States’ 
governments. Correspondingly, Garrett cites Eric Stein’s speculation that 
politicians have regarded most of the legal decisions within the development of
95
96
Ibid.
Garrett, “International Cooperation.”
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the European Union as too “technical” and thus the responsibility of legal 
experts, who have enjoyed great latitude in the formation of legal principles 
within the Communities.97 According to Stein, “Although all member 
governments have a legal right to be notified of any proceedings referred to the 
Court under Article 177 and to state their views, relatively few have taken 
advantage of the opportunity, and they did so in most instances only if their 
national law or other interest was directly involved.”98 Garrett further explains 
that legal experts may argue that the benefits of modifying European law did not 
merit the costs; however, Garrett correctly points out that this explanation is 
less than completely persuasive since the Member States had the opportunity to 
adjust Community law during the negotiations of the Single European Act and
did not choose to do so.99
In response to the arguments by legal scholars, Garrett argues that a 
desire by the separate Member States to maintain the EC legal system suggests 
a greater explanation for the importance of, and reverence for, EC law by the 
Member States. Thus, this line of reasoning regards the system of European
law to be “consistent with the interests of member states,” as it allows for
“monitoring” of members and helps to alleviate the “incomplete contracting 
problems confronting the EC members.”100 Garrett further argues that contrary
97 Ibid., 556.
98 Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution” American 
Journal of International Law 75 (1981): 26.
99 Garrett, “International Cooperation,” 556.
100 Ibid., 556-557. “Incomplete contracting problems” arise as a result of the general nature 
of the EU Treaties, and the Court provides a means for equitable decisions to be reached 
on issues not specifically outlined in the Treaties.
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to conventional analysis of co-operation, the Member States will not necessarily 
establish a set of absolute rules from the beginning and that adherence or 
violation of rules will not be transparent.101
Even though Member States might prefer to ignore certain European 
policies, the fact that the rules of the Communities constrain the actions of the 
whole group for the collective benefit commands loyalty. Thus, the actions of a 
free-rider would be apparent and would result in punishment by the complying
Members through the organs of the Communities. Hence, states are motivated 
by the threat of penalties to comply with the rules of the European 
Communities. However, the uncertainty and complexity that characterises the
Communities, given their rather young age and broad scope of responsibilities,
would, in the absence of some regulatory body, possibly have a detrimental
impact upon the stability of the single market. Furthermore, states would face 
the great temptation of cheating if there were no monitoring body.102
The European Court of Justice acts as such a monitoring body, which 
greatly enhances the legitimacy of the European Communities. Initially, the ECJ
functions as a monitor of the actions by the Members, identifying breaches of
EC law. Thus, the threat of public rebuke of transgressor states by the Court
deters cheating. Likewise, the drafting of national law which contradicts EC
regulations or the failure to comply with commitments would most likely be met
with embarrassing public rebuke for the violating country by the Court.
101
102
Ibid., 557. 
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According to Garrett, although the SEA recognises the possibility of Member 
States “passing statutes that transparently violate their EC commitments,” it is 
deterred by “the ability of the EC legal system to paint scarlet letters on 
transgressors,”103
Besides its monitoring role of the trade between the Member States, the
ECJ also functions to mitigate “the incomplete contracting problems” in the
Communities. To explain, as the Communities are built on a foundation of 
general principles, rules and regulations, the legal framework is not equipped to 
address every possible issue that might arise. While the Single European Act 
recognises the responsibility of the Council of Ministers to pass directives aimed
at adding specifics to the broad framework of European law, the national courts 
of the Member States and the ECJ assume the role of interpreting these
“guidelines” from the Council. Garrett concludes: “The EC legal system 
provides a mechanism through which the types of general agreements about the
rules of the game supplied by the EC treaties and internal market directives can 
be applied to the myriad interactions that constitute the EC economy.”104
Additionally, Garrett argues that the ECJ behaves in such a manner to 
add legitimacy to its actions despite its “institutional weaknesses.” Thus, the
ECJ appears to mirror the collective interests of the Member States. 
Accordingly, if the Court wishes to maintain its “authority, legitimacy, and 
independence,” it must render decisions that will most likely not be overturned.
103
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Ibid., 557-558.
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Therefore, the actions of the judicial system become “political,” as it is aware 
that intervention by “other political actors” could undermine its legitimacy 
should it render decisions that are not amenable to the principal authorities. 
Due to the facts that the ECJ lacks a written constitution and is composed of 
justices nominated or selected by the Member States and who face re­
appointment every six years, “the court must be fearful . . . [of] a coordinated 
attack on its behavior and competencies—through systematic noncompliance or, 
at the extreme, through a treaty revision.”105 Garrett also points out that “the 
Court of Justice is. . . a strategic actor that takes into account the anticipated 
responses of national governments before it decides cases brought before it. 
The court will likely rule against governments in cases where it expects the 
government ultimately to accept the decision.”106 Although this research will 
deviate from Garrett’s model, addressing its weaknesses in the next chapter, it
also recognises the suitability of analysing the European Court through a 
rational choice approach. Specifically, the two-level, bargaining structure which
characterises the dichotomy between the ECJ and the Member States will form
the basis of the model which will be derived in the next chapter.
Rational Choice and the Court: A Review and Preview
This study argues that traditional theories of integration have fallen short
in their explanations and that the use of rational choice analysis may offer insight
105 Ibid., 558.
106 Geoffrey Garrett, “The politics of legal integration in the European Union,” International 
Organization 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 180-181.
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into a greater understanding of the ECJ’s role and impact on the process of 
integration in Europe. First, this approach recognises the existence of several, 
self-interested players. Both the Court itself and the separate national 
governments vie for the best possible outcome despite the fact that the rational 
decisions motivated by their respective goals do not necessarily translate into 
their preferred outcomes. Furthermore, the Court works to guard its interests, 
which is in keeping with the idea of the Court as a strategic actor. Thus, the 
Court and the Member States are engaged in a bargaining process whereby the
Member States and the Court interact with each other, attempting to secure 
their respective aims through the Communities. Second, the Court’s 
“democratic deficit,”107 coupled with apathy on the part of the Member States 
toward the actions of the Court, might explain the ability of the ECJ to make 
such great advances in integration. Third, the Court has actively sought to 
further integration in its judgements, which plays the additional role of 
functioning to increase the ECJ’s legitimacy within Europe.
The task of this research project is to examine the bargaining and the
outcomes that lead to European integration with respect to the Court and the
Member States. Rational choice theory recognises that both national
governments and the Court have self-interests that guide their behaviours. 
Realistically, the national governments and the European Union institutions are 
engaged in a struggle for the achievement of their respective goals.
Consequently, the application of game theory seems to present a favourable
107 See, for example, Brigitte Boyce, “The Democratic Deficit of the European 
Communities,” Parliamentary Affairs 46, no. 4 (October 1993): 458-477.
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means to examine integration since it is able to capture the essence of this 
bargaining. In such a game, the Member States and the Court represent the 
players while the process by which integration is either advanced or hampered 
represents the game. This study will argue that such an analysis seems to 
provide the emphasis on the roles of the states that is overlooked by 
functionalism, neofunctionalism and federalism.
To this purpose, this research will first concentrate on establishing the 
appropriate rational choice, game-theoretic model for evaluating the Court, the 
Member States and integration. Second, this model will be tested against Court 
cases, examined vis-a-vis the interactions between the Court and the Member
States and evaluated in terms of the goals of both the Court and the Member 
States. Thus, the next chapter will focus on the development of a particular 
game as a model for evaluating the relationship between the Court and the 
Member States. Empirical testing will then evaluate the validity of this model 
and conclusions will be drawn on its appropriateness in evaluating the European 
Court of Justice and its role in European integration.
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Chapter II
Towards a Rational Choice Analysis of the European Court of Justice
Despite a growing body of literature that characterises the Court of
Justice of the European Communities as a chief actor in the process of 
European integration,1 there is little agreement as to the manner in which the 
Court pursues such integration. This chapter will initially examine two theories
of integration: neofunctionalism and neorationalism. After identifying their 
respective weaknesses, an alternative rational choice model, which will be
termed the architect’s compromise, will be derived. The architect’s compromise 
model will then be tested on two landmark cases, Cassis de Dijon2 3and 
Francovich v. Italy* to determine its suitability in explaining the role of the 
European Court of Justice. The chapter will then conclude that the architect’s
compromise model does provide a more rigorous explanation than previous
models.
A vast amount of the literature cited in this research project examines the Court’s role in 
integration in some manner. Among others, the following works address integration and 
the Court exclusively: Maurice Lagrange, “The Court of Justice as a Factor in European 
Integration,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 15 (1966-67): 709-725; Spyros 
Pappas, “The Court of Justice of the European Communities and European Integration,” 
Europaische Integration und Offentliche Ferwaltung, ed. Reiner Buchegger (Vienna: 
Orac, 1992), 67-74; and Hjalte Rasmussen, “The Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and the Process of Integration,” Federalisme et Cours 
Supremes/Federalism and Supreme Courts, ed. Edmond Orban et al. (Montreal: 
Les Presses de l’Universite de Montreal, 1991), 199-237.
2 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, European 
Court Reports 1 (1979): 649-675; or Common Market Law Reports 3 (1979): 494-515.
3 Cases C-6/90 & C9/90, Andrea Francovich and Another v. The Republic (Italy), Common
Market Law Reports 2 (1993): 66-116; or European Court Reports (1991): I-5357-I- 5418. . - , .
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Survey of Theories
In her survey of the contending theories which examine the role of the 
European Court of Justice in European integration, Anne-Marie Slaughter terms 
one approach as “interactive” (or “contextual”) theory and subsequently defines 
its purpose as “to locate the activities of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the national courts in a broader political context.”4 Such an approach is 
particularly promising since it combines both law and politics, and hence is more 
reflective of reality. Viewing the European Court of Justice as “catalyst: of 
integration, of disintegration, [or] of equilibrium,” Slaughter recognises three 
“sub-strands” of such interactive theory: “traditional legal and political theory 
concerning the role of courts in conjunction with other political institutions,” 
neofunctionalist integration theory and rational choice analysis.5 While the first 
sub-strand consists of an impressive literature based on traditional political and 
legal theory and combines both prescription and analysis,6 it does not offer a
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “New Directions in Legal Research on the European 
Community,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (September 1993): 391.
5 Ibid., 393-395.
6 Ibid., 393. See, among others, M. Cappelletti, A. Seccombe, and J. Weiler, eds.,
Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1985); Joseph H. H. Weiler, “Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions 
Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental 
Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities,” Washington Law 
Review 61, no. 1 (January 1986): 1103-1142; J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of 
Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 1991): 2403-2483; Joseph Weiler, “The 
Community System: the Duel Character of Supranationalism,” Yearbook of European 
Law 1 (1981): 267-306; J. H. H. Weiler, “Journey to an Unknown Destination: A 
Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political 
Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1993): 417- 446; 
Joseph Weiler, “Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law 
Relevant?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (1982): 39-56; Eric Stein, “On
Divided-Power Systems: Adventures in Comparative Law,” Legal Issues of European 
Integration 1 (1983): 27-39; and Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a 
Transnational Constitution,” American Journal of International Law 75 (January 1981): 
1-27. ’
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comprehensive model of integration despite its value in terms of description. 
Partly because of its concern with prescription, the first sub-strand often 
overlooks actual political events, relying instead on theoretic arguments which 
have not necessarily been validated. Thus, this present study instead focuses on
the latter two explanations since these have formulated testable models which
have been examined against actual events. Furthermore, the present research 
will argue that although neither neofunctionalism as applied to the Court by 
Mattli and Slaughter nor Garrett and Weingast’s neorational model adequately 
explains the ECJ’s role in the integration process, these models nevertheless 
capture important aspects of integration. The purpose of this research is thus to 
amalgamate the positive attributes of these competing models in the hope of
providing the foundation of a theory of integration which explains both the role
and the actions of the Court more precisely.
Neofunctionalism and Neorationalism
Given the sagacious attempts to better understand the Court, a recent
debate has emerged between the proponents of neofunctionalism and rational 
choice as to the better alternative for explaining legal integration in the 
European Communities.7 Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter have
7 Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie (Burley) Slaughter are the chief proponents of a 
neofunctionalist explanation of the ECJ’s contribution to European integration (in 
addition to the article listed above, see Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe 
Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,” International Organization 
47, no. 1 [Winter 1993]: 41-76; and Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Law and 
Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett,” International Organization 49, no. 
1 [Winter 1995]: 183- 190.), while Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast have laid the 
foundation for a rational choice explanation (see Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast,
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ingeniously resurrected the once tarnished theory of neofunctionalism as a 
means of examining the role of the European Court of Justice in European 
integration. Drawing upon the ideas of Ernst B. Haas and other 
neofunctionalist pioneers, Mattli and Slaughter contend that while 
neofunctionalism might have been discredited as a means of explaining
European integration at large, such a theory was never applied to the Court. 
They argue further that a closer study indicates that “neofunctionalism is in its 
element” in terms of explaining legal integration.8 Defining legal integration as 
“the gradual penetration of EC law into the domestic law of its member states,” 
Burley and Mattli cite both formal and substantive penetration of Community
law into the laws of the Member States as evidence of neofunctionalism.9
Specifically, Burley and Mattli argue that formal penetration, both in the form of 
“supranational legal acts” and in the institution of European citizenship; and 
substantive penetration, in the form of economic spillovers into diverse social 
and political areas, reflect the Court’s “adoption of principles of interpretation
that further the uniformity and comprehensiveness of the community legal 
system.”10 On the contrary, the current research project will argue that such 
encroachment of EC law simply does not occur as the national legal systems
have vigorously guarded their own jurisdictions, as is clearly illustrated by the
“Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal 
Market,” Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, eds. 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane [Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1993], 173­
206; Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The 
European Community’s Internal Market,” International Organization 46, no. 2, [Spring 
1992]: 533-560; and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Politics of Legal Integration in the European 
Union,” International Organization 49, no. 1, [Winter 1995]: 171-181.)
8 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 51.
9 Ibid., 43.
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Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), which will 
be examined in Chapter VII.
According to Mattli and Slaughter, neofunctionalism correctly identifies 
the actors, their motives, their roles and the outcomes of their actions. In
addition to the Member States and the Court, Mattli and Burley argue that a
host of individuals and organisations above and below the states must all be
examined in light of the European integration process. Hence, Mattli and 
Slaughter argue that integration cannot be understood without studying the 
personalities involved—including the various judges, academics and politicians— 
in the European project. (Conversely, this research project will argue that while 
this approach is useful as a descriptive device, it renders analysis difficult at best 
and quite possibly unmanageable.) Neofunctionalism identifies the self-interests 
of the actors as the motivation for integration.11 Mattli and Burley further 
suggest that integration is attributed to functional spillover, or economic growth 
in one sector leading to growth in another; political spillover, or adaptation of 
political values and expectations as a result of sectoral integration; and the 
upgrading of the common interests which functions to stimulate compromise 
through international organisations (and thus increase the prestige of such 
organisations). Finally, neofunctionalism demands that these processes occur
under the “mask” of “technical” or “uncontroversial” operations rather than as 
political developments.12 Hence, a neofunctionalist would argue that integration 
occurs not because it moves in a series of notable and distinct steps. Instead, it
" Ibid., 53-54.
12 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 55-56.
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is a pattern of low profile alterations concealed by a perception that such 
decisions are purely technical in nature.
However, despite Mattli and Slaughter’s thorough discussion, their 
advocacy of neofunctionalism nevertheless suffers from four main weaknesses. 
First, this study will prove that neofunctionalism underestimates both the power
and the role of the Member States in the integration process and, instead,
overestimates the impact of other actors. Second, this study will argue that
neofunctionalism confuses the results of rational choices regarding integration
with the concepts of functional and political spillovers. Third, the current
research will further argue that Mattli and Slaughter’s use of neofunctionalism
suffers from one of the very weaknesses that largely discredited the theory in the
1970s: neofunctionalism implies that a particular institutional outcome is the 
result of integration. Fourth, this study will demonstrate that Mattli and 
Slaughter’s assertion that the Court hides behind the mask of law in its thrust to 
integration,13 while a deceptively cogent explanation, exaggerates the perceived 
concealing quality of law and evades the fact that law is, in fact, essentially a 
political issue. These weaknesses underline the deficiencies of
neofunctionalism: hence, a more appropriate model is warranted.
In contrast, Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast reject the claims of
neofunctionalism and present an impressive case for analysing integration 
through the lens of game theory.14 Challenging the notion that international co­
13 Ibid., 72-73.
14 See previously cited works by Garrett and Weingast.
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operative arrangements inevitably reflect optimal settlements,15 Garrett instead 
argues that it is often difficult to identify perfect solutions among several
countries and that asymmetric patterns of power may play a greater role in
international co-operation than acknowledged by the traditional literature. In 
presenting his case, Garrett argues that “studies that concentrate solely on the
shared interests of states and ignore the conflicts between them will be 
inadequate.”16
Garrett and Weingast’s game-theoretic analysis of European integration 
is characterised by “ideas, interests, and institutions.” To begin, Garrett and
Weingast modify the traditional rational choice approach, recognising that 
games do not invariably offer a single optimal strategy and that institutions may 
play a large role in defining ambiguity. To this end, Garrett and Weingast point 
out that ideas may serve as “focal points” in stimulating the motivations of
states to co-operate and argue that “some solutions are inherently more likely to 
emerge because the actors believe that others will choose them too.”17
15 Geoffrey Garrett refers to the body of literature on co-operation in general and notes
particularly the following: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983); Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); David Kreps et al., “Rational Cooperation 
in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27 (August 
1982): 245-52; Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987); Robert O. Keohane, Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord 
in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Paul 
Milgrom, Douglas North and Barry Weingast, “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of 
Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” 
Economics and Politics 2 (March 1990): 1-23; Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 
Economica 4 (November 1937): 386-405; and Oliver Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985). Garrett, “International 
Cooperation,” 534.
16 Ibid., 534-535.
17 Garrett and Weingast, 182.
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Similarly, the Court functions as a mechanism for providing “solutions” to the 
problems not explicitly addressed by the Treaties. Furthermore, the authors 
suggest that, juxtaposed against their ideas for institutional solutions, the 
interests of Member States help determine the manner in which collective action 
is characterised either by the wishes of the stronger Member States 
(asymmetrical organisations of states) or by shared ideological focal points— 
(more symmetrical organisations of states)--in Garrett’s example, completion of 
the internal market. Finally, authority is granted to institutions—in this case the 
ECJ—for whom the focal points of Member States’ self-interests and shared
ideas suggest likely mechanisms for achieving collective goals.
As with Mattli and Slaughter, Garrett and Weingast’s model fails to
offer a cogent, rigorous explanation for the role of the Court in European
integration. Specifically, neorationalism as described above does not fully 
recognise the real power the Court has assumed in the integration process. In 
particular, Garrett and Weingast’s analysis appears to relegate the Court to 
being merely a tool of the Member States, whose only strategic goal is to retain
its legitimacy through careful consideration of the possible repercussions a case 
might have before handing down a decision. As the present analysis will prove,
this falls short of recognising the fact that the Court has been a relatively 
autonomous body using its mandate to create a more integrated Europe through 
establishing such fundamental principles as direct effect and supremacy.
Thus, while neofunctionalism and neo rationalism offer fruitful points of
departure for the development of a more coherent theory of integration, this
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research will argue that neither offers a decisive account of the role of the Court 
in European integration vis-a-vis the Member States. Following a more 
thorough critique of both Mattli and Slaughter’s neofunctionalist model and 
Garrett and Weingast’s neorationalist hypothesis, an alternative model will be 
presented in an attempt to explain the process of European integration in regard 
to the interactions of the European Court of Justice and the Member States. In 
particular, such a detailed discussion of the respective shortcomings of 
neofunctionalism and Garrett and Weingast’s brand of neorationalism should
reveal the necessity for an alternative model. With this in mind, this analysis
now turns to an examination of the deficiencies of neofunctionalism.
Neofunctionalist Deficiencies
Although Mattli and Slaughter are correct in arguing that numerous 
personalities at the sub- and supra-state level exert an influence on integration, 
these individuals and organisations only exert pressure on the preferences of 
Member States and the Court; they do not have the power to make the actual
decisions that lead to either integration or disintegration. Mattli and Slaughter 
state “just as neofunctionalism predicts, the drivers of this process are 
supranational and subnational actors pursuing their own self-interests within a 
politically insulated sphere.”18 According to such logic, one is led to believe 
that lawyers and judges are able to increase the prestige of their profession 
through pushing integration with no significant resistance. On the contrary, the
18 Burley and Maltli, “Political Theory,” 43.
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Member States have functioned as the agents of integration through drafting the 
Treaties, bargaining within the Council by their respective ministers and making 
decision regarding integration in the Inter-Governmental Conferences. The case 
of Francovich v. Italy™ which will be subsequently discussed in greater detail, 
illustrates the argument that the Court acts to bring about the European 
Communities according to the aims of the Member States as expressed in the 
Treaties. Basing its decision on Articles 5 and 189 (EEC), the Court found in 
Francovich v. Italy that Member States were liable in the failure of enacting
directives and must compensate individuals for any adverse results of this
failure. In short, the Court’s decision can be interpreted as “filling in the gaps” 
(of the Treaties) necessary to the efficient functioning of the Communities. 
Thus, as the Member States committed themselves to the goals enumerated in
the separate Treaties, they have de facto committed themselves to the measures 
necessary for the maintenance of such a common market. Regardless of the 
facts that individuals may bring cases before the Court, lawyers argue the cases 
and judges make the decisions, the Member States have already designated 
certain authority to the Court; its decisions merely fill in the gaps. Thus, the 
true process of integration is initiated by the Member States—for example, 
through drafting the Treaties, participating in the Inter-Governmental 
Conferences, appointing Commissioners, working in the Council: the Court can 
merely interpret what has already been written into law by the Member States. *
19 See Francovich v. Italy.
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The second criticism of Mattli and Slaughter’s argument focuses on their
assertion that functional and political spillovers lie at the foundation of the 
process of integration. Mattli and Slaughter assert that functional spillovers 
account for the considerable expansion of European law from “dominantly
economic” areas into diverse social issues including “health and safety at work,
entitlements to social welfare benefits, mutual recognition of educational and 
professional qualifications, and . . . political participation rights.”20 While the 
argument for spillovers at first glance appears to offer a comprehensive 
explanation of integration, a closer study of the Court reveals that integration is 
not adequately explained by spillover logic. Although the term “spillover” can
be used as a descriptive term for expansion, such a use does little to provide an 
explanation of the processes that lead to decisions by the Court regarding 
integration. According to Mattli and Slaughter, spillovers occur when “the 
jurisdiction of the authorities charged with implementing. . . [an agreed], . . 
objective will expand as necessary to address whatever obstacles that stand in 
the way.”21 On the contrary, “the ECJ cannot initiate; it can only rule on the 
cases brought before it, which explains the haphazard ways in which
fundamentals have so far been elucidated.”22 In their examination of Schlieker
v. High Authority of the ECSC (1963), D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok point out
that “the Court is the creature of the Community Treaties and so its jurisdiction 
derives exclusively from those Treaties. . . , [I]n interpreting the Treaties the 
Court is bound to adhere strictly to the provisions of the text, and. . . it has no
20 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 66.
21 Ibid., 65.
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power other than that conferred by the Treaty.”22 3 Thus, there is a clear 
contradiction between Mattli and Slaughter’s and Lasok and Lasok’s 
interpretation of jtnisdiction. Specifically, Mattli and Slaughter appear to 
attribute power to the Court to unilaterally extend its jurisdiction; however, as 
has been illustrated, the Court’s jurisdiction is defined by the Treaties and can 
only be altered by the Member States themselves. The present research argues
instead that the process of integration is a product of the bargaining between
both the Member States and the Court.
Moreover, such an assertion that Community law is organic in nature is
simply not reflected in reality. Although employing a teleological approach to 
decision-making allows the Court to formulate judgements which strengthen the 
integrity of European law, the German reaction to the Maastricht Treaty,24 25for 
example, unambiguously proves that the Court of Justice cannot extend its 
jurisdiction. To explain, the German Federal Constitutional Court (the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht} held that Kompetenz-Kompetenz f5 or the authority 
for determining authority, rests with the Member States. Hence, the ECJ is
22 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics of the European Union 
1973-95 (London: Fontana Press, 1995), 369.
23 D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, 6th ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1994), 251. According to Lasok and Lasok, in Schlieker v. High 
Authority of the ECSC, the plaintiff maintained that she had sustained a loss due to the 
inactivity of the High Authority and argued, “upon analogy with German municipal law,” 
the Court had a “residual jurisdiction to enable it to protect the interests of individuals 
where the Treaty texts are silent”; however, the Advocate General stated that “the Court 
can define the limits of its supra-national legal protection only by using the text of the 
Treaty and not by following national law.” See Case 12/63, Marga Schlieker v. High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Common Market Law Reports 
(1963): 281-288.
24 Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union 
Treaty, Common Market Law Reports 1 (1994): 57-108.
25 The issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the ECJ is fundamental to this research and will 
be addressed throughout the project, most notably in Chapters III and VII.
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practically and legally incapable of expanding its own jurisdiction. Moreover, 
such ultra vires acts (actions which are outside the jurisdiction of a particular 
entity) that neofunctionalism labels “spillovers” have also been prohibited by the 
German Federal Court. Juliane Kokott summarises the position of the German
court:
. . . problems arise when European organs, including the ECJ, overstep 
the competences attributed to them by the founding Treaties. The 
democratically elected German parliament consented to Community 
Acts covered by the Treaties; ultra vires Acts not covered by the will of 
the German Parliament violate the principle of democracy. The Federal 
Constitutional Court as the guarantor of basic rights takes over the role 
of defending the people against undemocratic ultra vires Acts of the 
Communities. These are now directly subject to review by the Federal 
Constitutional Court.26
Given these political and legal realities, it is difficult indeed to argue that 
European law grows organically from previous acts of the Court. Instead, this 
research project argues that European law can only develop within the 
parameters set by the Member States in the Treaties.
A third criticism of neofunctionalism concerns its assumption that a 
particular institutional outcome is the result of integration. In the very work 
which declared the “obsolescence” of regional integration theories, Haas argues
that the assumption that regional integration will result in a particular
institutional outcome runs counter to reality in the case of Western Europe. 
Haas argues that unless neofunctionalism can accommodate the emergence of
“various end states,” then it becomes irrelevant, and instead, “regional
26 Juliane Kokott, “German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration II,” 
European Public Law 2, no. 3 (1996): 434.
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integration processes will result in the creation of independence patterns with 
extra-regional forces and actors.”27 Interestingly, Mattli and Slaughter quote 
Haas’s earlier (pro-integration theory) writings to provide a definition of 
neofunctionalism which clearly suggest that the final product of regional 
integration is “a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”28 Mattli and Slaughter’s 
brand of neofunctionalism thus suffers from the inadequacies of the theory’s 
oversights a priori, something which is further exacerbated by both their 
adoption of such a deterministic definition and their failure to even mention,
much less rectify, neofunctionalism’s inability to accommodate various 
institutional outcomes. Mattli and Slaughter’s model is especially vulnerable to 
this oversight as they criticise other theories on their lack of 
“microfoundations.”29 However, without adhering to the microfoundations of 
neofunctionalism, Mattli and Slaughter’s model must necessarily be considered 
less than theoretically sound.
Fourth, Mattli and Slaughter attribute a greater influence to the use of 
law as a mask or a shield than is reasonable. Contrary to Mattli and Slaughter’s 
assertion, law Is a political issue. Perhaps the Court has benefited from relative
obscurity, “tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg, and blessed
27 Ernst B. Haas, “Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration,” International 
Organization 30, no. 2 (1976): 177-178.
28 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 53, quoted from Ernst B. Haas, “The Study of 
Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” 
International Organization 24 (Autumn 1970): 610.
29 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 42.
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until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media”;30 
however, its decisions do affect the Member States in a political manner, and by 
asserting that the Court has a carte blanche to march toward integration as long 
as it wears the mask of law is simplistic at the very least. Moreover, it is also 
short-sighted to assume the Court can hide behind the shield of law. That the 
Member States have yet to mount a concerted attack on the powers of the 
Court offers precious little evidence that the shield of law provides refuge from 
the attacks of Member States. Although unsuccessful, the vote by Eurosceptic
MPs in the British House of Commons in April 1996 to curb the powers of the 
ECJ in the wake of the BSE crisis31 is but one recent example of the political
backlash that “the shield of law” could not deflect.
Neorationalist Shortcomings
In contrast to the great importance given to the Court by Slaughter and 
Mattli, Garrett and Weingast seem to underestimate its powers. While Garrett 
has recognised that the “Court of Justice is. . . a strategic actor that takes into 
account the anticipated responses of national governments before it decides 
cases brought before it,”32 such an interpretation of the Court falls short of 
appreciating its actions in reality. Renaud Dehousse and Joseph Weiler point 
out that “the Court of Justice has been called on to develop a constructive 
interpretation of basic principles contained in the EEC Treaty. . . in order to fill
30 Stein, “Transnational Constitution,” 1.
31 See Philip Webster, “66 Tories vote to cut power of EU Court,” The Times (Wednesday, 
24 April 1996): 1.
32 Garrett, “Politics,” 180.
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lacunae caused by the inaction of Community legislative organs [which has]. . . 
opened many avenues which are not expressly envisaged by the drafters of the 
Treaties.”33 As a self-interested actor within the integration process, the Court 
“has a vested interest in political centralization, and there is little doubt that it 
has acted as an ‘engine’ of political and market integration.”34 In contrast, 
Garrett and Weingast attempt to relegate the Court to very much a secondary 
actor in the integration process, one whose raison d’etre is but to serve the 
wishes of the (usually most powerful) Member States. However, as has been 
(and will further be) argued, such a pessimistic view of the Court is simply not 
indicative of reality.
Nevertheless, despite Garrett and Weingast’s disregard for the Court’s 
real power as a player in the integration process, their idea of the Court as an 
agent for the resolution of the incomplete contracting problems left by the 
Treaties offers great promise for illustrating a general explanation of the Court’s 
authority and responsibilities. To explain, Garrett and Weingast suggest that the 
Court functions to “fill in the gaps” which the Member States inevitably left in
the framework of the Communities in the Treaties. Furthermore, it should be
recognised that Garrett’s concept of the incomplete contracting problems 
present in the Treaties which must be addressed by Court action actually 
accommodates Mattli and Slaughter’s argument that the Court is a major actor
in the integration process although within the confines of what the Member
33 Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H. H. Weiler, “The legal dimension,” The Dynamics of 
European Integration, ed. William Wallace (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 246-247.
34 Roland Vaubel, “The Public Choice Analysis of European Integration: A survey,” 
European Journal of Political Economy 10 (1994): 237.
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States have already agreed upon. To explain, Garrett asserts that the Court 
functions as an agent for “mitigating the incomplete contracting problems” of 
the Union. Garrett further argues:
It is always extremely costly, if not impossible for actors to make 
exhaustive agreements that anticipate every dispute that may arise 
between them. Rather than attempting to do this, parties inevitably 
make agreements that only sketch the broad ‘rules of the game’ and then 
delegate the authority to apply and adapt these rules to specific cases.35
The Treaties are then subjected to clarification, at which time the Court 
becomes a means of integration but only in terms of its authority to clarify the 
prior agreements by the Member States.
As is noted above, the Court is restrained within the boundaries
established by the Treaties (which, as earlier explained, is incompatible with the 
idea of spillovers and better explained by incomplete contracting logic). Thus, 
the Court must remain cognisant of the fact that it was created by the Member 
States and owes its legitimacy to just interpretation of the Treaties. Alter and 
Meunier-Aitsahalia explain that “the Court is a political actor, responding to the 
political environment as do all political actors, but nonetheless able to act 
autonomously from the member states.”36 Garrett and Weingast’s notion of the 
Court following the will of the largest Member States thus appears flawed since
the Court has clearly expressed judgements contrary to the wishes of the largest
35 Garrett, “International Cooperation,” 557. In referring to the “rules of the game,” Garrett 
cites David M. Kreps, “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” Perspective on 
Positive Political Theory, eds. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 90-143.
36 Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, “Judicial Politics in the European 
Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision,” 
Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 4 (January 1994): 556.
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states and has taken an “activist”37 role in integration within the confines of its 
responsibility to clarify the Treaties. Burley and Mattli criticise Garrett and 
Weingast on the neorationalist assumption that “states will only comply with 
judicial decisions if in fact those decisions are in their interests,” and assert that 
instead, “What we know is that at the time a particular case is brought, different 
governments strongly disagree as to its outcome. Over time, however, they 
tend to accept the Court’s position and regard the path chosen as inevitable. It 
is precisely this process that needs to be explained,”38 To reiterate, as this 
study suggests that neither Mattli and Slaughter nor Garrrett and Weingast have 
adequately explained this problem, an alternative explanation could rectify these
inconsistencies.
Towards a New Rational Choice Model
Although Garrett and Weingast’s rational choice explanation suffers 
from the flaws discussed above, there is still merit in analysing the Court
through a game theoretic approach since such an approach is able to capture the 
bargaining situation which lies at the heart of the relationship between the ECJ
and the Member States. Such a model to examine the contribution of the
European Court of Justice to the integration process must focus on the 
relationship between the Member States and the European Union since the
37 Maiy L. Volcansek (“The European Court of Justice: Supranational Policy-Making” in 
Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe, ed. Mary L. Volcansek [London: 
Frank Cass, 1992], 109-121.) and Stein (“Transnational Constitution,” 1-27) are but two 
of the authors who characterise the European Court of Justice as an “activist” court.
38 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 51.
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arguments made above seem to suggest that this theatre is fundamental to the 
understanding of European integration. Precisely, it appears to be the manner in 
which the Member States accept Court decisions and the role that the Court 
plays in the integration process that should be at the heart of a theory of legal 
integration. A recent attempt to examine the European Court of Justice through 
the lens of game theory has been undertaken by Robert Cooter and Josef Drexl; 
however, the research focuses on the overall balance of power among the
institutions rather than between the Court and the Member States, as is the 
focus of this study.39 Hence, it, too, sheds little understanding on the Court’s 
role in the integration process. Noting the shortcomings of previous attempts to 
analyse the Court through game theory, we move now to develop a new model 
which will more accurately capture the essence of the Court’s role in European
integration.
The Architect’s Compromise Model
Based on the foregoing conclusions of this research project, any model 
that attempts to address the role of the European Court in European integration 
must appreciate the position of the Member States; hence, such a model must be 
founded upon the bargaining between the Member States and the Court which 
has characterised the process of European integration. While the specific
39 See Robert Cooler and Josef Drexl, “The Logic of Power in the Emerging European 
Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers,” International Review of Law 
and Economics 14 (1994): 307-326. In its assumptions on the Court, the authors state 
that “an independent court can make law or change it by interpretation.” Such an 
assumption appears to be in contradiction to the actual authority granted to the Court by 
the Treaties, which has been explained above by Lasok.
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assumptions regarding such interaction between the Court and the Member 
States will be outlined subsequently, it is initially advantageous to examine the 
overall dynamics of their relationship. A useful illustration to explain the 
Court’s role in integration in relation to the Member States could involve similar 
elements to those that are implicit in the relationship between an architect and
his or her client. In such a model, the client commissions the architect to design 
and build a particular structure. In an economic sense, both the client and the 
architect wish to maximise their respective utilities in the completion of the 
project. Accordingly, the client maximises his or her utility by the construction 
of a building that most closely conforms to its intended purpose, to any price 
restraints, to the proposed function and to the image sought by the client. For 
example, if the client wishes to build an art gallery, he or she would scarcely be 
interested in designs for an amusement park. Similarly, the architect wishes to 
maximise his or her utility. Naturally, the architect often receives great
satisfaction in achieving many of the client’s goals; however, other concerns
such as the aesthetic value of the building and the freedom for artistic 
expression could represent a significant element of the architect’s utility. 
Therefore, some conflict will exist between the separate goals of the architect 
and the client to the extent that their respective utilities are unique.
Given the fact that the client actually commissions the architect to
construct a particular structure, the architect must ultimately compromise his or 
her self-interests or risk being sacked when preferences are noticeably 
dissimilar. While the ultimate design is a product of the client’s initial requests 
tempered by the architect’s preferences, the architect maintains a formidable
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influence upon the design of the structure. Furthermore, the architect is able to 
take relatively great liberties in developing an aesthetically pleasing structure but 
only as long as the ultimate product appears it will conform to the client’s 
requirements even when minor or temporal developments might seem to 
conflict with the client’s preferences. The final product may thus best be 
described as the intersection of the client and the architect’s preferences and
ideas, reached through a process of the declaration of wishes of the client 
followed by the interpretation and subsequent implementation of these wishes 
by the architect, who often enjoys great liberty in execution.
Likewise, the relationship between the European Court of Justice and 
the Member States appears similar to that of an architect and a client. As has 
been previously discussed, although the European Union is an association of 
sovereign states, the Court of Justice—as a rational agent, engaged in purposeful 
actions—is assumed by this research to seek to increase its influence through 
further integration. However, it ultimately owes its legitimacy to the favour of 
the Member States40 and must in this respect reflect the same concerns as those 
evident in an architect’s compromise: the Court is bound by its “contract,” the
Treaties, to restrain its actions within these parameters set by its clients, the
Member States. In such a manner, both the Court and the Member States are
40 According to Keith Middlemas, “The Court. . . has margins of interpretation which 
inhibit it from direct confrontation with member slates—as when it found the Irish 
government liable neither to fund the provision of information about abortion nor to 
change its legislation, but nevertheless ruled that it could not impose restrictions on an 
individual’s right to travel , and to have access to information about clinics outside the 
Republic where an abortion might be performed (Crotty Case). ... Its inner standard is to 
pursue the largest possible measure of consensus in the judgements, even if only a bare 
majority suffices.” (Middlemas, 377)
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engaged in a bargaining process in which they must co-operate with one another 
in order to advance European integration. Nevertheless, this thesis will argue 
that the Court enjoys significant freedom in interpreting the Treaties and, as a 
result, has assumed impressive authority in the move towards further 
integration.41
Assumptions of the Architect’s Compromise Model
This research recognises five assumptions which are fundamental to the 
explanation of the Court’s role as architect in an architect’s compromise model 
of European integration. First, the actors are defined as the Court (the 
architect) and the Member States (the client). Second, actors are assumed to be 
rational insofar as they make decisions according to the information (although 
often imperfect) that appears to maximise their future returns. Third, the Court
is a strategic actor whose goal is the success of the European Communities and 
thus generally prefers to act in favour of further integration. To refer back to 
the architect-client analogy, the architect wishes the structure to be constructed;
therefore, he or she prefers to act in a manner which will bring the designs to
fruition. Fourth, the state of nature which surrounds the decision-making
atmosphere of the Court is characterised by what will be termed modified 
preferences. As this concept will be discussed in due course, for the moment, 
we will recognise simply that modified preferences imply that the preferences of
41 For a basic discussion on the Court’s authority, see Weiler, “Community, Member States 
and European Integration.”
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Member States are often tempered by competing ambitions. Fifth, the Member 
States, while possessing the right and ability to ignore or rebel against the 
Court, generally follow the decisions of the Court as they must conform to the 
Treaties, with the ultimate interests of integration, and with Members’ modified 
preferences. The following discussion will elaborate on these assumptions.
First, while lawyers, lobbyists, judges, academics, politicians,
international organisations, corporations and a host of other individuals and 
groups certainly influence the nature of integration, the model focuses on the 
Member States and the Court as these are the actors who actually make the
decisions that determine European integration. According to Mary L. 
Volcansek, “the Community, though not really a federation, functions largely 
through its member states.”42 As has been previously argued, while states do 
transfer an element of their sovereignty by choosing to join the Union, they 
avoid ceding “open-ended authority” to supra-national institutions including the
Parliament and Commission. Rather, Member States are more prone to decide 
the sensitive issues dealing with sovereignty in the inter-governmental Council.43 
Engaged in an often virtual tug-of-war, the Member States and the Court both 
seek their respective self-interests, reflecting a similar relationship to that of the
architect and the client. Likewise, as the Member States themselves established
the Communities, they must adhere to the provisions or risk losing the privileges
of membership as a result of cheating. We further identify the national courts as
42 Volcansek, 110.
43 Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” International Organization 45, no. 
3 (Summer 1991): 26-27.
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an important element of the Member States. The national courts’ influence is 
particularly important in that they have the power to appeal for preliminary 
rulings, and depending on their reception of Community law, integration can 
either be enhanced or stymied. For the sake of simplicity, however, the model
assumes the national courts to be a component of the Member States and not 
separate actors in their own right. Moreover, a model which attempts to 
incorporate each of the separate, unique national court systems of the Member 
States faces the danger of being too complex and merely descriptive. Hence, 
the national judiciaries will be thought of as a component of the separate
Member States. The other main actor, the European Court of Justice is
identified because of its influence on determining the meaning of the Treaties. It
is almost axiomatic to state that the Court has truly functioned as one of the 
most successful factors affecting European integration. However, although the 
Court may be thought of as the organ which interprets the specific problems 
that arise with the process of integration, the ECJ must nonetheless operate 
within the boundaries set by the Treaties or risk losing its legitimacy in the eyes
of the Member States.
Second, the Member States and the Court are considered rational actors.
Recognising the lack of consensus surrounding the connotations of the term
rational, the model uses Peter C. Ordeshook’s broad, neutral definition which 
equates rationalism to purposeful activity. Accordingly, Ordeshook remarks:
Purposeful does not necessarily mean that people carefully and 
consciously list their alternative actions, map all the relevant or possible 
consequences of each act, estimate the probability of each consequence, 
and define precisely their preferences across all consequences. Thus, we 
cannot ignore habit, instinct, and the use of simple cues and heuristics to
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uncomplicate complex decisions. . . The assumption of purposeful 
choice implies simply that, after taking account of people’s perceptions, 
values, and beliefs, we can model their decisions by asserting that they 
act as if they make such calculations.44
Applying this definition to the model, this research will demonstrate that the 
Court rationally seeks to pursue the action that maximises its expected utility in 
light of the knowledge that Member States have made rational decisions in the 
Treaties establishing the Communities, through the Council and in their
reactions to Court decisions.
Third, the Court is a strategic actor finding its raison d’etre in enhancing 
the effectiveness of the European Communities. To begin, Andre Bzdera 
argues that the Court with its “centralist inclination” has advanced a federal 
legal system over traditional international law.45 Rasmussen speaks of an 
“activist court”46 while Stein maintains that the ECJ “has fashioned a
constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe” which has 
resulted in “the supremacy of Community law within its limited but expanding 
area of competence over any conflicting national law.”47 These phenomena 
appear to be directly related to the strategic decisions made by the Court which 
reflect the predictions of rational choice theory.
44 Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 2.
45 Andre Bzdera, “The Court of Justice of the European Community and the Politics of 
Institutional Reform,” Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe, ed. Mary 
L. Volcansek (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 124.
46 See Hjalte Rasmussen, “Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for the 
European Court,” European Law Review 13 (1988), 28-38.
47 Stein, “Transnational Constitution,” 1.
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Fourth, the current research suggests that the nature of further 
integration appears to be the product of the dichotomy between the limits set by 
the Treaties and what will be called the modified preferences of the Member 
States. The term modified preferences will be used to represent the interests of
the States as a function of their responsibilities as Members of the Community. 
Reality runs counter to Garrett’s assertion that “it seems that the principles 
governing decisions of the European court. . . are consistent with the 
preferences of France and Germany,”48 which he later attempts to justify by 
suggesting that the Court’s ruling against Germany in the Cassis de Dijon 
decision was actually in Germany’s “rational self-interest” since it both allowed
the German government to appear to argue for domestic industry and to 
subsequently appear to be a “good European” by accepting the adverse decision 
against it.49 However, Slaughter and Mattli recognise a flaw in Garrett’s 
explanation by stating: “We argue that at each major step of the construction of 
that system, the court was able systematically to override member states’ true 
preferences as perceived by individual states at the time and was able to impose 
constraints on the ability of those states to fight back.”50 Perhaps Mattli and 
Slaughter err in attributing too much power to the Court; however, they 
correctly make the point that the decisions of the Court are not always in line 
with the true preferences of the Member States. Instead, employing a
teleological approach, the Court will attempt to interpret the Treaties to fit its 
own self-interests (further prestige for the EU, generally through increased
48 Garrett, “International Cooperation,” 558.
49 Garrett, “Politics,” 175-176.
50 Mattli and Slaughter, “Law and Politics,” 184.
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integration). As the Treaties provide the Court with its framework for decision­
making and since they have been constructed by the will of the Member States, 
they embody the preferences of the States and work to provide the Court with 
legitimacy as long as its decisions are within the bounds of the Treaties. 
However, these modified preferences are not reflective of the sheer self-interests
of the Member States, lest they would argue for more than the Communities
could provide. Instead, these preferences are modified by the Member States’ 
realisation that they must sacrifice certain selfish interests such as complete 
sovereignty to gain access to the largest free market in the world.
Fifth, in their reactions to the decisions of the Court, the Member States
generally co-operate with the decisions of the Court as it is usually in their
ultimate interests to show such co-operation as to achieve the aims of the
Treaties, even if a particular decision by the Court is cause for a temporary set­
back. (Moreover, repeated offences by a Member State would have negative 
repercussions on its reputation for compliance.) Conceding the flaws of their 
neorationalist model, this research nonetheless recognises that Garrett and 
Weingast correctly illustrate this point in relation to the development of the
internal market of the Communities. Since the Member States all benefit from
the internal market and since it is recognised that the Court functions to settle 
problems that arise, the Member States--even when temporarily injured--tend to 
abide by Court decisions. According to Garrett and Weingast, “So long as EC 
members value effective participation in the internal market more highly than
they do the benefits of defecting from rules that affect them adversely, it is 
unlikely that governments will jeopardize their positions through flagrant
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violations of commonly agreed rules.”51 Neill Nugent argues that while “the 
particular balance of advantages and disadvantages varies from state to 
state, . . . each judges that there is more to be gained from being in the EU than 
being out.”52 However, it must be acknowledged that Member States may 
rationally choose to ignore the decisions of Luxembourg. This is due not to the 
least that, as Andre Bzdera suggests, “the Court possesses. . . only a very 
limited institutional capacity to ensure that its decisions are implemented by 
recalcitrant member states.”53 However, non-compliance by Member States 
could significantly undermine the integrity of the Communities and hence, the 
benefits it provides. Therefore, it is generally in the interests of the Member 
States to comply with ECJ decisions.
Explanation of the Architect’s Compromise Model
Based upon these assumptions, a particular rational choice model will
now be derived to examine the actions of the European Court of Justice vis-a­
vis the Member States. Specifically, the decisions of the Court can be explained 
as being reflective of the maximum expected utility the Court predicts in light of 
its anticipated preferences of the Member States and according to its desired 
consequence. Such an equation will be adopted because it provides a
51 Garrett and Weingast, 198.
52 Neill Nugent, William E. Paterson, and Vincent Wright, eds., The Government and 
Politics of the European Union (London: Macmillan, 1994), 411.
53 Bzdera, 123. See also Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law, 2nd ed. 
(London: Penguin Books, 1995), 174-182.
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perceptible gauge of the Court’s preferences in issues regarding integration. To
such an end, we will consider the following utility function:54
AEU(a) = 2 p(m)u[o(m,a)], 
all m
where: AEU(a)55 represents the expected utility the Court derives through 
pursuing action a;
p(m)56 indicates the probability that a particular state of nature (m), or in 
this case a particular modified preference by the Member States will 
prevail; and
u[o(m,a)] denotes the utility that would be derived if outcome o (a 
function of state of nature m and action a) is achieved.
Furthermore, all of the possible actions, or in this case decisions, available to the 
Court comprise the set A, which is composed of all the mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive possible actions available to the Court. In other words, all the 
possible actions are contained in the set A, and one and only one must be 
chosen. Specifically, A = {ab a2, a3}, and ai denotes a Court decision in favour 
of deeper integration; a2 represents a Court decision neither in favour of deeper 
integration nor in favour of disintegration; and a3 indicates a Court decision in 
favour of disintegration. Similarly, M is the set of all possible states of nature 
(or in this case, the attitudes of the Member States) that characterise the 
political, economic and social climate in which Court decisions are made. Thus, 
M comprises the mutually exclusive and exhaustive set M, where M = {mi, m2,
54 The utility function upon which the model is based is an adaptation of the Von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function presented in James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political 
Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 23.
55 AEU(a) denotes “Architect’s Expected Utility of action a.”
56 p(m) denotes “probability of modified preference.”
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m3}. In the set M, mi indicates a condition in which the modified preferences of 
the Member States reflect pro-integration sentiments; m2 denotes a condition in
which the modified preferences of the Member States are ambivalent to 
integration; and m3 represents a condition in which the modified preferences of
the Member States reflect anti-integration sentiments.
By using such an equation, the expected actions of the Court are
functions of the expected utility (prestige earned, integration achieved or power 
attained) from certain outcomes and the probability of the Member States 
holding particular preferences. Such specific formulations have been adopted 
since they are able to capture the strategic nature of Court decisions and the 
modified preferences which characterise the attitudes of the Member States to 
further integration. As a result of this model, a number of consequences could
be expected depending on the prevailing state of nature and the pursued action.
The following table maps the possible consequences resulting from a selected 
action and the existence of a particular state of nature:
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States of Nature (Modified Preferences)
mi m2 m3
ai Oi 04 o7
actions a2 o2 o5 Og
a3 o3 o6 09
The elements of set O denote all possible consequences of Court decisions
taken under differing states of nature, where O = {oi, o2, 03, o4, 05, 06, 07, Og,
09} and the following table lists all the elements of O:
Oi Member States accept the Court decision, integration deepens
o2 Member States accept decision
o3 Member States may either reject Court decision outright or 
alter the Court through Treaty revision
04 Member States accept Court decision but could limit the 
authority of the Court in the future
o5 Member States accept decision
og Member States may accept Court decision but may alter 
the authority of the Court in the future
07 Court decision rejected if not consistent with modified 
preferences, rejection in the form of cheating and/or
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Og
altering the authority of the Court 
Court decision accepted
09 Court decision accepted
Thus, in these simple game-theoretic terms, the Court determines its desired
outcome and pursues such actions according to its understanding of the state of 
nature (modified preferences) to bring about its desired consequence. Having 
developed a theory based upon rational choice assumptions, it will now be 
tested against two notable cases: Cassis de Dijon and Francovich and Bonifaci 
v. Italy. Through such testing, the ability of the model to explain the manner in
which European integration is achieved by the Court will be evaluated.
Cassis de Dijon
Given that the pivotal Cassis de Dijon case of 1979 is the most
thoroughly discussed case in the debate between Garrett and Mattli and 
Slaughter, it seems only natural that it should serve as the first case study of this 
research. Before examining the case by means of the architect’s compromise 
model previously developed, a brief overview of Cassis will outline the details
of this well-known case. Following the overview, a critique of the models of 
both Garrett and Mattli and Slaughter will be developed. Finally, the case will
be examined through the architect’s compromise approach.
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A Brief Overview of Cassis de Dijon
In the events leading up to the case, the German corporation Rewe 
Zentral AG sought to import the French blackcurrant liqueur Creme de Cassis 
de Dijon and thus applied for permission from the Bimdesmonopolverwaltung 
fur Brcmntwein (German Federal Spirits Monopoly) in September 1976. In 
response to this request, the Federal Spirits Monopoly stated that such 
authorisation was no longer required (due to a general authorisation of 
importation granted on 8 April of the same year); however, the Federal 
Monopoly advised Rewe that Cassis could not be marketed in Germany. 
Specifically, German law permitted only those spirits with an alcohol content of
32% or greater (with some exceptions, notably a reduction to 25% for liqueurs
similar to Cassis, which came as a result of a similar case involving the liqueur 
Ainsette) to be marketed in the Federal Republic. The Federal Monopoly 
maintained that since Cassis has an alcohol content of 15 to 20%, the 
importation and sale of the liqueur could not be authorised.57
In contesting the advice of the Federal Monopoly, Rewe brought the
issue before the Hessische Finanzgericht, a German national court. 
Consequently, the Hessische Finanzgericht requested a preliminary ruling from 
the European Court of Justice on 28 April 1978. As Article 30 had been 
interpreted to prohibit any measure enacted by a Member State that directly or 
indirectly creates an obstacle to trade, the German Monopoly argued the case
57 See Cassis de Dijon and Alter and Mcunicr-Aitsahalia, 535-561.
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on health grounds. Despite the German assertions that a reduction of the 
alcohol content could contribute to health problems arising from consumer 
confusion and that the German law discriminated equally among domestic and
foreign producers, the Court ruled against the German position. The Court 
found that the German law was in conflict with the free movement of goods.
This decision thereby established the principle of mutual recognition, which has 
subsequently been so important.58 Before turning to an examination of the 
Cassis decision in terms of the model developed earlier in this chapter, the ideas 
of Garrett and Mattli and Slaughter will be critiqued in light of this case to once
again illustrate the weaknesses of these respective models and thus demonstrate 
the necessity for the means of analysis employed in this current study.
Critique of Garrett and Mattli and Slaughter
In his analysis of the case, Geoffrey Garrett focuses on attempting to 
prove that the actors demonstrated rational behaviour. Arguing that the 
German government had no great economic stimulus to fight the case to 
victory, given that “the impact on powerful wine and beer producers would 
have been minimal,”59 Garrett instead identifies Germany’s necessity to appear 
“prepared to fight for the protection of German industry.”60 In addition, it 
should be noted that Garrett believes that Germany had two additional reasons 
for fighting the Court decision: first, to avoid the political repercussions by
58 Alter and Meunier-Ailsahalia, 537-539.
59 Garret, Politics, 175.
60 Ibid., 175- 176.
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angry domestic producers at losing part of the market; and second, in the event 
that the Court ruled against Germany, to act as a “good European” by then
following the decision of the Court. Thus, the actions of Germany can be 
thought of as a win-win situation, both domestically and internationally. Finally, 
Garrett concludes that, after fiercely fighting against Rewe, the German 
government rather happily acquiesced to the decision of the Court since it 
actually made a great stride in the direction of German interests—namely, 
increased trade liberalisation amongst the Member States.61
Arguing that the Cassis decision actually reflects German preferences,
Garrett maintains that the players conformed to the rational choice expectations
of his model. To this end, Garrett argues that the European Court’s decisions 
are generally reflective of the preferences of Germany and France, citing 
specifically, the general Franco-German stance for “mutual recognition of
national standards.” It thus follows from Garrett’s line of reasoning that Cassis 
de Dijon “firmly established the principle of ‘mutual recognition’ as the 
foundation of EC law. . . [;however,]. . . the court has been unwilling to extend 
the scope of this essentially deregulating and laissez-faire doctrine to other areas 
of economic activity, including precisely those cherished by the French and 
German governments.”62 Thus, Garrett suggests that the Court is merely a tool 
of the Member States, especially France and Germany. While Germany clearly 
fought the case prior to the decision, Garrett argues that Germany’s win-win 
situation allowed Germany to gladly—and rationally—accept the decision as the
61
62
Ibid.
Garrett, “International Cooperation,” 558-559.
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protector of German business, as a good European and as a champion of trade
liberalisation.
As can be expected, Mattli and Slaughter take exception to such an 
explanation. To begin, Mattli and Slaughter simply refute Garrett’s claim that 
the Court acts consistently with the preferences of France and Germany and 
argue that in Cassis de Dijon, Germany strongly opposed the Court’s ultimate
decision. Instead, Mattli and Slaughter cite Stein’s argument “that the Court
follows the lead of the commission, using it as a political bellwether to ascertain
how far member states can be pushed toward the Court and the commission’s 
vision of maximum integration.”63 Moreover, Mattli and Slaughter claim that 
the European Court has functioned to “systematically. . . override member
states’ true preferences as perceived by individual states at the time and ... to 
impose constraints on the ability of those states to fight back.”64 Given that 
“preferences” feature so prominently in the analysis of both Garrett and Mattli 
and Slaughter, the latter identify three specific categories of state preferences: 
(1) “an effective dispute resolution system,” (2) “pace, scope, and degree of 
European integration” and (3) “specific economic and political preferences in 
individual cases.”65 In the first category, Mattli and Slaughter agree with 
Garrett’s claim that the Member States desire an effective dispute resolution 
system. To explain, Mattli and Burley point out that the EU’s resolution system 
is much more effective than that of the United Nations, for example. Further,
63 Burley and Mattli, “Political Theory,” 51.
64 Mattli and Slaughter, “Law and Politics,” 184.
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they argue that the real strength of the Court comes not from the right to hear 
cases as assigned in Articles 169 (EEC) and 170 (EEC) but from the success of 
the Court’s use of its power of preliminary rulings in Article 177 (EEC) to 
essentially fashion the corpus of European law.66 Second, Burley agrees with 
Pierre Pescatore and argues that the Court has “une certaine idee de I’Europe 
(a certain idea of Europe)”67 which manifests itself in the Court’s decisions, 
albeit behind the “mask of law.” This runs contrary to Garrett’s claim that the
Court acts in favour of the most powerful Member States since according to the
neofunctionalists, the Court’s motivation is to increase integration, and to the
neorationalist, the Court’s raison d’etre is to serve the largest Member States.
Third, Burley argues that Garrett’s claim that the Court considers the 
preferences of the Member States violates “the most basic precepts of the rule 
of law,” and that if the Court did behave according to the preferences of the 
Member States, “it would quickly get a reputation for arbitrary and capricious 
‘political’ decisions, thereby undermining its legitimacy.”68
Mattli and Slaughter take further exception at Garrett’s reasoning. First,
Mattli and Slaughter suggest that Garrett’s model contains the premise “that the 
law itself cannot guide decision,”69 which they effectively disprove. Although 
they concede that the law may be ambiguous, they accuse Garrett of 
embellishing the ambiguity much beyond reality in his arguments that the Court
66 Ibid., 184-185.
67 Ibid., 185. Mattli and Slaughter quote from Pierre Pescatore, “The Doctrine of Direct 
Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law,” European Law Review 8 (June 1983): 
155-177, particularly page 157.
68 Ibid., 185-186.
69 Ibid., 186.
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considers the political and economic interests of the Member States when 
rendering its decisions.70 In contrast, Mattli and Slaughter argue that the 
decision in Cassis de Dijon precisely proves that the Court decided not 
according to the preferences of the Member States but in line with the Treaties, 
the advocate generals’ opinions and academic writings. Finally, in Mattli and 
Slaughter’s examination of Garrett’s model, they argue that it fails as it pointed 
to non-compliance by Germany in Cassis de Dijon rather than compliance, 
which was actually Germany’s course of action.
Although Mattli and Slaughter’s arguments are concise and for the most 
part correct in their assertions, the analysis suffers from its attempt to utilise the 
“mask/shield concept” as the catch-all for explaining the Court. The 
mask/shield explanation is particularly unattractive as a means of explaining 
integration because it fails to appreciate the constraints the Member States have 
outlined in the Treaties and hence suggests that the Court has a virtual “free 
hand” to push integration forward without resistance. While law is doubtlessly 
shielded to some degree by its technical nature and the Court may mask certain 
decisions behind the veil of law, exaggeration of this concept simply 
oversimplifies the role of the Court and underestimates the power of the 
Member States: in short, such simplicity ignores reality. To refer back to the
architect’s compromise, the client commissions the architect, not vice versa. 
Similarly, the Court can only operate within the area of authority granted to it 
by the Member States. Furthermore, Mattli and Burley’s assertion that
70 Ibid.
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“without understanding the way lawyers and judges think and reason on their 
own terms, it is impossible to grasp the mask/shield concept we put forward”71 
is unconvincing in its attempt to prove its superiority over Garrett’s. While 
judges and lawyers may have a different perspective on integration, the purpose 
of models of integration is to explain these processes. By defending 
neofunctionalism while attacking neorationalism based on unexplained 
discipline-specific logic, Mattli and Slaughter neither prove neofunctionalism 
valid nor invalidate Garrett’s neorationalist model (which, however, is damaged 
by other criticisms). Mattli and Slaughter do well to point out the
inconsistencies in Garrett’s analysis; however, the concept of the Court
marching toward increasing integration, hiding behind the shield of law whilst
Member States remain helpless to either curtail the powers of the Court or to
direct the speed and depth of integration is rather unbelievable. The discussion
of Cassis below is aimed to consider the interpretation of the architect’s
compromise model.
Cassis de Dijon Revisited
In applying Cassis de Dijon to the architect’s compromise model
developed previously, a clearer understanding of the actions of the Court can be 
illustrated. To examine the Cassis decision, the five assumptions of the 
architect’s compromise will initially be reviewed. Then, the model will once
again be presented and subsequently, applied to this case. Next, the
71 Ibid., 187.
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assumptions of the architect’s compromise will be contrasted against the models 
by Garrett and Mattli and Slaughter. Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the 
validity of the architect’s compromise.
First, we assume the primary actors in the case to be the Court and the
Member States. A cursory examination of the case reveals four players: the
ECJ, the Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, the Hessisches 
Finanzgericht and Rewe-Zentral AG. While individuals undoubtedly compose
the structure of each of these entities, the four acted as individual units rather
than as a collection of personalities and preferences as neofunctionalism might 
suggest. Furthermore, even with four distinct players wrestling over the
ultimate decision, only two actors emerge under closer consideration. To 
explain, the four players, while distinct entities in their own right, can all be 
reduced to either the Court or the Member State (in this case Germany). 
Clearly, the Federal Monopoly represented the German interests, and the Court 
itself certainly must be acknowledged as an actor. As for Rewe and the 
Hessisches Finanzgericht, it would be a mistake to recognise either or both on
the same level as either the Court or Germany. First, the Hessisches 
Finanzgericht merely acted as a conduit through which the matter was brought 
before the Court. While the action of the Hessisches Finanzgericht might attest 
to the effective structural development of the European legal system, it must be
borne in mind that the Member States laid the foundation and allowed the
creation of this system. Second, Rewe did initiate the case and provided the 
impetus for the Court to resolve a particular issue not explicitly mentioned in 
the Treaties; however, the Member States committed themselves to the market,
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and thus, the events should be seen as evidence of resolution of incomplete 
contracting problems. To explain, the Court’s decision in the case was
indicative of the ECJ’s responsibility to interpret and formulate the aims of the 
Treaties to create an effective legal structure for the Communities. Although it 
is more descriptive—as in the neofunctionalist pattern—to recognise all the 
players and the personalities within them, such description renders analysis 
problematic at best and without simplification, precious little can be explained. 
Moreover, description might add to the overall knowledge of an issue, but it 
fails to provide critical understanding.
Second, both the Court and the Federal Republic of Germany—the two 
primary actors—did act entirely rationally. First, the Court vigorously pursued 
further integration. Greeting Cassis de Dijon as an opportunity to eliminate
situations through which Member States were able to create obstacles to trade,
Advocate General Capotorti, enthusiastically realised the impetus for integration 
that the case possessed. According to Capotorti,
This new Rewe case presents the Court with the opportunity to tackle 
the problem of the limits within which the member-States are still free to 
make the marketing of certain categories of products, whether national 
or imported, conditional upon the presence of certain characteristics, 
thereby creating an obstacle to the importation of foreign products 
within those categories which do not possess the requisite 
characteristics.72
Likewise, Germany, calling for “the protection of the consumer against fraud 
and against dangers to his health and the maintenance of fair competition,”73
72 Cassis de Dijon, CMLR, 496-497.
73 Cassis de Dijon, ECR, 657.
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determinedly argued against the case. Likewise, Germany had the additional
incentive of greater protection of Germany industry in the Federal Republic in
the event that Germany won the case.
Third, the Court played the role of a strategic actor. It has already been
established that the European Court of Justice, as the architect of the legal
foundation of the Communities, has a vested interest in their success.
Furthermore, the comments by Capotorti above confirm the argument that the
Court does act in a strategic manner. Without labouring the point 
unnecessarily, it will be simply stated that the decision in Cassis de Dijon 
reflects the Court’s preference for further integration rather clearly, and many 
have heralded the decision to be truly groundbreaking.74 Hence, the ECJ was 
successful in enhancing the integrity and effectiveness of the Communities.
Fourth, modified preferences prevailed. Although Germany may have 
preferred maintaining relatively high limits on alcohol content—reputedly to 
curtail overconsumption and to protect the consumer against unknowingly 
purchasing a lower-content alcohol at a higher price—of liqueurs sold in the 
Federal Republic, Germany’s commitment and desire to achieve a single market 
transcended both the health and fraud arguments. Thus, Germany was able to 
fight vigorously against a case it regarded as hostile to the temporal preferences 
of Germany. However, as Germany’s modified preferences allowed certain
74 See Alter and Mcunier-Aitsahalia, for example.
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compromises for the achievement of the single market, the Federal Republic 
could accept the ultimate decision.
Fifth, the architect’s compromise suggests that the Member States will 
ultimately accept the decision of the Court as long as such a decision conforms 
to modified preferences. In Cassis de Dijon, this is precisely what occurred. 
The Court ruled against the German Federal Monopoly, and the German 
government acquiesced to the decision since it conformed to Germany’s 
modified preferences for achieving the single market. Whilst the case did, in 
fact, contribute significantly to further economic integration, the decision should 
hardly be regarded as remarkable, however. In contrast, it is the natural 
outcome of decisions made by Member States several decades previously when
they committed themselves to a common market (and have remained continually 
committed since). The Court, merely interpreting the intent of the Treaties and
recognising the Member States’ continued support of the European project, 
furthered the cause of integration by establishing the principle of equivalent 
effect in its ruling on Cassis de Dijon.
Having reviewed the specific assumptions, we will now examine the
model more closely. In its deliberations, the Court sought to maximise its 
expected utility (AEU) from the action (a) it pursued from the set A = {ai
(decision resulting in deeper integration), a2 (decision that is neutral to 
integration) and a3 (decision that obstructs integration)}. From the set A, the 
Court’s ruling in Cassis de Dijon can be accurately represented as ai, given that
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it led to deeper integration. Specifically, the decision led to the establishment of 
the principle of mutual recognition, a cornerstone of Community law.
Having further established above that the Court pursued action ab we 
shall now determine the state of nature that prevailed at the time of the Cassis 
de Dijon decision. To review, the actions of the Court are made against the 
prevailing state of nature (m) which is represented by the set M = {mi (modified 
preferences of the Member States reflect pro-integration sentiments), m2 
(modified preferences are ambivalent to integration) and m3 (modified 
preferences are hostile to integration)}. A superficial view of the case might 
suggest that the prevailing state of nature could be characterised by m3. After 
all, Germany opposed Rewe’s request to import Cassis de Dijon. However, 
recalling that the set S contains not the unbridled wishes of the Member States, 
but rather the modified preferences, m3 loses its ability to capture the essence of 
the state of nature which prevailed at the time of Cassis de Dijon. It is on this 
point—or more precisely, the actions and motivations of the Federal Republic— 
that the present research runs counter to the notions of Mattli and Slaughter and
we now turn our attention to examining their argument.
According to the logic of Mattli and Slaughter, it might be argued that 
the opposition by the Federal Republic proves that Germany, harbouring anti­
integration notions, was outwitted by a pro-integration Court—hiding behind the 
shield of law—which was able to push integration beyond the will of the Member 
States. As imaginative as it all might sound, this explanation simply falls short 
of providing a critical explanation. First, the notion that the Court “pushes”
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Member States toward integration is misplaced: the Member States committed 
themselves to the idea—perhaps not fully realising the twists and turns such a 
commitment might bring, however—of an integrated European Community 
when they became signatories to the Treaty of Rome (and subsequently have 
voluntarily remained in the Communities for this specific reason). While the 
Member States could not specifically predict the events that would be necessary 
to achieve the aims of this Treaty, it is unwise to argue that they are being 
“pushed” against their will. The fact remains that the European Communities is 
a concert of states, which depends upon satisfaction from its Members in order 
to exercise its powers. Second, while Mattli and Slaughter might be correct in
maintaining that the Court is able to override Member States’ unbridled
preferences in particular cases dealing with specific economic or political 
matters, this is no longer the case when one considers the modified preferences
in lieu of these “unbridled preferences.” Specifically, the fact that Germany
fought hard to protect its domestic wine producers against increased 
competition from Cassis de Dijon simply reflects an unbridled preference. In 
contrast, realisation of the single market—a goal to which Germany was firmly 
committed—requires Member States to approach Court decisions according to 
their modified preferences rather than their particular short-term political and
economic preferences. Finally, the argument that Germany accepted Cassis de 
Dijon because the Court ingeniously masked its decision behind the guise of 
that technical field “law” suggests that Germany is opposed to the achievement 
of the single market and only accepts Court decisions because of the Federal
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Republic’s inability to realise the true role of the Court: the success of the
European Communities.
Following the above logic, it becomes clearer that the state of nature 
could be characterised not by m3 but by mi (pro-integration sentiments). This
research departs from Garrett’s in a very important manner on this point: 
specifically, this research argues that the Member States have two sets of 
preferences. First, they hold specific short-term political and economic 
preferences which are unrelated to the process of Community-building and
consist of their unbridled self-interests as states. Second, the Member States
possess what we have come to refer to as modified preferences which, as has 
been argued, are inextricably intertwined with the Member States’ desire to 
derive full benefits from membership in the Communities. It is the interaction of
these two—often conflicting sets of preferences—which allows the Member
States to both argue against the Court and to ultimately accept the decision (as 
long as the decision conforms to modified preferences).
While Garrett provides several reasons which suggest Germany faithfully 
played the part of a rational actor within the confines of his game-theoretic 
model, a closer examination reveals inconsistencies in such logic. Initially, 
Garrett argues that Germany had very little reason to fight the case from an
economic perspective; however, he attributes Germany’s willingness to fight the
case due to its desire to appear to protect German industry and to avoid the
political fallout from loss of the German market share by domestic producers. 
Thus, Garrett appears to suggest that Germany had little impetus to actually win
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the case. Accordingly, Germany should have not fought vigorously; however, 
Germany did, as Mattli and Slaughter are correct to point out. Finally, the idea 
that Germany’s “strategic calculus changed” is difficult to argue from a game- 
theoretic perspective, as an actor’s preferences~by definition-remain
constant.75
Contrary to Garrett’s suggestion that Germany showed relatively little 
opposition to the case, Mattli and Slaughter are more correct in arguing that 
Germany did mount a serious effort to win the case. For if Germany, or 
specifically the Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, was willing to 
acquiesce to the wishes of Rewe-Zentral to allow the importation of Cassis de 
Dijon from the outset of the case, there would have been no reason for the case 
in the first place. Having said that, however, what is at issue here is not whether 
Germany fought against a decision of the Bundesmonopolverwaltung but why
Germany accepted the decision.
Having examined the case through the assumptions of the architect’s
compromise, conclusions will now be drawn from the expected utility equation 
that is used to suggest the actions of the Court according to the model to 
determine if the model adequately explains the events. Given that (1) we 
assume the Court to maximise its expected utility, (2) we have determined that 
the Court pursued action ai and (3) we have found that the state of nature was 
characterised by mi, we can predict that the outcome can be represented by Oi
75 According to James Morrow, “Preferences over outcomes are assumed to be fixed. They 
do not change during the course of the decision being examined.” (Morrow, 19)
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as indicated in the model. In fact, Oi is exactly what did occur: Germany 
accepted the decision, the Court decided in favour of further integration and 
further integration proceeded. From the above discussion, the decision in and 
the events surrounding Cassis de Dijon conform to the architect’s compromise
model. The architect’s compromise adequately reflects the actions of the Court 
with respect to the Member States and thus cogently explains the integration 
process. To further test the model, a number of cases will be examined 
throughout the remainder of this research project, including Francovich and 
Bonifaci v. Italy below.
Francovich and. Bonifaci v. Italy
Having determined that Cassis de Dijon conforms to the architect’s 
compromise model, we now turn to a more recent court decision, Francovich 
and Bonifaci v. Italy. Before evaluating the case in terms of the architect’s 
compromise, a brief review of the facts of the case will be presented. Then, the 
case will be measured against the game-theoretic model developed by this 
thesis. Finally, conclusions will be drawn on the suitability of the architect’s 
compromise as an explanation of the Court’s role in European integration and 
the acceptance of decisions by Member States.
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The case of Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy16 grew out of the Italian 
government’s failure to implement a Directive by the prescribed date. Directive 
80/98776 7 required the Member States to provide protection for employees in the 
case of insolvency by their employers. The deadline for the enactment of such 
protections was 23 October 1983, and as the result of Italy’s failure to enact 
legislation by that date, the Commission brought suit against the Italian Republic 
in 1989, at which time the Court found Italy at fault.78 Francovich arose out of 
two separate claims by Andrea Francovich, who was owed approximately six 
million Lira by CDN Electronica SnC, in Vicenza, and by Danila Bonifaci, who 
together with 33 other employees, was owed approximately 254 million Lira by 
Gaia Confezioni Sr. After unsuccessful attempts to recover the sums owed to 
them, the plaintiffs filed suit against the Italian Republic, Francovich in the 
Pretore di Vicenza and Bonifaci in the Pretore di Bassano del Grappa. 
Believing that Italy was bound by the provisions of Directive 80/987 after 23 
October 1983, the plaintiffs sought damages against Italy for the Republic’s
failure to enact the directive. As the two separate Italian courts regarded the 
cases as European matters, both cases were referred to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling, on 9 July 1989 for the former and on 30
December 1989 for the latter.
76 For a full explanation of the case, see Francovich v. Italy. Deirdre Curtin provides a 
thorough discussion in “State Liability Under Community Law: A New Remedy for 
Private Parties,” International Law Journal (1992): 74-81.
77 Council Directive 80/987, Official Journal (1980), L 283/23.
78 See Case 22/87, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, European
Court Reports (1989): 143-173, '
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Three identical questions were posed to the Court for preliminary rulings 
in the two cases. The first question essentially asked if Council Directive 
80/987 had direct effect and what the state liability for breach of its obligations
was under Community law. The second asked if the Member State was
required to pay claims of the employees in the event that it failed to lay down 
limits as specified by the directive. Finally, the third question asked, in the case 
of the second question being answered negatively, what was the minimum
guarantee the Member State must provide as to comply with the directive.
In its decision, the Court determined that the Italian Republic was liable 
for damages in the case. Specifically, the Court considered the three questions 
above in the following manner. With regard to the final two questions, the 
Court did not issue a ruling, considering the answer to the first question to be 
sufficient. In answering the first question, the Court ruled that despite Italy’s 
failure to enact the directive, the plaintiffs could not enforce rights against the 
state for the simple reason that implementation measures had not been adopted. 
However, the Court further i*uled that despite its finding that the directive did 
not have direct effect, “the member-States are obliged to pay compensation for 
harm caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be 
held responsible.”79 Thus, although the Court did not regard the directive as 
having direct effect, it was nonetheless reasoned that the Italian Republic was 
“required to pay compensation for the harm suffered by individuals as a result of 
the failure to implement Directive 8O/987.”80
79 Francovich v. Italy, CMLR, 114.
80 Ibid., 115.
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Having reviewed the facts of the case, we are now in a position to 
analyse Francovich v. Italy through the architect’s compromise model. To 
begin, it may appear that the actors in the case could be identified as Andrea 
Francovich, Danila Bonifaci et at, the Italian Republic, the Pretura di Vincenza, 
the Pretura di Bassano del Grappa, the European Commission, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany. However, as was the case in
Cassis de Dijon, the number of actors that had a significant role in the process is
far less. First, neither the Pretura di Vincenza nor the Pretura di Bassano del
Grappa played a significant role in the case. Requesting a preliminary ruling in 
accordance with Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the two Italian courts 
functioned as a conduit by which the case was brought before the European
Court of Justice; they were not involved in the final decision of the case. 
Furthermore, of the plaintiffs, Francovich and Bonifaci (and her colleagues), 
neither affected the decision the Court ultimately made. That their actions
resulted in an example of resolution of incomplete contracting problems 
suggests that the Member States and the Court determine the pace and depth of 
integration, regardless of which forces identify an incomplete contracting issue. 
Similarly, the Commission functioned like the plaintiffs: it served to identify an 
incomplete contracting issue, which was subsequently resolved by the Court. 
While the Commission presented a pro-integrationist statement, arguing even 
that the directive should have direct effect,81 its comments could be no more 
than advisory since the ultimate decision of the case lay in the hands of the
81 Gerhard Bebr, “C-6/90 & c-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, Bonifaci v. Italy," Common Market 
Law Review 29 (1992): 559.
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Court. Once again, it must be borne in mind that while the Commission may 
put forth arguments, the Court is dependent upon the continued support of the 
Member States to maintain its relevance. With regard to the Member States
that participated in the case, their statements can be viewed as reflective of their 
unbridled preferences: they unanimously argued that state liability was 
essentially a national concern and should be resolved under national law, not 
Community.82 While state preferences do play an important role in Court 
decisions, the Court--as will be further explained below—considers the modified 
preferences of the Member States in formulating a decision, rather than such 
unbridled preferences. Next, the Italian Republic can be reasonably assumed to 
occupy the role of one of the more significant players in the case, as can the 
Court. Given that neither the Commission, the plaintiffs nor the Italian courts
played a role in the actual court decision and that the statements of the Member 
States merely reflected their unbridled preferences, we can assume only the
Italian Republic and the Court to be the primary actors.
Second, we assume the actors to be rational. First, the Italian Republic
fought consistently against the Directive 80/987, even evading a prior European 
Court decision which identified Italy’s failure to comply with the directive83 as 
was described previously. Arguing “that the provisions of Directive 80/987 
cannot be considered to be unconditional and sufficiently precise,” the Italian
Republic thus maintained that it was not “obliged to ensure that all the
conditions set out in the directive were met in order for individuals to be able to
82 Ibid., 560.
83 See Commission v. Italy, ECR.
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enforce their rights.”84 Plainly, the Italian government’s unbridled preference 
for not being held liable in the case necessitated challenging the claims of
Francovich and Bonifaci. Similarly, as has been argued, further integration is a
preference of the Court. As will be demonstrated below, such an increase in 
integration is precisely the action the Court took.
Third, the Court played the part of a strategic actor. As an ultimate goal 
of the Court is the success of the European Communities, it can be expected 
that the Court would have judged in favour of integration, which is precisely 
what did occur. However, the Court was careful in not too vigorously pursuing 
such increased integration. Specifically, the Court stopped short of interpreting
the case to conform to direct effect. Instead, the Court took a more cautious
interpretation, holding Italy nonetheless liable for damages. By refraining from 
declaring that the directive had direct effect although simultaneously finding 
Italy liable, the Court strategically moved the integration process forward 
without eliciting opposition from the Member States. According to P. P. Craig, 
“The judgment furnishes a prime example of the style of legal reasoning 
employed by the European Court of Justice, being purposive and teleological in
nature, while drawing upon general Articles of the Treaty, in this instance 
Article 5, for support.”85 Thus, the Court was careful to strategically deepen 
integration, while basing its decision legitimately on the Treaty.
8/1 Francovich v. Ilaly, ECR, 1-5365.
85 P. P. Craig, “Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages Liability,” The Law 
Quarterly Review 109, no. 11 (1993): 597.
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Fourth, modified preferences prevailed. In contrast to the positions 
taken by the Member States, the outcome conformed to another standard. As is 
evidenced in the opening arguments, the Member States were uniformly 
opposed to an extension of Community authority in this area at least in terms of 
their unbridled preferences. However, once it is recognised that this is yet 
another example of the necessity of such a measure for the proper functioning of 
the Union, the calculus changes, and the Member States’ modified preferences 
reflect the notion that they must accept certain measures to achieve the single 
market. According to Helen Smith, “If a Member State goes beyond its powers 
or otherwise violates its obligations, it follows that those individuals adversely 
affected have been denied their rights and should therefore be entitled to sue for 
any quantifiable damage caused. Otherwise, the full effectiveness of 
Community law would be jeopardised.”86 Accordingly, the Member States must 
ultimately sacrifice their unbridled preference and replace them with modified 
preferences to achieve the full benefits of the Communities.
Fifth, the decision was accepted as it conformed to modified 
preferences. As has been previously demonstrated, the Member States argued 
forcefully against the case; however, unlike Italy’s evasion of the directive as 
determined by Case 22/87, Francovich has been accepted by the Member States 
and has subsequently functioned as a “watershed” in the development of the 
Community.87 As the Court declared in its judgement, through Article 5 of the
86 Helen Smith, “The Francovich Case: Stale Liability and the Individual’s Right to 
Damages,” European Community Law Review 3 (1992): 131.
87 Malcolm Ross, “Beyond Francovich,” The Modern Law Review 56 (January 1993): 55.
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Treaty, the Member States have bound themselves “to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations 
under Community law.”88 It follows that the Member States must commit 
themselves to these obligations or the benefits of the Communities cannot be
realised.
Having confirmed that the assumptions of the architect’s compromise 
are applicable to Francovich v. Italy, we turn our attention to the model itself. 
Initially, we can see that that ai was selected from the set A by the Court since 
the ruling clearly supported the integration process. Next, we could
characterise the state nature as either Si or S2 since the modified preferences 
suggest that the Member States were not opposed to further integration. Given
that the Court selected action ai and that the state of nature conformed to either
mi or m2, the architect’s model suggests that the decision would be accepted by 
the Member States regardless if the Member States later decided to alter the 
powers of the Court. Thus, the model reflects the actual outcome of the case. 
Hence, the architect’s compromise appears to offer a useful means by which to
explain the European Court of Justice’s role in European integration. As with 
the Cassis de Dijon decision, the applicability of the architect’s compromise in 
Francovich v. Italy adds further credence to the value of the architect’s 
compromise model as a means by which to explain European integration. The 
remainder of this research project will further examine the model in the aim of
Francovich v. Italy, ECR, 1-5414.
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providing a rigorous alternative to Slaughter and Mattli’s neofunctionalist and 
Garrett and Weingast’s neorationalist models.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined a debate that has emerged between 
proponents of neofunctionalism and neorationalism in the analysis of the 
European Court of Justice. Initially, we identified shortcomings of both of these 
models; however, we also identified their respective strengths. From these 
strengths extracted from present neofunctionalist and neorationalist models, we 
developed the architect’s compromise game-theoretic model as an alternative 
explanation. This model was subsequently tested against two landmark case, 
and through the analysis, it was concluded that the architect’s compromise 
provides a sound explanation of the role of the European Court of Justice in the 
process of European integration. Having recognised the importance of the 
Court in the construction of the European Communities, it is the hope of this 
research that such a model will provide the foundation for further study of the 
European Court of Justice and the Member States through the lens of game 
theory as a means to greater understanding of the European Union. The next 
two chapters will further elaborate on the architect’s compromise model by 
critically examining its five assumptions in preparation for testing the model 
against the cases involving the doctrine of supremacy in the United Kingdom
and Germany.
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Chapter III
The Architect’s Compromise: The Actors and Constitutionalism
Having laid the foundation for a game-theoretic model of the Court’s 
role in European integration, the five assumptions upon which the architect’s 
compromise model is based will be examined in full. In this chapter, the logic of 
selecting the Court and the Member States as the primary actors will be 
presented and explained. In addition, a large portion of this chapter will be 
devoted to evaluating the “constitutional foundation” of the European
Communities since this exerts a significant influence on both the Court’s
authority and the integrity of EC law vis-a-vis the national legal systems of the 
separate Member States. While it has become common to refer to the Treaties
as a “constitution” of the Communities, this research is concerned that such a
convention overlooks the true lack of constitutional legitimacy held by the 
Court. Hence, the actual “give and take” relationship between the Court and
Member States is largely disregarded: specifically, the response by the Member
States to Court decisions, largely neglected by theories such as
neofunctionalism, must also be examined to understand the actual process which
leads to further integration. Moreover, such a simplistic approach, while 
descriptive, fails to recognise the constraints under which the Court operates 
which will be examined in this chapter and in the next. The purpose of this 
chapter is thus to more correctly describe the mutually dependent relationship
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between the ECJ and the Member States and justify their inclusion as the 
primary actors in the architect’s compromise model of integration. Owing to 
the importance of the issue of constitutionalism and the discussion it warrants, 
the remaining four assumptions of the architect’s compromise then will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.
The Actors: The Court and the Member States
As was outlined in the previous chapter, it is assumed that the European 
Court of Justice and the Member States are the primary actors. As this study is 
strictly focused on the Court’s role in the process of European integration, no 
claims will be made concerning the impact of other actors upon integration in 
other spheres of activity, such as the activities of the European Parliament, the 
Commission or the Council, as this would be beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Additionally, the term European integration will be used solely in the context of 
the Court’s role unless otherwise specified. Notwithstanding the fact that a host 
of players above and below the state have a strong impact on the process of 
integration, the Court ultimately owes its legitimacy to the Member States, and 
the Member States must accord respect for the jurisdiction of the Court to reap
the benefits of the Communities. Hence, the architect’s compromise model 
adopts the interaction between the Member States and the Court as the most 
appropriate level of analysis; the following discussion will justify this position.
Initially, the architect’s compromise model identifies the Member States 
and the Court as the primary actors according to their practical influence upon
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European integration. To explain, any number of individuals and groups— 
including lawyers, academics, individual politicians and special interest 
organisations—do, in fact, make contributions to the process of integration. 
However, it must be stressed that recognising the importance of individuals and 
groups is not a concession to neoftinctionalism, remembering that 
neoftinctionalism suggests that only through the study of all these actors above 
and below the state can integration be explained. On the contrary, this study 
believes such an explanation can be derived by studying the outcome of all these 
internal forces. The following discussion will address these points in turn.
To begin, it cannot be overemphasised that the European Communities 
are the product of deliberate decisions of the Member States to initiate and 
perpetuate these institutions. Accordingly, the initial six Member States 
pledged “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe.”1 Obviously, the Member States could not have predicted the details of 
this proposed union; however, it is clear that by ratifying the Treaties and 
subsequently retaining membership in the Communities that the Member States 
believe the benefits of membership compensate for any loss of sovereignty they
must countenance. Furthermore, the Member States joining in 1973, 1981,
1986 and 1995 pledged themselves to the same project, and by association, have 
agreed to abide by the body of European law both that existed prior to their 
membership and that has been adopted subsequently, thereby indicating the
same desire to achieve such a European Union.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Preamble.
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In examining the impact of other possible players on Court deliberations, 
the necessity of limiting the actors in the model to simply the Member States 
and the Court becomes evident. First, as has been previously mentioned, the 
neofunctionalist notion that “the primary players in the integration process are 
above and below the nation-state”2 is misplaced, since the process of decision­
making in the Court and the institutional dynamics of the European 
Communities conflict with this neofunctionalist claim. Second, the institutional
structure of the Communities must be examined in light of the true impact they 
exert upon Court proceedings to illustrate the constraints which frame the
decisions of the ECJ. Third, the actions of the Member States in cases and in 
accepting or rejecting rulings must be critically examined: such an examination 
will demonstrate the pivotal role of the Member States in European integration, 
justifying the logic behind the architect’s compromise model.
Although individual personalities themselves and the variety of 
institutions which they might compose inevitably influence Court decisions, the 
actual decisions belong to the Court itself. To explain, regardless of the fact 
that individuals,3 Member States or European institutions are responsible for the 
particular case brought before the Court, the decision of the Court is a product
2 Anne-Marie Burley and Waller Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration,” Internationa! Organization 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 54.
3 Much has been made over the diversity of individuals involved in legal integration. To 
begin, the existence of various legal systems undoubtedly complicates—and enriches—the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Furthermore, the ever-increasing number of languages of the 
Court further complicates the activities of the Court. However, most experts point out 
that such difference are approaching negligibility in terms of the integration process. 
See, for example, Giuseppe Federico Mancini, “Crosscurrents and the tide at the 
European Court of Justice,” Irish Journal of European Law 2 (1995): 120-133, especially 
121-125.
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of the consensus reached in the judges’ chambers. Therefore, in the decision­
making procedures of the Court, only those actors which are allowed to be a 
party to Court proceedings are relevant to be considered actors in the 
architect’s compromise model. Accordingly, we will consider the Court, the 
Commission, the Council, the Parliament, the Member States and other persons 
or bodies4 to justify the selection of the Court and the Member State (or States) 
as the primary actors in the model.
The Court as an Actor
As the subject of this study, and as the decision-maker in the architect’s 
compromise model, the Court must be recognised as an actor in the model. 
However, in addition to appreciating its status as an actor, it should also be
characterised as a single, unitary actor. While such an assumption runs counter 
to neofunctionalist claims and, on first appearance, might seem rather simplistic, 
such a notion of the Court as a single, unitary actor is the only assumption that 
can be logically made. To explain, the composition, the structure and the 
decision-making procedure of the Court all suggest that the Court is most 
correctly identified as a single unit, as will be subsequently examined in full.
4 Sec K. P. E. Lasok, The European Court of Justice: Practice and Procedure (London: 
Butterworths, 1994), 108.
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The Court: An Overview
Before engaging in a full discussion, it is useful to provide a brief 
overview of the composition of the Court. The Court consists of fifteen judges5 
and nine advocates general.6 “Chosen from persons whose independence is 
beyond doubt,” the Members of the Court are “appointed by common accord of 
the Governments of the Member States for a term of six years.”7 Appointed by 
the Court,8 the Registrar “has the same court duties as the registrar or clerk or a 
national court, but he also acts as secretary-general of the institution.”9 The 
Registrar is not a Member of the Court, and the conditions regarding 
appointment are outlined in the Rules of Procedure.10 The Members of the 
Court are assisted by a staff of translators, legal advisors and administrative
personnel.
The Court as a Single, Unitary Actor
As it is the Members of the Court who grapple over the cases brought 
before the Court, we will now focus more extensively on the dynamics11 of this
5 EEC, Article 165.
6 EEC, Article 166.
7 EEC, Article 167.
8 EEC, Article 168.
9 The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1995), 9.
10 See Lasok, 21.
11 The procedure of the Court consists of three phases: (1) a written phase during which the 
plaintiff will submit a written claim, after which, the defendant will be given an 
opportunity to lodge a response. Then, the plaintiff may write a response, after which, 
the defendant will once again have the opportunity to do the same; (2) a preparatory 
enquiiy phase at the discretion of the Court for the purpose of collecting additional 
information regarding the case; and (3) an oral stage consisting of oral hearings on the
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group. Of paramount importance is the manner in which the Court functions as 
a cohesive unit. Upon taking office, Members pledge to “perform. . . [their]
duties impartially and conscientiously. . . [and to] preserve the secrecy of the 
deliberations of the Court.”12 Hence, the Court maintains a sense of privacy 
regarding its workings and thus protects itself from possible criticism by 
restricting public knowledge of its workings. This, in turn, fortifies the idea that
the Court operates as a single unit. Furthermore, each Member is required to 
sign “a solemn declaration that, both during and after his term of office, he will 
respect the obligations arising from his office, in particular the duty to behave 
with integrity and discretion regarding the acceptance of ‘certain appointments 
or benefits’ after he has ceased to hold office.”13 Hence, even after leaving the 
Court, Members must remain discreet in their actions, which further limits
public understanding of the events that take place within the judges’ chambers. 
Given such restricted access to the workings of the Members of the Court, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to characterise and examine the Court except as
a unit defined by congruity and continuity.
The conventions which constitute the decision-making process of the 
Court further suggest that the Court functions as a single, cohesive unit. While 
it is common knowledge that French14 serves as the working language in the 
judges’ chambers, little more is clear concerning the deliberations. Specifically,
case. See D. Lasok and K P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union 
(London: Butterworths, 1994), 247-249.
12 Lasok, 16.
13 Ibid.
14 Carl Otto Lenz, “The Court of Justice of the European Communities” European Law 
Review 14 (1989): 131-132.
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deliberations are held in secret.15 According to Judge David Edward, the 
deliberations begin as the President of the Court requests the Rappoteur to
comment. Judge Edward further explains:
Thereafter, there is open discussion. . . which goes on until a consensus 
or a clear difference of opinion emerges. If there is a clear difference of 
opinion, the President will take a vote. The discussion may then 
continue or it may be left to the Rapporteur to produce a new draft (or a 
first draft). Once consensus is reached, the Court goes over the 
Rapporteur’s draft page by page.16
In the voting procedure, the order of votes occurs progressively from the most 
junior to the most senior judge.17 Given such a process, a single judgement 
emerges which is the product of the entire Court. The convention of secrecy 
ensures that the particular contribution and ideas of individual members of the
Court held in private are concealed within a uniform judgement which the public 
receives, further suggesting that the Court is best characterised as a single,
unitary actor.
In addition to the secrecy that surrounds the deliberations of the judges’ 
chambers, no dissenting opinions are given.18 Such a system is enhanced by the 
collegiate approach used by the Court in which the separate Members of the 
Court operate as a single body. Judge Edward further explains:
All members of the Court are responsible, up to the last minute, for 
making the judgment as good as it can be, even if they disagree with the
15 EEC, Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic 
Community, Article 32.
16 David Edward, “How the Court of Justice Works,” European Law Review 20 (1995): 
556.
17 Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law: The Essential Guide to the Legal 
Workings of the European Community (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 164.
18 L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994), 260.
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result. The system assumes that there will be perfectly legitimate 
differences of opinion between judges but that, where such differences 
exist, the view of the majority must prevail.19
Through such a collegiate approach, the Court—despite the fact it is composed 
of judges drawn from various languages, legal traditions and nationalities— 
inevitably functions as a cohesive unit which ultimately issues a unanimous 
decision. Judge Ulrich Everling adds “. . . there is frequently particular dispute 
over questions that leave no trace in the reasoning of the judgment. . . , but 
reaching agreement on them is so difficult that the Court prefers not to mention 
them.”20 Thus, the decisions of the Court should be regarded as a collective 
action, albeit done by individuals, but inevitably taking the form of a single, 
coherent judgement.
As “the existence and the nature of a disagreement within the court itself 
is not disclosed,”21 the Court can further be thought of as a unitary actor. 
Advocate General Francis Jacobs suggests that the introduction of dissenting 
opinions might foster the disintegration of the common jurisprudence the Court 
has forged “from the variety of legal systems of the Member States.”22 
Additionally, Jacobs suggests that “the authority of judgments of the European 
Court is still relatively fragile, and there is a risk that its judgments would carry 
less authority if they were not presented as the collective wisdom of the whole
19 Edward, 556.
20 Ulrich Everling, “The Court of Justice as a Decisionmaking Authority,” Michigan Law 
Review 82 (April/May 1984): 1308.
21 Ami Barav, “The Court of Justice of the European Communities,” The Role of Courts in 
Society, ed. Shimon Shetreet (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), 417.
22 Francis G. Jacobs, “The Member States, the Judges and the Procedure,” La Cour de 
Justice des Comntunautes Europeennes et les Etats Membres (Brussels: Editions de 
TUniversite de Bruxelles, 1981), 16.
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Court.”23 24Given the lack of dissenting opinions and the decision-making 
procedures, it is further apparent that the Members of the Court function as a 
single unit, bound by secrecy, and issuing unanimous decisions; therefore, the 
present research is resolute on the necessity to examine the Court as a unit.
The advocates general play an important advisory role to the ECJ by 
submitting their own opinions on the case. Based on the French Commissaire 
du Gouvernement in the Conseil d'Etat^ the function of the advocate general 
in a case is “to ensure that [in] the interpretation and application of the treaties 
the law is observed”25 by issuing legal analyses on the cases before the Court. 
Despite this advisory role the advocates general play, the architect’s 
compromise model does not analyse their contributions separately since they do 
not participate in the actual decision-making process. Martin Vranken notes 
that the contribution of the advocates general is undoubtedly of a lesser value 
than the Court’s since “only the court is the institution that is officially entrusted 
with the observance of Community law.”26 Thus, although this research will 
often mention the reasoning of the advocates general, these submission do not 
play a large role in the architect’s compromise model.
23 Ibid., 16-17.
24 Kirsten Borgsmidt, “The Advocate General at the European Court of Justice: A 
Comparative Study,” European Law Review 13 (1988): 106.
25 Ibid., 107.
26 Martin Vranken, “Role of the Advocate General in the Law-Making Process of the 
European Community,” Anglo-American Law Review 25, no. 1 (Januaiy-March 1996): 
60-61.
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Other Institutions
Having established that the Court functions as a single actor with respect 
to the architect’s compromise model, the remaining institutions must be
examined in terms of their merit to be considered actors in the model to justify
the inclusion of only the Court and the Member States. First, it must be 
recognised that the Commission submits observations in all cases before the 
Court dealing with preliminary rulings.27 According to Chrisham and 
Mortelmans, such observations “are a useful and sometimes necessary 
supplement to the frequently unclear questions.”28 However, aside from its 
responsibility in investigating particular cases to provide observations, the
Commission can play no particular role in European integration in the theatre of
the Court, which allows the architect’s compromise model to exclude it as one
of the primary actors. Likewise, the Council and Parliament, despite the fact 
they have both contributed significantly to proceedings before the Court (in 
lodging observations, for example), play no part in the actual decision-making 
process. Thus, these institutions are not considered relevant to the architect’s 
compromise model of European integration.
Additionally, to recognise every individual, group, sub- and supra-state 
actor which has ever brought suit before the Court is simply beyond the scope
27 See Article 177, EEC Treaty. See also C. A. Crisham and K. M. Mortelmans, 
“Observations of Member States in the Preliminary Rulings Procedure before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities,” Essays in European Law and Integration, eds. 
David O’Keeffe and Henry G. Schermers (Antwerp: Kluwer, 1982), 56.
28 Crisham and Mortelmans, 56.
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of analysis. The fact that particular individuals are unquestionably responsible 
for initiating cases, presenting evidence and ultimately making decisions fails to
undermine the central issue: the Member States, in the EU’s present inter­
governmental form, are key players in decisional processes. They ultimately 
decide whether or not to implement decisions and co-operate with the Court,
resulting in a bargaining game between the Court and the Member States.
Additionally, in the case of legal integration, the Court is the primary actor and,
thus, interacts within the structure created by the Member States.
Member States
Although the Member States do not play a particular role in the
decision-making within the judges’ chambers of the Court, they represent an 
indispensable force to be examined in any study of the Court’s impact upon 
integration. Ulrich Everling points out the reason for this important position the 
Member States occupy: “The Community is not a state and also not a federal 
state but a special system in which the Member States have a dominant role.”29 
Despite the fact they have clearly ceded elements of their sovereignty to the
Court and are thus bound by the decisions of the Court, the Member States 
have defined and continue to refine the boundaries of European integration. 
According to Jean-Victor Louis, “While the institutions have received from the
treaties an important legislative power, the execution of Community law
29 Ulrich Everling, “The Position of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its 
Institutional System,” Polish Yearbook of International Law 19 (1991-1992), 49.
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depends essentially on the Member States.”30 The Solange31 decisions in 
Germany illustrate the importance of the Member States in terms of the 
acceptance ECJ decisions. As will be demonstrated in a Chapter VII, these 
cases prove that the legitimacy of the Court rests upon the reception of 
European law by the Member States, and failure by a particular Member State 
to co-operate with the Court significantly undermines its legitimacy within that 
state, as is illustrated by Solange I. The architect’s compromise model captures 
this important element by its incorporation of the concept of modified 
preferences and the inclination of the ECJ to conform to these preferences in 
issuing decisions.
Since national courts possess the power to refer to the ECJ, and 
therefore, can grant legitimacy to the ECJ by consistently appealing for 
preliminary rulings in matters of European law or by strictly adhering to the 
ECJ’s case law, they play an important role in the expansion of European law. 
Conversely, the national courts can deprive the ECJ of legitimacy by ignoring its 
jurisdiction,32 given that “the decision to refer a matter to the Court of Justice
30 Jean-Victor Louis, “Ensuring Compliance and Implementation by Member States,” 
European Economic and Business Law, eds. Richard M. Buxham et ai. (Berlin: Waller 
de Gruyter, 1996), 38.
31 See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide und Futtermittel, European Court Reports (1970): 1125-1155; Case 2 BvL 
52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide 
und Futtermittel, Common Market Law Reports 2 (1974): 540-592; Case 126/81,
Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Federal Republic of Germany, European Court Reports 
(1982): 1479-1501; Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wiinsche
Handelsgesellschaft, Common Market Law Reports 3 (1987): 225-265; Case 2 BvR
2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty, 
Common Market Law Review 1 (1994): 57-108.
32 This will be subsequently addressed in full detail with regards to the historical and 
philosophical positions of national courts to the jurisdiction of the European Court.
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rests exclusively with the national court.”33 Hence, the national courts play an 
important role as a component of the actor we identify as the “Member 
State(s) ” While national courts over the past few years have largely adhered to 
Article 177, such respect for preliminary rulings has not always characterised 
the relationship between national courts and the ECJ. Gerhard Bebr explains 
the liberty the national courts possess:
Seeking to recognize the supremacy of Community Law the courts 
encounter obstacles and difficulties originating in the national legal order 
within which they operate. They apply Community law within the 
context of their respective constitutional structure and practice 
influenced and formed by principles, legal thoughts and tradition which 
differ from one member State to another. To a certain extent these 
difficulties have preconditioned the various attitudes of municipal courts 
towards Community Law and its relation to municipal law. They may 
also explain the hesitancy or even resistance of municipal courts to 
accept the supremacy of Community Law. Particularly in the early years 
of the operation of the Community it is hardly surprising that municipal 
courts viewed this relation through biased glasses, coloured by their 
traditional constitutional experience and practice. This understandable 
position, however much it may be regretted, may help to explain the 
different impacts the Court’s case law has had on municipal courts, and 
their divergent case law.34
While Article 177 is intended to produce the uniform application of European 
law in all the Member States,35 it has also allowed the French Conseil d'Eta?6
33 Ami Barav, “The Judicial Power of the European Economic Community,” Southern 
California Law Review 53, no. 1 (November 1979): 510. Article 177, which grants 
national courts the responsibility to appeal for preliminary rulings, contain the following 
provisions:
“Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that 
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable 
it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
“Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, the 
court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.”
34 Gerhard Bebr, “How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts?” Common 
Market Law Review 11 (1974): 7.
35 See Case 107/76, Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Common Market Law Reports 2 (1977): 334-358.
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to ignore its responsibility to appeal for preliminary rulings, proving that the 
ECJ is ultimately dependent upon the separate national institutions for its 
legitimacy. Given its importance, the behaviour of the Conseil d'Etat in 
rejecting the authority of the ECJ will be more folly examined in Chapter V.
The Court and Constitutionalism
As was explained in the introduction to this chapter, the Court’s so-
called “constitutional role” is directly related to the legitimacy of European law,
and thus, it is essential to address this concern folly. Specifically, if the ECJ is 
truly a constitutional court for the Communities, its decisions should not be 
challenged. However, if the Court is less than a constitutional court, then the
Member States retain the authority to guard their respective jurisdictions in
opposition to the ECJ. On this particular point, the present analysis must
examine the complex and often misrepresented notion of the Court as a
constitution-maker.
The debate over whether of not the Treaties establish the constitution
for the European Union is fundamental to understanding the authority and
legitimacy of the Court. It is the opinion of this research that the Treaties do 
not establish such a constitution since ultimately authority remains with the
separate Member States. Nonetheless, owing to the substantial authority
transferred to the Community institutions and the varied and numerous tasks *
36 This will subsequently be discussed in greater detail with regards to the establishment and 
acceptance of supremacy of European law.
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which the Communities have been called upon to perform, the Treaties have 
provided a de facto constitutional framework. There is wide disparity between 
the Court and the Member States on this issue, with the Court holding that it is 
such a constitutional court,37 while the Member States have expressed an 
opposite view.38 Given these contradictory views, a thorough discussion on this 
matter is warranted.
In his seminal article on the Court, Eric Stein suggests that “the Court
has construed the European Community Treaties in a constitutional mode rather 
than employing the traditional international law methodology.”39 Weiler and 
Haltern argue that such was the impact of Stein’s article on European legal 
scholarship that the ECJ was no longer even considered an area within 
international law.40 According to its own assessment, the Court recognises the 
role it must inevitably play in building a “constitution” for the Communities.
Accordingly, the Court stated in an opinion in 1992:
The EEC-Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international 
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a 
Community based on the rule of law. . . . The essential characteristics of 
the Community legal order which has thus been established are in 
particular its primacy over the law of the Member State and the direct 
effect of a whole series of provisions (of Community law).41
37 See, for example, the Court’s ruling in Opinion 1/91, Re the Draft Treaty on a European 
Economic Area, Common Market Law Reports 1 (1992): 245-275; and The Proceedings 
of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European Communities, no. 
15/95 (22 to 26 May 1995): 4.
38 See the Solange cases, for example.
39 Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution,” American 
Journal of International Law 75 (January 1981): 1.
40 J. H. H. Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltern, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order- 
Through the Looking Glass,” Harvard International Law Journal 37, no. 2 (Spring 
1996): 421-422.
'11 Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 269.
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However, this research holds that although the Court has functioned to shroud 
the Treaties in a guise of “constitutionalism,” the Communities lack a
constitution and the Treaties do not fulfil this device in the traditional sense 42 43
Since the third Solange^ decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German 
Federal Constitutional Court) in which the German court held that Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz remained with the Member States and not with the Court, this 
particular issue has been the subject of intense discussion,44 with scholars 
divided on whether or not the Treaties provide a constitution for the
Communities. While no consensus exists with regard to the legitimacy for the 
supra-national character of Community law, it is clear that the “constitution” the
Court has fabricated lies on unstable ground. According to Weiler and Haltern,
“The Community has adopted constitutional practices without any underlying 
legitimizing constitutionalism.”45 This concern lies at the foundation of the 
present research’s assertion that the legitimacy of the Court remains contingent
upon the Member States, and hence, this issue will now be examined in full.
42 According to Advocate General Francis Jacobs, “In many respects, however, the Treaty 
does not have the character of a constitution. First, it does not contain many of the 
general provisions usually found in national Constitutions. In particular, although it 
guarantees particular social and economic rights, such as the right of men and women to 
equal pay for equal work and the right of workers and the self-employed to move freely 
between the Member Stales, the Treaty does not contain a comprehensive catalogue of 
fundamental rights. Secondly, the Treaty contains many provisions which would not 
traditionally be regarded as being of a constitutional character, such as substantive rules 
on competition.” F. G. Jacobs, “Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a 
Constitutional Court?,” Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and 
National Law (Dublin: Butterworlh, 1992), 26.
43 See Brunner.
44 See Theodor Schilling, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of 
Possible Foundations,” Harvard International Law Journal 37, no. 2 (1996): 389-409; 
and J. H. H. Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltern, 411-448.
45 Weiler and Haltern, 423.
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Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and International Law
Lacking a true constitution, the European Union (the Court of Justice 
specifically) relies upon a precarious source of legitimacy. According to Ulrich 
Everling,
Courts in States receive their legitimation from constitutions, from 
which their traditional position obtains its justification. The Court of 
Justice relies on Article 164 of the EC Treaty, according to which the 
Court is to ensure that “in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty the law is observed.” It is, however, not bound in the same way 
as national courts by a network of institutional relationships, for the 
constitutional system of the Community has not yet been secured and in 
part receives its legitimation indirectly from the Member States.46
Specifically, the Communities originated from treaties in the style of 
international law; however, the process of integration has seen the Court’s 
decisions attempt to convert supra-national agreements into a constitutional
form. The fundamental problem is that without a true constitution, the 
legitimacy of the Communities flows not from the Treaties themselves but from
the Member States’ continued respect for them; therefore, the Court is not 
wholly independent of the Member States as it possesses no inherent 
jurisdiction.
In a recent issue of the Harvard International Law Journal, Theodor
Schilling argues that the Treaties fail to provide a true constitution for the
Communities while Joseph Weiler and Ulrich Haltern have taken the opposing
46 Ulrich Everling, “Reflections on the Reasoning in the Judgments of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities,” Festskrift til Ole Due (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads 
Forlag, 1994), 58.
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view.47 A review of the basic aspects of this debate is pertinent to the present 
discussion. Theodor Schilling adamantly argues that “at its inception, the 
European Community was clearly a creature of international law,”48 and that 
“the European Treaties are still creatures of international law.”49 Schilling 
further reasons the “ultimate umpire” in the system is not the ECJ since it 
possesses only “persuasive authority.” Instead, the Member States hold the 
decisive authority “concerning the scope of the competences they have 
delegated” to the European Communities.50 Finally, Schilling concludes that the 
Court does not enjoy “exclusive competence” as it adjudicates international law 
and not constitutional. As such, “the ECJ’s reliance on the rule of law can only 
be rhetorical,” and despite the fact the Court has been highly successful in 
employing this rhetorical rule of law to gain the compliance of the Member 
States, the Court derives its legitimacy from the voluntary co-operation of the 
Members rather than from any so-called constitution which has arisen from the
Treaties.51
The reasoning of Schilling has been challenged by Weiler and Haltern. 
Conceding that the European Community does, in fact, lack the foundation of a 
constitution, Weiler and Haltern nonetheless argue that “. . . attempts such as
those by. . . Schilling to try to push the toothpaste back into the tube by
47 See Harvard International Law Journal 37, no. 2 (1996): 389-409 (Schilling) and 411­
448 (Weiler and Haltern).
48 Schilling, 403. Schilling refers the reader to J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of 
Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 1991): 2413.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 407.
51 Ibid, 408.
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asserting that the Community is nothing more than an International 
Organization are self-serving (to the Court) and unhelpful in addressing the real 
problem of legitimacy.”52 In contrast, Weiler and Haltern regard the life of the 
Communities as the process of the federalising of Europe. Accordingly, it is 
argued that prior to the Single European Act (SEA), the Member States could
individually—as the agreement of all State was required—regulate “the legislative 
expansion of Community jurisdiction/competences/powers”; therefore, placating 
any fears of alleged activism by the Court. Interestingly, Weiler and Haltern
further argue that with the adoption of the Single European Act and, thus,
majority voting, the Member States no longer enjoy de jure or de facto veto
power, which thus limits their individual ability to restrain Community actions.
The authors then proceed to argue that the SEA grants the Union—and not the
Member States singularly—the authority to determine the boundaries of the 
Court’s jurisdiction.53 As will be explained below, such reasoning is not 
indicative of reality, and the present research project will instead, in concurrence 
with the logic of Schilling, demonstrate that the authority of the ECJ is still very 
much dependent upon the Member States.
While Weiler and Haltern construct an impressive argument against 
Schilling’s thesis, they cannot explain away the fact that without a constitution, 
the European Communities lack Kompetenz-Kompetenz and thus an inherent 
source of legitimacy. As the lack of a specific source of legitimacy underlines 
the bargaining process assumed by the architect’s compromise model, it is
52 Weiler and Haltern, 423.
53 Ibid., 442-448.
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necessary to examine the issue raised by Schilling and Weiler and Haltern more
thoroughly. However, before attempting to unravel the truth in the claims of 
Schilling and Weiler and Haltern, and hence whether or not the body of 
European law issued by the Court to fill in the gaps of the Treaty forms a
constitution for the EU, the definition of a constitution must be established.
Constitutions: Some Definitions
Legal scholars have attached two distinctive meanings to the term 
“constitution”: both a narrow and a broad meaning.54 To begin, the narrow 
meaning is described by Bradley and Ewing as “a document having a special 
legal sanctity which sets out the framework and the principle functions of the 
organs of government within the state, and declares the principles by which 
those organs must operate.”55 The American Constitution is often cited as 
reflective of this meaning of the term. This type of constitution is 
characteristically written, and among liberal democracies, only Israel and Britain 
are lacking such a constitution.56 In contrast to the narrow meaning, Wheare 
provides a broad definition in stating:
... it is used to describe the whole system of government of a country, 
the collection of rules which establish and regulate or govern the 
government. These rules are partly legal, in the sense that courts of law 
will recognize and apply them, and partly non-legal or extra-legal, taking 
the form of usages, understandings, customs, or conventions which
5A See, for example, Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (London: Butterworths, 
1987), 1.
55 A. W. Bradley and K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed. 
(London: Longman, 1993), 4.
56 Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. 
(London: Penguin Books, 1994), 10.
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courts do not recognize as law but which are not less effective in 
regulating the government than the rules of law strictly so called.57
In comparing the Treaties and the subsequent bodies of European law to the 
foregoing definitions of a constitution, the corpus of European law fails to meet 
the requirements of either definition. The following section will illustrate the
reasons why the Treaties do not constitute a constitution in a narrow sense
while the section thereafter will demonstrate that the Treaties also fail as a
constitution according to its broad definition.
Constitutions in a Narrow Sense
Initially, the Treaties and subsequent law cannot be regarded as a 
constitution in the narrow sense, and the purpose of the following section is to
justify the current research’s reason for arguing such. Usually written, a
constitution in this sense refers to the specific document which establishes the
rule of law of the state for which the constitution is given effect. De Smith and 
Brazier note that such written constitutions usually share two features: “They 
will be the fundamental law of the land; and they will be a kind of higher law.”58 
On the first count, given that its execution is dependent upon the co-operation 
of national governments and national courts, European law simply cannot be 
considered the chief law of the land. The Court’s self-proclaimed doctrine of
supremacy has been highly successful, but such success flows not from an 
inherent jurisdiction of the ECJ but from the modified preferences of the
57 K. C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 1.
58 De Smith and Brazier, 4-5.
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Member States as will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters. 
Furthermore, given the particular inter-governmental character of the European 
Communities--in which the Member States are the primary actors in drafting 
and revising the Treaties—the legitimacy of European law is contingent upon the 
resolve of the separate Member States to maintain it. Secondly, while European 
law has been largely granted supremacy59 it can only be regarded as a higher law 
in the narrow fields in which it operates, and even then, it is conditional upon 
the satisfaction of the heads of government who hold the power to amend the
Treaties. Furthermore, the Treaties have never been altered to contain the
doctrine of supremacy of European law over national law; the Court of Justice
itself established the principle.
Moreover, it is difficult to consider the Treaties as a constitution since
they were drafted for the purpose of establishing international organisations and
thus were not endowed with constitutional authority. As the Communities have 
been compared to the United States from time to time, such a comparison to 
illustrate the lack of constitutional authority of the European Treaties is indeed
proper. Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States 
establishes the document as the supreme authority on American law.60 
However, the various Treaties that form the European Communities lack a clear
59 As will subsequently be shown, the Member States have not always acquiesced to the 
concept of supremacy, which is particularly clear with regards to the French Conseil 
d’Etat and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.
60 United States Constitution, Article 6, Section 2 reads: “This Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United Stales which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Conlraiy notwithstanding.”
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statement of the supreme constitutional authority. Moreover, while the 
implementation of the Treaties forming the European Communities depended 
upon the ratification by the “Member States”61 or “High Contracting Parties”62 
in a similar manner to the American Constitution’s contingence upon its 
ratification by state “Conventions,”63 the ratification of the European Treaties 
were conditional upon the “constitutional requirements”64 of the Member States 
while the ratification of the American Constitution was conditional upon no 
other constituent constitution.65 Hence, the enactment of the European Treaties 
required the approval of the constituent Members of the Community in
accordance to their own constitutions while the establishment of the American
Constitution involved the elevation of the document as the supreme law, binding 
all those states which ratified it for this purpose. Thus, while the authority of 
the American Constitution is explicit and inherent in the document itself, the 
authority of the Treaties which form the European Communities is derivative, 
lacking clear expression in any of the documents.
Similarly, constitutions generally validate themselves by basing their 
legitimacy upon “the people” of a particular state. According to Whaere, “The 
people, or a constituent assembly acting on their behalf, has authority to enact a
61 See, for example, the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), Article 99.
62 See, for example, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), 
Article 247, Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 
Article 224 or the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article R., Section 1.
63 United States Constitution, Article 7.
64 See ECSC, Article 99; EEC, Article 247; Euratom, Article 224 and TEU, Article R, 
Section 1.
65 United States Constitution, Article 7.
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Constitution.”66 This is exactly the manner in which the American Constitution 
premises its authority.67 While such a statement clearly makes for good 
rhetoric, Whaere stresses this “statement is regarded as no mere flourish. It is 
accepted as law.”68 Hence, constitutions derive their authority in a manner 
philosophically similar to the theoretical establishment of the social contract: 
the “people” agree to a particular binding higher law. In stark contrast is the 
European Treaties’ regard for the people and its source of legitimacy. Without 
repeating the reasoning above, it can simply be postulated that the source of 
legitimacy for the Treaties comes not from the “people” but from the Member
States themselves according to their separate constitutional provisions.
Whereas the contracting parties of the United States Constitution theoretically 
constitute “the people,” those of the European Treaties are specifically the 
governments of the Member States. Furthermore, while the concept of
European citizenship has become embedded as a fundamental element of
European law, such a concept derived not from a higher law but from the inter­
governmental co-operation of Member States establishing this idea in Part Two, 
Article 8 of the amended European Economic Treaty.69
66 Whaere, 54-55.
67 See the Preamble of the United States Constitution.
68 Whaere, 55.
69 See EC Treaty. (The Treaty on European Union formally changed the name of the 
Community from the “European Economic Community” to “European Community”; 
hence, the term EC Treaty or simply EC will be used henceforth to refer to the former 
EEC Treaty after the ratification of the TEU.) Part Two, Article 8, Section 1 reads: 
“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.” Section 2 continues: “Citizens of the 
Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties 
imposed thereby.”
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Additionally, the nature of the Treaties in relation to “the people” 
reflects a system basing its legitimacy not directly on the people but aiming to 
achieve a higher level of integration among the people of the Member States. 
Specifically, Title I., Article A of the TEU contains the provision: “This Treaty 
marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen.”70 Hence, the authority for European law does not flow from “the 
people” (from bottom to top) but from the top downwards, finding its
legitimacy in a system imposed by the Member States. As a result, unlike the 
American Constitution which justifies its legitimacy upon “the people,” the 
European Treaties find their legitimacy in the limited fields ceded by the 
Member States, which is dependent upon each of the Member States’ respective 
constitutions. Likewise, the European Court of Justice depends upon the same 
source of legitimacy and must operate within its designated jurisdiction or risk 
repercussions from the Member States. As the foregoing discussion has 
illustrated some of the reasons why the European Treaties cannot be considered 
a constitution in the narrow sense, it is now necessary to evaluate the ability of
the Treaties to form a constitution in the broad sense.
Constitutions in a Broad Sense
As with the narrow definition of a constitution, neither the Treaties nor 
the recognised body of European law accurately conforms to the concept of a
TEU, Title I, Article A.
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constitution in broader terms. While the Treaties and subsequent legal acts do 
represent an “assemblage of laws, institutions and customs,”71 this source of law 
lacks the authority of the respective national constitutions of the Member 
States. Whaere suggests that constitutions generally “claim to possess the 
authority not of law only but of supreme law,”72 73giving two reasons for this. 
First, logic dictates that the constitution must supersede other laws or it would 
fail to serve the purpose for which it was created—an authoritative source of 
law—as is the logic of the Marbury v. Madison13 case in American law. Second, 
the constitution is the result of the actions of one which has the authority “to 
make supreme law.”74 However, as has been previously established, the 
European Communities rest upon an inter-governmental structure, and unless 
the Member States endow the Communities with constitutional authority, the 
Court’s jurisdiction will depend precisely on the willingness of the Member 
States to co-operate with the European institutions. To state this plainly, 
without transferring Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the Communities, the Treaties 
cannot be transformed into a constitution for Europe. Hence, despite the
Court’s consistent inclination to cloak its decisions with the trappings of 
constitutionalism, the body of European law remains something other than a
constitution.
71 From Bolingbroke, A Dissertation Upon Parties (1733), quoted in Wheare, Modern 
Constitution, 2; and Bradley and Ewing, 4.
72 Whaere, 56.
73 United States Supreme Court. William Marbury v. James Madison, Secretary of State of 
the United States, United States Supreme Court Reports, 1 Cranch (1803): 136-179.
74 Whaere, 56-57.
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Complicating the debate on the constitutional nature of the Treaties is a 
steady stream of influential literature which assumes the ECJ to be a 
constitutional court.75 A purely descriptive model of the European Court might 
lead one to believe that it is, in fact, the constitutional court of the Communities.
This description is bounded up in the various roles the Treaties affirm, which are 
particularly well-sketched by Ole Due:
The Treaties not only define the tasks of the Communities; they also set 
out the general principles to be respected by the Member States as well 
as by the Community Institutions; they establish the Institutions and 
provide them with the powers necessary for performing the tasks of the 
Communities; they install a complicated system of checks and balances 
between the Institutions; they define the relations between the 
Communities, their component States, third countries and international 
organisations; they regulate the effect of Community acts within the 
internal legal order of the component State and they authorize the 
Community Institutions to make rules and take decisions directly binding 
on the individual subjects of these States.76
Due further contends that in these tasks, the Treaties assume greater 
responsibilities than is customary for agreements establishing and governing 
international organisations, and thus concludes, that the Treaties fulfil “the same 
functions as the Constitution of a federal State.”77 Additionally, Koen Lenaerts
75 Weiler and Haltern make the point by stating, “Literature on this point is endless.” 
(Weiler and Haltern, 420, note 36) Beyond Stein’s celebrated work (“Lawyers, Judges, 
and the Making of a Transnational Constitution”), see, for example, Donal Barrington, 
“The Emergence of a Constitutional Court,” Human Rights and Constitutional Law: 
Essays in Honour of Brian Walsh, ed. James O’Reilly (Dublin: The Round Hall Press, 
1992), 251-261; Ole Due, “A Constitutional Court for the European Communities,” 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law: Essays for the 
Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O’Higgins, eds. Deidre Curtin and David O’Keeffe (Dublin: 
Butterworth, 1992), 3-10; Koen Lenaerts, “Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of 
Federalism,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 38 (1990): 205-263; Federico 
Mancini, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe,” Common Market Law Review 26 
(1989): 595-614; and J. Rinze, “The Role of the European Court of Justice as a Federal 
Constitutional Court” Public Law (1993): 426-443.
76 Due, 4.
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justifies the Court’s perceived constitutional character by examining the Court’s 
influence on the horizontal and vertical separation of powers-specifically, the 
Court’s role as arbitrator between firstly, the European institutions, and 
secondly, the Member States and the Community.78 Federico Mancini presents 
a well-argued and reasonable account of the Court’s contribution toward 
constitutionalising the Treaties, especially with regard to the establishment of 
the principles of direct effect and supremacy.79 Clearly, such descriptions of the 
“constitutional” character that the Court has embraced are useful in
understanding the Court’s role in the integration process; however, they fall 
short of appreciating the narrow base of legitimacy upon which the Court rests
as will be addressed below.
Problems of Assuming a European Constitution
The fatal error in assuming that the Treaties have become 
“constitutionalised” or that the European Court has become a constitutional 
court for Europe is that it fails to acknowledge the true structure of the 
European Communities. Whether friend or foe of European integration, it has 
become fashionable to depict the Court as the centrepiece of an evolving 
European constitution in much of the literature dealing with the ECJ. Those 
hostile towards integration charge the Court of wilfully wrestling national 
sovereignty from the hands of the individual Member States while those looking
78 Lenaerts, 208-210.
79 Mancini, 596-602.
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favourably upon the integration process confidently overlook the fact that the
Communities remain primarily inter-governmental and carelessly discount the 
potential problems that can arise from a lack of a constitutional foundation. In
both views, the idea that the European Union is marching towards a federal 
state seems to underlie the respective exuberance or despair for further 
integration. However, a closer look at the issue reveals a very different story, 
one that is tremendously important for the current research.
To begin, the European Union is an international organisation; it is not a 
federal state. The Treaties do lay the foundation for this community of states, 
but they do not form a constitution. Whaere notes that for a constitution to be 
accepted as the source of law, . . it must have been enacted or approved or 
promulgated by a body recognized as competent to make law.”80 While the 
Member States do possess the power to make law, they did not grant a
wholesale transfer of this power to the institutions of the Communities, and 
thus, they retain the constitutional authority within the EU. The determining 
factor is that the European Treaties lack the authority of a constitution.
To further examine these issues, it is necessary to distinguish between a 
community established through a treaty and a state which is founded upon a 
constitution. To explain, Kelson maintains that when a treaty confers 
administrative powers regulating foreign relations and “other functions of the 
contracting states” on an organ of the community created by the contracting
80 Whaere, 52.
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states, and a constitution is “stipulated by that treaty,” then such a community 
will have the character of a state.81 Kelsen further explains:
By concluding such a treaty and submitting to the federal constitution, 
the contracting states lose their character as states in the sense of 
international law. They become so-called component states of the 
federal state. . . . The centralization in the field of foreign affairs may 
not be complete; the component states may have some competence left 
in this respect, for instance, the power to conclude treaties with third 
states in certain limited fields. . . . But since the component states have 
this competence in accordance with the federal constitution, the organs 
of the component states, in concluding treaties within the competence 
conferred upon them by the federal constitution, may also be considered 
as indirect organs of the federal state, [or], . . the federal state acting, in 
certain respects, through a component state.82
Following Kelsen’s reasoning, if a group of contracting states forms a
community, and if the treaty forming that community endows its organs 
administrative power equivalent to that of the centralised organs of a state, then 
the community constitutes a federal state. Counter to this supposition, we can 
infer that if these conditions are not met by the contracting parties to the
community, and such a centralised organ is not created, then a federal state is
not created. Hence, Kelsen argues that the difference between a federal state 
and a non-federal state lies in the fact that the federal state is characterised by a 
greater deal of centralisation. Accepting this, we turn again to Kelsen’s
reasoning on such non-federal state structures:
An organized international community is constituted by a treaty which 
institutes special organs of the international community for the 
pursuance of the purpose for which the community has been established. 
This community is an “international” community; it has not the character 
of a state. The legal order laid down in the constituent treaty has the 
character of international not of national law if the centralization does
81 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., rev. and ed. Robert W. Tucker 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston: 1967), 260.
82 Ibid., 260-261.
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not reach that degree which is characteristic of a state. An organized 
international community is an international organization. In 
contradistinction to a federal state, it is a confederation of states. 
German terminology, which distinguishes between Bundesstaat (“federal 
state”) and Staatenbund (“confederation of states”) is more precise.83
Thus, Kelsen distinguishes between a federal state and a confederation of states 
according to the degree of centralisation,84 and this distinction provides a 
relevant element to the present discussion. Specifically, according to the logic 
of Kelsen, the Treaties cannot technically be a constitution unless the 
Communities are, in fact, a federal state. As it is a safe assumption to regard the
Communities as being something less than a federal state, the Treaties,
therefore, cannot be a constitution. Hence, it is apparent that the Court does
not enjoy an independent, inherent source of legitimacy, but one derived from 
the constitutional legitimacy of the separate Member States, ultimately proving 
the dependence of the Court upon the Member States for its own authority as
will be described in greater detail below.
The Court’s Dependence Upon the Member States
It is clear that the Member States (both individually and collectively) 
have and still exert a determining influence on the Communities. As was
alluded to above, not only have the Member States defined the stage upon 
which the Court acts, but they also indirectly provide legitimacy to the Court.
83 Ibid., 262.
84 Kelsen actually warns against assuming the European Communities to be even a partial 
federation. He does, however, concede that the Communities do represent a high level of 
centralisation in particular areas; however, due to the limited tools for enforcement of acts 
of the Communities and lack of its lack of authority in foreign and military affairs, he 
argues that it cannot be considered a federation. (Kelsen, 263-265)
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Federico Mancini points out that in contrast to federal constitutions that “enjoy 
higher-law status with regard to the laws of the contracting powers,” the 
Treaties do not claim such authority.85 86Unlike the German Basic Law which 
states “Bundesrecht bricht Landesrecht” or the American Constitution that
declares “the laws of the United States. . . shall be the supreme laws of the
land,” the Treaties are silent on the supremacy of law. Through such cases as 
Costa v. ENEL™ the Court has established the principle of supremacy for 
Community law87 by arguing that without Community law enjoying supremacy 
over national law, the network of European law would fail to provide the 
regulation necessary for the success of the internal market and other projects of 
the Communities. However, to assume that the Court unilaterally created such 
a device fails to appreciate the dynamics that allowed and even fostered the 
Court’s creation of the principle of supremacy.88
In particular, despite the fact that the Member States have, in fact, 
“limited their sovereign rights. . . and have thus created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves,”89 such events should not be 
interpreted as the result of the Court’s ability to push integration. Rather, the 
Member States delegated to the Court the responsibility to fill in the gaps of the 
Treaties which necessitated such Court decisions. According to Mancini, 
“. . . the recognition of Community pre-eminence was not only an indispensable
85 Mancini, 599.
86 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
87 Mancini, 599.
88 This point will be subsequently discussed in greater detail.
89 Costa v. ENEL, 593.
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development, it was also a logical development.”90 Unless Member States 
delegated to the Court the final authority in matters concerning the 
Communities, the Union could not actually exist91 Rather, the European 
Communities would simply be an international organisation dependent solely 
upon the whims of the Member States. Joseph Weiler argues that the gradual 
growth of the Court’s authority
. . . constitute^], in a strict sense, a necessary condition for the effective 
functioning of the Community as a system in which common policies and 
common rules can have the force of law and be translated into effective 
action. Without these the Community would be completely at the mercy 
of the Member States, not merely as regards the adoption of policies but 
also as regards implementation; moreover the actual obligations 
undertaken by the Member States when signing the Treaty in 1957 could 
have remained a dead letter or not much more.92
While it has been argued that the Court has bypassed the Member States in the 
construction of its “constitution,”93 the neofunctionalist argument that the 
Member States accept decisions because the Court cleverly masks controversial
decisions behind “that technical field law” simply falls apart. Once again, it
must be stressed that the Member States delegated this authority to the Court
and have not been alarmed enough to reduce its jurisdiction. Richard Plender 
actually asserts that the Member States purposely left the Treaties ambiguous to 
allow the Court to fill in the gaps in the manner it felt most fitting. Accordingly,
Plender remarks:
90 Mancini, 600.
91 The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities no. 15/95 (22 to 26 May 1995).
92 Joseph Weiler, “Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law 
Relevant?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (1982-1983): 45.
93 See, for example, Stein, “The Making of a Transnational Constitution.”
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What are we to make of the use of ambiguous language by the 
negotiators? We certainly cannot conclude that the Member States were 
blind to the ambiguity. ... I suggest that we must infer this: that the 
Member States preferred to avoid resolving their differences by a precise 
form of words which they might well have used if they had been 
prepared to press the matter to a vote. . . . They therefore remitted to 
the European Court the task of resolving the conflict at an unspecified 
later stage. The language used in the Treaty. . . defines and limits the 
Court’s jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute. It sets the confines 
of the Court’s power.94
Thus, a very accurate description of the Court and the Member States could be 
drawn as follows: the Member States, who have designated the Court’s 
jurisdiction but have retained the power to alter it, are nonetheless bound by the 
decisions of the Court as a prerequisite to the realisation of the benefits of the
Communities.
Additionally, the legitimacy of the Court is tied up with the Member 
States’ willingness to accept its rulings. According to J. Rinze:
The continued existence of the consent between the Member States and 
the general readiness to observe common Community rules depends very 
much on the functioning of the “give and take” process between the 
Member States, i.e. on the general acceptance of the same rules by all 
Member States. Only in this way can all Member States be sure that 
certain disadvantages imposed on them by Community law will be 
compensated by certain advantages granted by Community law. . . . 
Thus, as in federal states, the observance of the Community rules by all 
Member States is absolutely crucial for the continued existence of the 
Community, and there must be an independent and neutral ultimate 
arbiter.95
Naturally, there are flaws in this system, and non-compliance by Member States 
is certainly a reality. According to Weiler, “. . . one should not be misled to 
think that no violations, by Member States, Community institutions, or
94 Richard Plender, “In praise of Ambiguity,” European Law Review 8 (1983): 315-316.
95 J. Rinze, 432.
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individuals, occur. They occur regularly and, as Community activities and 
impact expand, increasingly.”96 Advocate General Carl Otto Lenz reiterates this 
lack of compliance by noting that in the late 1980s, the European Parliament 
identified about fifty judgements of the ECJ which Member States have not 
acted upon. Furthermore, Lenz points out that only about eighty percent of the 
ECJ’s preliminary rulings are precisely followed by national courts.97 Leila
Sadat Wexler adds:
Enforcement of the Court’s judgments has been good—but not excellent- 
-by member state governments. . . . The Court itself has not stood by 
helplessly in the face of member state defiance, holding in Francovich 
that a member state’s failure to implement a directive already sanctioned 
by the Court in article 169 enforcement proceeding could entitle a 
person to claim compensation for damages sustained as a result of the 
member state’s failure to implement. . . [Community law]. In addition, 
article 171 (2) of the TEU would allow the Court, upon a request by the 
Commission, to impose pecuniary sanctions on a recalcitrant member 
state.98 99
Hence, Article 171 (2)" has formally given the Communities a tool through 
which Member States might be compelled to comply with the laws of the
Community—or suffer the consequences of breaking laws. However, the Court 
does, in fact, occasionally make decisions to which the Member States show
little compliance. A classic example—and one which will be described 
subsequently—is the manner in which the French Conseil d’Etat effectively 
ignored the rulings of the ECJ until fairly recently. Such a phenomenon
96 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 
1991): 2464.
97 Lenz, 138.
98 Leila Sadat Wexler, “The Role of the European Court of Justice on the Way to European 
Union,” Europe after Maastricht, ed. Paul Michael Liitzeler (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
1994), 172-173.
99 Treaty on European Union, Article 171 (2).
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underscores the complex relationship between the Member States and the 
Court: the Court is dependent upon the Member States for legitimacy, but the
Member States are also dependent upon the Court for the continued integration
of Europe, and the benefits this brings.
Conclusion
In short, the Court and the Member States are inextricably linked 
together in the process of European integration. Ulrich Everling explains:
It is undisputed that the Community’s institutions are only competent to 
act as far as sovereign powers are given to them by the Treaty. This 
limit is not only to be respected by the political institutions but also by 
the Court when it decides about the validity of acts of the institutions or 
interprets the Treaty. But the sum of the numerous and broad powers 
transferred to the Community is more than a mere patchwork carpet. 
The Court is an independent body pursuing political and economic aims 
defined by the Treaty. The competencies must be coherently and 
teleologically interpreted in order to enable the institutions to 
accomplish the aims of the Treaty.100
As has been argued, based upon the Court’s position in the decisional process as 
defined by the Member States in the Treaties, the Court must be identified as an 
actor. Additionally, as the founders of the Communities, the Member States
must be considered primary actors in the model. Moreover, the absence of a 
true constitution and the legitimacy gap this inevitably brings to the Court
demands that the Member States be included in any model of European 
integration. Finally, given this complex relationship between the Member States
100 Ulrich Everling, “The European Court of Justice and Interpretation of the Treaty,” The 
Developing Role of the European Court ofJustice (London: European Policy Forum and 
Frankfurter Institut, 1995), 52.
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and the Court, any model of legal integration should place special interest on 
this theatre of judicial-political interaction. Moreover, such a model of 
integration should be able to incorporate and explain non-compliance as well as 
compliance to Court decisions as the idea of modified preferences does in the 
architect’s compromise model. These modified preferences and the remaining 
assumptions will be addressed in the following chapter, completing the 
theoretical construction of the model in preparation for its testing against the 
acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy, particularly in the United Kingdom 
and Germany, which will comprise the remainder of this research.
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Chapter IV
The Architect’s Compromise Model and its Remaining Assumptions
In the preceding chapter, the first assumption of the architect’s 
compromise was explained as well as the related issue of constitutionalism and
the Treaties. The debate concerning constitutionalism received particular
attention, owing to its extreme importance in the logic behind the architect’s 
compromise model. This chapter will address the remaining assumptions of the 
architect’s compromise model in detail. First, the rationality of the Court and 
the Member States--as the primary actors in the model-will be demonstrated. 
Secondly, the assumption of the Court as a strategic actor will be justified with
a short discussion of the common perception of the Court practising periods of 
activism and self-restraint. Third, the idea of modified preferences will be 
addressed. Although the architect’s compromise model makes two separate 
assumptions concerning modified preferences (the Court usually conforms to 
modified preferences when making decisions and the Member States can be 
assumed to accept Court decisions when they conform to modified preferences),
the discussion will address the assumptions together since they are so closely
related. The purpose of this chapter is thus to justify the claims that have been 
made previously concerning the architect’s compromise model of European
integration.
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Rationality of the Actors
Having already established that the Court and the Member States are 
recognised as the primary actors in the architect’s compromise model, the 
rationality of the actors will be examined. As has already been argued,1 the term 
“rationality” is laden with controversy; however, defined as purposeful activity 
in pursuit of one’s goals, rationality faces no particular problems in the present 
research. Therefore, within the realm of the activities of the European Court of
Justice, this study will argue that rationality—as defined by purposeful 
behaviour—predominates. Thus, the following section will initially demonstrate 
the issue of rationality as evident by the Court’s teleological approach; 
subsequently, the rationality of the Member States will be discussed, focusing 
on their purposeful behaviour.
The ECJ: A Rational Actor with a Teleological Approach
To begin, the actions of the European Court of Justice are reflective of 
rational behaviour. Specifically, in the case of the Court, purposeful behaviour 
involves behaviour which further enhances and realises the aims of European 
integration as outlined in the Treaties. According to Ulrich Everling, 
“Consequently, when the Court is in the process of reaching a decision it 
engages in a work of construction which, in a certain sense, reflects the entire
See Chapter I.
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process of European integration in which it is embedded.”2 It is widely held3 
that the Court relies greatly on a teleological approach4 in which the ECJ 
interprets the Treaties in a purposeful manner as to strengthen European law. 
Through adopting such an approach, the Court’s preference for further 
integration becomes apparent. It is on this point that we turn to a fuller 
discussion of the teleological approach and what it reveals concerning the
actions of the Court. Such an examination of teleology will illustrate the
manner in which the Court engages in purposeful behaviour.
In a teleological approach, a certain action is preferred when it promotes 
a particular end.5 According to Brown and Kennedy:
The term teleological is applied to an interpretation which is based upon 
the purpose or object of the text facing the judge. This approach, which 
is increasingly favoured by the Court, is peculiarly appropriate in 
Community law where, as we have seen, the Treaties provide mainly a 
broad programme or design rather than a detailed blue-print.6
2 Ulrich Everling, “The Court of Justice as a Decisionmaking Authority,” Michigan Law 
Review 82, nos. 5 and 6 (April/May 1984): 1307.
3 Much of the literature cited in this section concerns teleology, especially, for example, J. 
Mertens de Wilmars, “Reflexions sur les Methodes d’lnterpretation de la Cour de Justice 
des Communautes Europeennes,” Cahiers de Droit Europeen (1986): 5-20; and Bastiaan 
van der Esch, “The Principles of Interpretation Applied by the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities and their Relevance for the Scope of the EEC Competition 
Rules,” Fordham International Law Journal 15, no. 4 (1991-1992): 366-397.
4 Nancy (Ann) Davis, accepting the reasoning of Rawls, recognises a division between 
moral theories into teleology and deontology. A deontological approach suggests certain 
actions are immoral in themselves and cannot be justified regardless of the ends. In 
contrast, teleology suggests that particular acts should be regarded as moral or immoral, 
or right or wrong, based on the ends they achieve. Nancy (Ann) Davis, “Contemporary 
deontology,” A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1991), 205-206.
5 See John N. Adams and Roger Brownsword, Understanding Law (London: Fontana 
Press, 1992), 36-40. The present research recognises the Court’s use of the teleological 
approach in many circumstances but makes no comment on the morality of such 
approach, especially regarding its association with utilitarianism.
6 L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994), 316-317.
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Ulrich Everling addresses teleology and the Court as follows:
. . . the Court of Justice. . . . must draw guidance from the specific tasks 
defined in the Treaty and the results, which must be pursued and 
expanded upon, hitherto achieve on the basis of those tasks. This 
involves primarily securing the Common Market by applying the 
prohibition of discrimination and restrictions, by guaranteeing the 
conditions of competition, by ensuring a common position toward other 
countries and by protecting persons affected by unlawful acts. The 
Common Market constitutes the starting point for the entire integration 
process and all attempts at more far-reaching economic and political 
progress stem from it. Running like a red thread through the whole of 
the Court’s case law is the idea that this core of the Community must 
remain sacrosanct7
Thus, from a teleological approach, the Court is bound by the Treaties to 
accomplish their aims. According to Article 164, “The Court of Justice shall 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed.”8 Therefore, the Court is bound to bring about the Treaties’ 
objectives in accordance with the rule of law. Moreover, the Court, as an 
institution of the European Communities, is thus bound “to promote throughout
the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment 
and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, 
and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.”9 The 
fact that the Court employs a teleological approach which attempts to bring to
fruition the aims of the Treaties confirms the Court’s rationality under the 
criteria of purposeful behaviour. Lord Slynn of Hadley writes that
Everling, “Court of Justice and Decisionmaking Authority,” 1305. 
EEC, Article 164.
TEU, Article 2.
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“‘teleological’ is synonymous with ‘purposive,’” and the “Court may, in 
application of a teleological interpretation, go so far as to override the clear, 
ambiguous words of a legal text.”10 The idea of the Court employing a 
teleological approach has also been verified fairly recently by Mertens de 
Wilmars, a former President of the Court. While recognising different methods 
of interpretation, Mertens pays particular attention to teleology given the 
framework established by the Treaties for the completion of a specific goal.11 12
The case law of the Court contains prime examples of teleological 
interpretations. One such case is Costa v. ENEL?1 which established the 
doctrine of supremacy of European law. However, it was virtually axiomatic 
that the Court would rule in favour supremacy when one considers that the
Court was established under the Treaty to ensure that the laws are observed.
Without recognising supremacy, the Member States would not be bound to any 
of the provisions to which they had signed, and the Communities would be no 
more than a traditional international organisation without any mechanism for
enforcement, with no ultimate legal authority. Instead, adopting a teleological 
approach, the Court reasoned for the fulfilment of the objectives in the Preamble 
and other parts of the Treaty, a doctrine of supremacy must be embraced and, 
accordingly, founded this principle in Costa and strengthened it in its further
rulings.
10 Lord Slynn of Hadley, “They Call it ‘Teleological’,” The Denning Law Journal (1994): 
226.
11 See J. Merten de Wilmars, 5-20.
12 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
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Recalling that, for the purposes of the architect’s compromise model, 
purposeful activity was established as the criteria for rational behaviour, the 
Court’s use of a teleological approach verifies the rationality assumption. In 
addition, the consistency with which the Court strives to strengthen EC law 
further suggests the Court’s rationality. According to Guiseppe Tesauro,
There is no doubt that one of the aims pursued is to ensure the 
rationality and harmony of the system. And the endeavours being made 
by the Court of Justice to that end seem at least to be consistent, in so 
far as they are directed towards every aspect of the system, in particular 
the preliminary ruling procedure, not only in itself but also in relation to 
the other procedures relevant to judicial review. That applies above all 
where the aim pursued is that of extending judicial protection of rights 
and making it ever more effective.13
Thus, as a rational actor, motivated by purposeful behaviour, the Court seeks to
act in a consistent manner. Ulrich Everling notes:
The procedural elements relevant to legitimation are, therefore, 
particularly important. According to Max Weber, institutions legitimate 
themselves through their rationalism, their tradition and their charisma.17 
For courts, procedural principles such as publicity and transparency in 
the passing of judgments, the neutrality and independence of the judges, 
and the equal treatment and the opportunity for the parties concerned to 
be heard are paramount. Of central significance is the plausibility of the 
reasoning in the decision made, the persuasive power that they radiate 
and the answer that they give to the arguments of the parties. These are 
particularly important for the Court of Justice.14 * *
17 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Studienausgabe Koln 1964, p. 
159.
13 Giuseppe Tesauro, “The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection and Cooperation Between the 
Court of Justice and the National Courts,” Festskrift til Ole Due (Copenhagen: G.E.C. 
Gads Forlag, 1994), 373.
14 Ulrich Everling, “Reflections on the Reasonings in the Judgments of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities,” Festskrift til Ole Due (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads
Forlags, 1994), 58. (Footnote included)
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In sum, the Court must act in a consistent manner to maintain its legitimacy as 
engaging in erratic and arbitrary behaviour would most assuredly undermine its 
authority. Moreover, the fact that the Court undertakes such a consistent 
approach to its decision-making responsibility verifies the assumption of 
rationality. The Court’s rational approach will be further described in a related 
manner during the subsequent discussion of the Court as a strategic actor; 
however, it is first necessary to justify the rationality assumption for the
Member States.
Rationality and the Member States
Having established that the Court of Justice represents a rational actor
based on its teleological approach to the Treaties, its consistency and its general
commitment to purposeful activity, we now turn to the other primary actors in
the architect’s compromise model: the Member States. As with the Court, the 
Member States exhibit rational behaviour based on their display of purposeful 
activity. While it is virtually impossible to ascertain all the individual goals and 
ambitions which motivated each of the Member States to join the Communities 
and indeed the policy makers within them, it can be reasonably assumed that 
security and economic interests were particularly important during the 
establishment and continuance of the Communities. As has been previously 
discussed,15 the Community of Six grew out of the initial agreement for joint 
supervision of the coal and steel making industries of Germany and France. In
15 See Chapter I.
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forming the European Coal and Steel Community, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands deliberately ceded an element of their 
respective sovereignty with the intent of receiving greater security (or at least to 
lessen the threat of another war). Believing they could achieve similar successes 
in the atomic energy sector and at a larger economic level, the Member States 
purposely established Euratom and the EEC. Whether or not the formation of 
these Communities represents the optimal solution to the problems facing 
Europe after the Second World War is a moot point with regard to the present 
definition of rationality. Instead, having adopted “purposeful behaviour” as the
criteria, the formation of the Communities suggests the rationality of the 
Member States to the extent that they did, in fact, display purposeful behaviour
in the establishment of the Communities.
In addition to the founding of the Communities, the periodic
enlargements are the result of purposeful behaviour by the non-founding
Member States. Without recognising greater benefits within the Communities
versus outside, states would have no motivation for joining (as was the case in
Switzerland and Norway). The continued expansion and the expression of 
interest by a number of Member States suggests that many states recognise net 
benefits to membership. States which have joined after the Communities’ initial 
establishment also reflect purposeful behaviour in ceding an element of their
sovereignty for membership. For example, in the case of the United Kingdom, 
the Government calculated that the benefits of membership were greater than 
the costs. In the Command Paper of July 1971, it was reported that “. . . Her 
Majesty’s Government are convinced that our country will be more secure, our
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ability to maintain peace and promote the development of the world greater, our 
economy stronger, and our industries and people more prosperous, if we join 
the European Communities than if we remain outside them.”16 According to 
such logic, membership in the Communities was worth a certain loss of 
sovereignty, and despite occasional (although increasingly and more forceful) 
arguments against the Communities, the United Kingdom continues to value 
membership over non-membership. According to the criteria for rationality, 
Britain meets such an assumption since it has purposely joined the Communities
and continues to remain within the Communities. Likewise, we can assume the
other Member States to be rational actors as they too have purposely joined the 
Community for various benefits (such as access to a larger market and increased 
security) and continue to maintain their membership despite any short-term 
disagreements.17
The Court as a Strategic Actor
The architect’s compromise model next assumes that the Court is a 
strategic actor. Specifically, we recognise the Court as holding the goal of a 
successful European Union. Naturally, the Court is concerned with upholding 
the rule of law; however, in the earlier discussion of teleology, it was
determined that the Court does, in fact, make its decisions in a manner to best 
realise the aims of the Treaties. Hence, the Court has the mandate to pursue
16 Cmnd. 4715, The United Kingdom and the European Communities, July 1971, 2.
17 This acceptance of short-term sacrifices for the overall benefits of membership will 
subsequently be discussed in full detail with regards to modified preferences.
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integration as is outlined in the Treaties. According to Henry Schermers, “It is 
to the credit of the Court that it always protected the Community interest, even 
against the wishes of the Member States, and that it did not accept a right of the 
collective Members—or the majority of them—to give an interpretation of the 
Community Treaty, but rather adhered to the original intentions.”18 A 
formidable literature supports the idea of a Court steadily pursuing the goal of 
European integration. However, the danger of both overestimating and 
underestimating the authority of the Court in this area is real, and schools of 
thought on either spectrum have clouded the issue. While a thorough study of 
the debate over judicial activism and the Court is beyond the scope of this 
research, a brief sketch of this issue nonetheless illustrates the degree to which
the Court functions as a strategic actor.
The Court has been criticised for pursuing integration through its 
teleological approach, and at the extreme, the Court has been accused of judicial 
activism. Gavin Smith argues that the Court’s “judgements have not 
infrequently crossed the dividing line between interpreting and applying the law 
and actually creating it. In particular, there is concern that the Court has been 
too ready to depart from the plain wording of the texts in its desire to promote 
European integration.”19 Echoing the same concerns, Sir Patrick Neill has
commented:
18 Henry G. Schermers, “The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Free Movement of 
Goods,” Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, vol. 
1, eds. Terrance Sandalow and Eric Stein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 222-223.
19 Gavin Smith, The European Court of Justice: Judges or Policy Makers? (London: The 
Bruges Group, 1990), 9.
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The Treaty texts and directives agreed between the Member States may 
at any time be given by the Court a meaning and impetus that may not 
have been contemplated by the negotiators. The national law of 
Member States is subject to annulment, not only in the light of the 
Court’s interpretation of these texts, but also pursuant to general 
principles of law developed by the Court on its own initiative (e.g. the 
doctrine of proportionality). Whatever the views of Member States— 
and frequently they strongly oppose the ruling ultimately adopted by the 
Court—the decisions of the Court stand unchallenged and can only be 
altered by Treaty amendment. Even in that regard. . . the Court has 
called in question the power of Member Sates to make any amendment 
which alters the central role of the Court as guardian of “the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty.”20
After sketching the impact of early Court decisions prior to the UK’s accession, 
Neill focuses on key decisions affecting European integration following the 
advent of British membership. In doing so, Neill criticises the reasoning and the
“activism” of the Court and finally concludes with a hostile analysis of the 
Court. Specifically, Neill accuses the ECJ of being an unorthodox court with a 
mission for pushing forward European integration.21
In response to Neill’s criticism, Lord Howe effectively counters Neill’s 
arguments. To begin, Howe points out that the formative decisions of the 
Court’s first few decades were fundamental to establishing a European rule of
law since the Treaties were grossly incomplete in prescribing the precise legal 
environment that the Communities would assume. Thus, Howe argues that the
ECJ could not simply interpret the Treaties, and instead, it was motivated to 
establish working procedures in the absence of a “pre-existing legal system to
20 Patrick Neill, The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism 
(London: European Policy Forum and Frankfurter Institut: August 1995), 1.
21 Ibid., 47-48.
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work with.”22 Moreover, Howe argues that courts in general have engaged in 
establishing law by their successive rulings in case law and draws particular 
attention to “judge-made law” in Britain as a classic example of the very activity
for which Neill condemns the ECJ. In sum, Howe appears to suggest that Neill 
regards the Court as having a rather static mandate: to refrain from ever 
veering from a strict interpretation of the Treaties’ text. However, Howe is 
correct to argue that such a restraint on the actions of the Court is virtually 
impossible—especially given the Court’s role of filling in the gaps of the 
Treaties.23 Furthermore, recognising the Court’s necessary use of a teleological 
approach, the criticisms of Neill lose their potency.
In addition to Neill, Trevor Hartley accuses the Court of engaging in 
judicial activism, systematically attacking several doctrines established by the
ECJ. To begin, Hartley accuses the Court of activism in its adoption of direct 
effect given that it is conspicuously absent from the Treaties. Moreover, 
Hartley suggests that the Court’s judgement in Van Duyn v. Home Office™ 
violates Article 189 since the case suggests the direct effect of directives despite 
the freedom for implementation granted to the Member States by the Treaty. 
Next, Hartley accuses the Court of overstepping its jurisdiction in giving 
preliminary rulings on international agreements, citing Haegeman™ SPI™
22 The Rt. Hon. The Lord Howe of Aberavon, “Euro-Justice: Yes or No?” European Law 
Review 21 (June 1996): 191.
23 Ibid., 187-198.
24 Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office, European Court Reports (1974): 1337.
25 Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, European Court Reports (1974): 449­
474. In Haegeman, the Court held that Article 177 granted the Court jurisdiction over 
international agreements.
26 Joined Cases 267 to 269/81, Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa 
Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI), European Court
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Sevince21 Foto-Frost2* and Busseni* * 27 28 29 as evidence. Finally, Hartley attacks the 
Court over its rulings on annulment action. For example, Hartley accuses the 
Court of extending the right—against the text of the Treaty—to bring annulment 
actions to the European Parliament, citing the Chernobyl case.30
However, perhaps the most outspoken critic of the Court for its 
engagement in “judicial activism” is Hjalte Rasmussen. According to
Rasmussen,
In defiance of much European tradition, the European Court engaged in 
a teleological, pro-Community crusade, the banner of which featured a 
deep involvement which led it to give primacy to pro-integrationist 
public policies over competing ones that were often, even outside the 
ring of losing litigants, considered as meriting some protection.31
Rasmussen suggests at least five examples by which the Court has engaged in 
judicial activism. To begin, Rasmussen argues that the Court extended the 
prohibition of “quantitative restrictions and measures with equivalent effect” of 
Article 30 far beyond the spirit of the Treaty. Next, Rasmussen suggests that
Reports (1983): 801-845. In SPI, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to interpret
GATT.
27 Case C-192/89, S. Z. Servince v. Slaatssecretaris van Justitie, European Court Reports 
(1990): 1-3461-1-3507. In Sevince, the Court ruled that in international institutions 
established with non-Member States, the rules of Article 177 also apply.
28 Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Liibeck-Ost, European Court Reports (1987): 
4199-4235. In Foto-Frost, the Court ruled that it had the sole authority to declare a 
Community act invalid.
29 Case C-221/88, European Coal and Steel Community v. Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni 
SpA (in Liquidation), European Court Reports (1990): I-495-I-530. In Busseni, the 
Court determined that the measures adopted under the ECSC Treaty fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
30 Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council of the European Communities, European 
Court Reports (1990): 1-2041-1-2075. Trevor C. Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial 
Objectivity and the Constitution of the European Union,” The Law Quarterly Review 112 
(January 1996): 95-109, especially 95-102.
31 Hjalte Rasmussen (1988), “Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for 
the European Court,” European Law Review 13 (1988): 37.
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the Court interpreted the Treaty’s silence on the issue of supremacy to indicate 
that Community laws thus have supremacy over any national laws. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the Treaties which recognise direct applicability of 
Community law to the Member States only as the exception, the Court firmly 
established direct effect as a cornerstone of European law in Van Gend en Loos 
as was mentioned previously.32 In addition, Rasmussen points out that the 
Court simply invented the principle of pre-emption. Finally, Rasmussen 
suggests that “the Court even assumed responsibility for rewriting the text [of 
the Treaty] in question.” Specifically, Rasmussen argues that the Court, in the 
face of strong French opposition, interpreted the Euratom Treaty in light of the 
EEC Treaty, thereby suggesting the creation of a “common market” for the 
atomic industry when such was simply not suggested in the Euratom Treaty.33
However, the Court is not without its defenders in these accusations of
activism. While admiring its scholarship, Mauro Cappelletti takes exception to 
Rasmussen’s activist thesis,34 suggesting that “it is based on some wrong and 
often biased premises.”35 Additionally, Takis Tridimas argues that “criticism 
against the Court on grounds of judicial activism tends to be based on a 
selective analysis. . . . What is more, judicial activism is a term not easily 
susceptible to objective determination. Whether a decision is active or not
32 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport—en Expedite Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, European Court Reports (1963): 1-30.
33 Hjalte Rasmussen, “The Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Process of 
Integration,” Federalisme et Cours Supremes/Federalism and Supreme Courts, Edmond 
Orban et al. (Montreal: Les Presses de TUniversite de Montreal, 1991), 205-206.
34 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative 
Study in Judicial Policymaking (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986).
35 Mauro Cappelletti, “Is the European Court of Justice ‘Running Wild’?,” European Law 
Review 12 (1987): 3.
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depends on one’s standpoint.”36 Tridimas further argues that periods of 
apparent activism or self-restraint by the Court cannot be interpreted as 
conscious actions by the Court. Instead, they simply represent either the areas 
in which the Court must fill in the gaps or areas in which the Community has 
reached a degree of maturity and requires less judicial intervention.37
The fact that the Court has been the subject of such intense criticism 
simply underlines the important role the Court has assumed in the process of 
integration. Not wishing to become drawn into the debate, the present research 
simply recognises that the Court does play the part of a strategic actor, 
employing a teleological approach to decisions. We recognise that the Court 
does hold particular preferences, to the extent that a teleological interpretation 
finds its goals in the Treaties, and that the Court follows these preferences to 
the extent that cases lend themselves to the process of integration. However, 
the scope for deepening integration is quite limited in most cases, and thus, the 
Court’s action can be more easily described as conforming to deciding cases on 
the rule of law. In other words, the Court does pursue further integration 
through its teleological approach, but a great number of cases do not lend 
themselves to providing the Court with an opportunity to further integration to 
any great extent. These case, as can be recalled from Chapter II, can also be 
accommodated by the architect’s compromise.38
36 Takis Tridimas, “The Court of Justice an Judicial Activism,” European Law Review 21 
(June 1996), 200.
37 Ibid., 200-202.
38 Namely, these cases can be accommodated by a2, which expresses a Court action which 
leads neither to integration or disintegration. See the appendix following Chapter VIII 
for a full clarification.
150
The ECJ: Chronology of a Strategic Actor
A historical sketch of the Court perhaps best illustrates the manoeuvres 
of the Court as a strategic actor. Gerhard Bebr summarises the early strategic
actions of the Court:
In its initial jurisprudence, the Court sought first of all to lay down the
foundation of the Community legal order. This is reflected in the leading
cases establishing the fundamental principles of direct effect and
supremacy of Community rules. ... In the following stage of the
jurisprudential development—which is no less important—the Court
appeared anxious, next to preserving the acquis communitaire, to
consolidate and further develop the Community system of judicial 
• 39protection.
Weiler identifies the adoption of four particular doctrines which represent steps 
in the Court’s assertion of its authority: direct effect, supremacy, implied 
powers and human rights.39 40 The present research also adopts these four 
landmarks in European legal integration as illustrative of the Court’s
manoeuvres as a strategic actor.
To begin, the Court’s adoption of the doctrine of direct effect represents 
an early strategic act by the Court to solidify its authority. The doctrine of 
direct effect is summarised well by Weiler: “Community legal norms that are 
clear, precise, and self-sufficient (not requiring further legislative measures by 
the authorities of the Community or the Member States) must be regarded as
39 Gerhard Bebr, “Court of Justice: Judicial Protection and the Rule of Law,” Institutional 
Dynamics of European Integration: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, vol. II, 
eds. Deirdre Curtin and Ton Heukels (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 304.
40 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (June 
1991): 2413-2419.
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the law of the land in the sphere of the application of Community law.”41 When 
a provision has direct effect, it essentially means that the rights of individuals in 
question must be upheld in national courts. While issues of direct effect 
typically involve a private citizen wishing to invoke Community law against a 
public authority, questions of direct effect can also involve cases brought by 
individuals against other private individuals, or cases brought by national 
governments against private individuals. By embracing such a teleological 
approach to the Treaties, the Court has systematically strengthened the legal 
integrity of the Community.
As with the establishment of direct effect, the adoption of the doctrine of 
supremacy illustrates the Court’s attempt to strengthen the integrity and 
authority of European law. In Costa v. ENEL, the Court reasoned:
The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, 
whereby a regulation ‘shall be binding’ and ‘directly applicable in all 
Member States’. This provision, which is subject to no reservation, 
would be quite meaningless if a State could unilaterally nullify its effects 
by means of a legislative measure which could prevail over Community 
law.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the 
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the 
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, 
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept 
of the Community cannot prevail.42
Once again, employing a teleological approach, it is widely recognised that the
Court consciously expanded its jurisdiction beyond the scope of the explicit
41 Ibid., 2413.
42 Costa v. ENEL (ECR), 585.
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wording of the Treaty;43 44however, this action of the Court must be evaluated in 
the overall context of European law. Clearly, without the existence of a 
doctrine of supremacy, the body of European law would be unenforceable- 
relying on the goodwill of the Member States instead. Hence, the Communities 
would not suffer from simply a free-rider problem; instead, they would 
undoubtedly suffer from large-scale non-compliance by various Member States, 
which in turn would eradicate any benefits of community. Thus, the Court’s 
formulation of the doctrine of supremacy functioned to enhance the
effectiveness of the Communities by ensuring that Member States give priority 
to Community law when it conflicts with national law.
Weiler further discusses the Court’s adoption of implied powers. To 
explain, Weiler traces the origins of implied powers to the 1971 case 
Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities^ in which the Court decided that by granting internal competence, 
the Treaties also granted the Communities the power to make international 
treaties, which are binding on the Member States. According to Weiler, “The 
significance of this ruling goes beyond the issue of treaty-making power. With 
this decision. . . the European Court added another rung in its constitutional
ladder: powers would be implied in favor of the Community where they were 
necessary to serve legitimate ends pursued by it.”45 By formulating such
43 See Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 245.
44 Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities, European Court Reports (1971): 263-295.
45 Weiler, 2416.
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authority, the Court further consolidated and strengthened the powers of the 
Community.
Finally, the adoption of a doctrine of human rights represents an 
important step in the constitutional role of the Court. Although the Treaties 
contain no provisions for human rights, the Court began, in a series of cases 
from 1969, to review cases with respect to the shared constitutional principles 
among the Member States with regard to human rights.46 Coppel and O’Neill 
demonstrate that the Court has used the concept of human rights to extend its 
jurisdiction in two manners: offensively and defensively. In terms of a 
defensive use of human rights, the Court began to develop the doctrine in 
response to German and Italian concerns that the Communities would subvert 
the fundamental rights identified at a national level with the increase of 
Community competence. In contrast to the defensive use of human rights, 
which refers only to Community acts, the Court uses fundamental rights 
offensively through applying them the Member States. Furthermore, Coppel
and O’Neill maintain that the Court has been more concerned with the
expansion of legal integration rather than with the substantial development of 
human rights and has thus used the guise human rights instrumentally.
Ibid. 2417.
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The Court as a Strategic Actor: Some Conclusions
Above all, the Court must operate in a manner as to retain its legitimacy. 
Sir Patrick Neill explains that “. . . the Court should move with caution because 
it is very important that it should attract to itself legitimacy for what it does. By 
‘legitimacy’ I mean in this context that the Court should be seen to be acting as 
a judiciary and not as a legislature.”47 In a sense, the actions of the Court 
represent a balancing act between its teleological approach and the preferences 
of the Member States. It would be denying reality to believe the argument that
law constitutes a sacred field which commands authority for its own sake. 
Regardless of the “rule of law,” the political reality remains that the Member 
States maintain the authority to alter the Communities or even abandon the 
entire project. Therefore, the Court must be cognisant of the fact that the 
Member States must continue to recognise the independence and authority of 
the Court, and to maintain this delicate relationship, the Court must assuredly
take into the account the long-term goals of the Member States when making
decisions. Such considerations by the Court to forego its unbridled preferences 
logically lead to the concept of modified preferences, which will be discussed
below.
47 Sir Patrick Neill, “The Constitutional Role of the European Court of Justice,” The 
Developing Role of the European Court of Justice (London: European Policy Forum and 
Frankfurter Institut, 1995), 46.
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Modified Preferences
One of the central ideas of the architect’s compromise is that the Court
and the Member States forego their unbridled preferences for greater ultimate
benefits. Thus, in addition to assuming the Court to be a strategic actor, the 
architect’s compromise model recognises the important role of modified 
preferences in this theatre of European integration. While the idea of modified 
preferences has already been described in cursory terms, a more detailed 
explanation of the concept will now be undertaken. The concept of modified 
preferences is based on the notion that Member States must forego short-term 
national preferences in the expectation of greater benefits as a result of 
Community membership. According to the architect’s compromise model, it is
these modified preferences which characterise both Court decisions and 
acceptance of such decisions by the Member States. As has been suggested 
previously in the discussion of the Court as a strategic actor, modified 
preferences imply that the Court necessarily must consider its decisions in light 
of the (modified) preferences of the Member States. Likewise, the Member 
States can be expected to accept Court decisions as long as they conform to
modified preferences.
The European Court of Justice does not operate in a vacuum. While the
Treaties confer powers upon the Court to make its own judgements, the Court 
must remain cognisant of the fact that the Member States ultimately comprise 
the Union. Ulrich Everling contributes the following concerning the delicate
balance the Court must strike:
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The Court cannot ignore that in the final analysis the Member States 
sustain the Community as its founders and exercise decisive 
responsibility through the Council; it must also consider that they 
independently discharge functions of their own for the common good 
and in order to secure their national existence. On the other hand, 
however, the Member States are incorporated into the Community and 
are subject to Community law and must accept that restrictions are 
placed on them by the case law, including, where appropriate, decisions 
in Treaty-infringement cases.48
Although its case law indicates the Court is more likely to apply a teleological 
approach as has already been explained in detail, modified preferences determine 
the limits of the Court’s rulings. Perhaps the most obvious examples are Foglia
v. Novello Nos. 1 and 2,49
In the cases, the French corporation Novello agreed to purchase wine
from the Italian corporation Foglia, and in the contract, Novello refused any
charges levied by either Italy or France which were contrary to Community law. 
In response to a French tax, Novello refused to pay, and Foglia sued Novello in
the Italian Courts. In its first decision, the Court decided that the matter was
not an issue of European law, and instead was a matter of national concern. In 
contrast to the reasoning of those painting the Court as an activist institution,
the ECJ issued its decision with marked caution; in addition, the Court exhibited
the same cautious behaviour in the second Foglia case. Instead of extending its 
jurisdiction through issuing a decision in the case, the Court refused to rule on 
the case, arguing it was a matter for the national courts. Such a view was 
precisely the position advocated by the French government in Foglia v. Novello
48 Ulrich Everling, “Court of Justice and Decisionmaking Authority,” 1306.
49 See Case 104/79, Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello (No. 1), Common Market Law 
Reports 1 (1981): 45-61; and Case 244/80, Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello (No. 2), 
Common Market Law Reports 1 (1982): 585-627.
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No. 2. It would be too convenient to assume that the Court simply adopted the 
French government’s view. Furthermore, such an explanation is simplistic at 
best and cannot be supported by the history of Court decisions in which the 
Court has at times vigorously opposed the Member States. However, some
factor did exist to cause the Court to restrain its decision. Accordingly, it could 
be argued that as the Court had already determined the rudimentary principles 
of the European legal system; it—at the time of the Foglia cases—had to restrain
its actions in light of the Member States.
In contrast, in the case of Defrenne v. SABENA,5Q the Court 
compromised the principle of the law in its agreement with Ireland and Britain 
that the concept of equal pay for equal work should not be enforced 
retrospectively. Additionally, the Court’s ruling in Keck50 1 represents another 
retreat by the Court from an integrationist stance. In Keck, the Court was 
aware that the French legislation in question did, in fact, restrict businesses from 
using a particular sales promotion, which would suggest that the measure was in 
violation of Community law. However, the Court cautiously ruled that the 
French legislation fell out of the scope of Article 3052 since the legislation 
applied equally to both domestic and foreign products. Moreover, in a study of
50 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne 
Sabena, European Court Report (1976): 455-493.
51 Cases C-267-268/91, Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, Common Market Law 
Reports 1 (1995): 101-125.
52 Article 30 (EEC) reads: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited 
between Member States.”
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the case law of the jurisdiction of the Court, Elizabeth Freeman identifies 
several other cases in which the Court clearly adopts a cautious approach.53
From the cases mentioned above, there appears to be a distinction
between those which actively deepen integration and those which advocate a
more cautious stance. As has been previously established, the concept of 
modified preferences explains the dichotomy between “activism” and “restraint” 
as simply reflecting the Court’s mandate to fulfil the aims of the Treaties 
balanced against the necessity to limit its actions within the boundaries set by
the Member States. Such boundaries exist in a formal extent, as in the actual
wording of the Treaties, as well as on an informal level, such as the political
climate of the Communities at the time of the decision.
The Member States and Modified Preferences
Just as modified preferences affect the scope of the decisions of the 
Court, they also affect the willingness of the Member States to accept Court 
rulings. It is almost axiomatic to state that actors wish to maximise their 
returns, and likewise, states wish to pursue the actions which promise the 
greatest payoffs. Therefore, it could be assumed that Member States which are 
confronted with unfavourable judgements are faced with the temptation to
either ignore the judgement outright or to at least acknowledge the ruling but
53 Elizabeth Freeman, “Decisions of the European Court of Justice relating to the 
Jurisdiction of the Court,” Yearbook of European Law, ed. F. G. Jacobs 1 (1981), 407­
416.
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remain less than eager to abide by it. However, despite a degree of non- 
compliance,54 the Member States largely abide by the rulings of Luxembourg. It 
is the argument of the present research that this is a result of the Member 
States’ realisation that the benefits of the Communities cannot be fully achieved 
without respect for the actions of the institutions. Particularly, without adhering 
to the rule of law, the provisions of the Communities would be as unenforceable 
as a traditional international organisation.
The examples of Member State compliance to unfavourable rulings are 
not difficult to find. The cases of Cassis de Dijon and Francovich have 
previously been cited. Simmenthal55 represents yet another revolutionary Court 
decision that was at odds with the temporal preferences of Member States. 
Specifically, in Simmenthal, Italy, after initial protestations, acquiesced to the 
supremacy of Community law. Likewise, Britain fought vigorously against the 
elevation of European law above national law in the events leading up to the 
decision in Factortame56 however, the Court was resolute in its ruling of 
supremacy of Community law. The remainder of this research will examine 
landmark cases in the area of supremacy of European law vis-a-vis the
architect’s compromise model. In these cases, it will further become apparent
that the Member States have foregone their unbridled preferences and complied
54 See, for example, Mary L. Volcansek, “Judicial Politics: Acceptance, Indifference, 
Defiance,” Judicial Politics in Europe: An Impact Analysis, ed. Mary L. Volcansek (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1986), 245-273.
55 Case 106/77, Amministrazione deile Finanze del Io Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., European 
Court Reports (1978): 629-657.
56 Case 213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. 
And Others, European Court Reports (1990): 1-2433-1-2475; and Case 221/89, Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited and Others (No. 2), 
Common Market Law Reports 3 (1990): 589-632.
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with European law z/z general (but not always, as will be illustrated
subsequently), confirming the logic of the architect’s compromise model.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on explaining the remaining assumptions of the
architect’s compromise model of European integration. By demonstrating that
the Court employs a teleological approach to decision-making and that the 
Member States have engaged in purposeful action with regard to their 
membership in the Communities, it has been shown that the primary actors in
the model act rationally. In addition, the discussion on judicial activism and 
restraint underlines the relevance of considering the Court as a strategic actor,
which conforms to the third assumption of the architect’s compromise model.
Finally, the discussion on modified preferences illustrates both the constrains the 
Court faces when making decisions and the manner in which Member States
accept Court decisions. Having firmly established these assumptions, it is 
suitable to proceed with testing the model against further Court decisions.
Thus, in the following chapter, after a short examination of the doctrine of
direct effect, the doctrine of supremacy will be explained with the aim of
providing the foundation for the case studies on the United Kingdom and
Germany which will follow in Chapters VI and VII, respectively. Through such
testing, the research will illustrate the ability of the architect’s compromise 
model to correctly explain the Court’s role in the process of European
integration and the acceptance of ECJ decisions by the Member States.
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Chapter V
The Doctrine of Supremacy in European Law
The doctrine of supremacy and the concept of direct effect form the 
cornerstones of European law.1 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
origins and development of the doctrine of supremacy as it serves as the area of 
law which will be tested against the architect’s compromise model; however, it 
is also necessary to briefly examine direct effect since supremacy is built upon 
this prior doctrine. Established by the Court in Van Gend en Loos1 as was 
mentioned previously, direct effect simply means “the immediate enforceability 
[of Treaty provisions] in national courts by individual applicants.”3 This device 
greatly enhanced the enforceability of Community law since it allows individuals 
to bring cases directly against an offending Member State for failure to fulfil 
Community obligations, instead of relying on the much slower process by which
another Member State or the Commission brings the case under Article 169 or
170.4 Mancini refers to Costa v. ENEL5—the case which established the
5 Jean-Victor Louis, The Community Legal Order, 3rd rev. ed. (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications, 1993), 131.
2 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport—en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, European Court Reports (1963): 1-30.
3 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 153.
4 Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law: The Essential Guide to the Legal 
Workings of the European Community, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 337.
5 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
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principle of supremacy of European law—as the “sequel of Van Gend en Loos.''6 
In Costa, the Court determined that national law is overridden in the limited 
field of European law agreed upon by the Member States. Hence, in a truly 
groundbreaking decision, the Court ruled that within the area of European law, 
it was the supreme authority. The concept has been largely accepted by the 
Member States; however, such acceptance has not been without challenges to
the Court’s authority, which thus makes the doctrine of supremacy especially 
intriguing to examine by the architect’s compromise model since it clearly 
illustrates the bargaining process implicit in this model. To determine further 
the aptitude of the architect’s compromise model for explaining the ECJ’s role 
in integration, the model will be tested with regard to the concept of direct 
effect and the doctrine of supremacy. After a brief overview of direct effect and 
the Van Gend en Loos decision, this chapter will examine supremacy in light of 
the Treaties, the issue of sovereignty, reception of the doctrine by France and 
the Costa case. Before this discussion, however, it is necessary to examine the
concept of direct effect.
Direct Effect
Direct effect was devised by the ECJ and is not contained in any of the 
Treaties. While a number of scholars7 have argued that Article 189 (EEC)8
6 G. Federico Mancini, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe,” Common Market Law
Review 26 601.
7 See, for example, Louis, 131.
8 The relevant section of Article 189 (EEC) reads: “A regulation shall have general 
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.” The Euratom Treaty in Article 161 contains the same provision, as Hartley
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implies this power, the Court’s formulation of this principle nonetheless 
conforms to the notion of the Court as a strategic actor as explained in the 
architect’s compromise model, particularly illustrating the Court’s teleological 
approach. Pierre Pescatore outlines the purposeful manner in which the Court 
established the principle of direct effect in Van Gend en Loos by explaining: 
“The reasoning of the Court shows that the judges had ‘une certaine idee de 
l’Europe’ of their own, and that it is this idea which has been decisive and not 
arguments based on the legal technicalities of the matter.”9 Hence, in 
establishing direct effect, the Court departed from the exact wording of the 
Treaties and filled in the gaps, effectively transforming European Community 
law from pure international law into a new creature.10 The Court succeeded in 
doing so due to its purposeful approach to the interpretation of the Treaties, 
which seeks to maximise their effectiveness. Weatherill explains the Court’s 
manoeuvres by noting that “the establishment and development of direct 
effect. . . represents a classic case study in the European Court’s teleological 
approach to legal integration.”11 Moreover, the doctrine has become a 
cornerstone of European law since the Member States accepted the Court’s 
ruling, contributing greatly to the integrity of European law.12 An overview of
points out. For a thorough discussion on these provisions, see T. C. Hartley, The 
Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the Constitutional and 
Administrative Law of the European Community, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), 195-200.
9 Pierre Pescatore, “The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community 
Law,” European Law Review 8 (1983): 157.
10 Fan Gend en Loos (ECR), 12.
11 Stephen Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 97.
12 For further discussion on direct effect, see Louis, 131-166; or Hartley, 183-214.
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Van Gend en Loos will explain the doctrine and allow for an examination of the 
case through the architect’s compromise model.
Summary of Van Gend en Loos
Before testing the architect’s compromise against Van Gend en Loos, 
the following paragraphs will provide a summary of the facts of the case which 
is necessary to understanding the Court’s decision in the case. The Court laid
the foundation for the doctrine of direct effect in its 1963 decision in Van Gend
en Loos, allowing individuals to invoke Community rights which must be 
protected by national courts. The case arose out of a dispute by the Dutch 
company N. V. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en 
Loos over a tariff charged for the importation of ureaformaldehyde from 
Germany into the Netherlands on 9 September 1960. The 8% ad valorem tariff
was levied in accordance to the guidelines set out by heading 39.01-a-1 of the
Tariefbesluit, an agreement between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
concluded on 25 July 1958, and came into force on 1 March 1960. However,
Van Gend en Loos lodged an objection to the tariff, arguing that Article 12 of
the EEC Treaty (which entered into force on 1 January 1958) provided that
Member States should neither introduce any new tariffs on imports or exports 
having equivalent effect nor increase any existing tariffs between other Member 
States. Van Gend en Loos held such a position since at the time the EEC 
Treaty came into effect, the 1947 Tariefbesluit set the tariff of such aminoplasts 
in emulsion as ureaformaldehyde in heading 279-a-2 at 3%. The heading 39.01-
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a-1 of the Tariefbesluit of 1960 became a subheading of the 1947 Tariefbesluit 
heading 279-a-2, increasing the tariff only on “aminoplasts in aqueous 
emulsions, dispersions or solutions” while maintaining the 3% tariff on all the 
products enumerated in heading 279-a-2 of 1947.13 The Inspector of Customs 
and Excise at Zaandam dismissed the objection, claiming its inadmissibility since 
it dealt with the rate of the tariff, not its application. In its appeal, the case was 
brought before the Tariefcommissie which appealed to the European Court of 
Justice under Article 177 on 16 August 1962.14 In its request for a preliminary 
ruling, the court posed two questions. First, the Tariefcommissie asked if 
Article 12 is directly applicable within the Member States, which would thus 
create individual rights that the courts must protect. Second, if the first 
question was answered affirmatively, the Tariefcommissie requested a ruling on 
whether the 8% tariff imposed on Van Gend en Loos constituted an unlawful
increase over the lower tariff which was in effect at the time the EEC Treaty 
came into force with regard to Article 12 of that Treaty.15
In terms of the first question, Belgium and the Netherlands disputed the 
admissibility of the case while the Commission argued for its admissibility. The 
Netherlands argued that the case fell outside the jurisdiction of the Court since it 
dealt with the application and not the interpretation of the Treaty. Additionally,
the Netherlands suggested that allegations of an infringement of the Treaty can 
only be brought by another Member State or the Commission as outlined in
13 Van Gend en Loos (ECR), 4.
14 Ibid., 5.
15 Ibid., 3.
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Articles 169 and 170. Belgium argued that the matter was under the jurisdiction 
of the national courts. Specifically, the national courts of the Netherlands were
confronted with two international treaties and had to turn to the constitutional
law and national principles to remedy the situation. Moreover, the Belgian 
government noted that a ruling by the European Court could not solve the issue 
at hand since despite the answer that would be forthcoming from the European 
Court, the national court still had to determine if it could legally violate the
Brussels Protocol of 1959 because it conflicted with the EEC Treaty of 1957. 
Finally, the Commission argued that if the Court found the case inadmissible, 
individuals would find themselves in the precarious state of being protected 
from infringements of Community law in all cases except infringement by
Member States. Hence, the integrity of European law would be significantly
harmed, lacking a mechanism for regulating the infringement of Community 
obligations by Member States.16
The players in the case were again divided regarding the substance of the 
first question. Van Gend en Loos argued that Article 12 (EEC) was directly 
applicable based on the following reasons: first, it imposed a negative 
obligation; second, custom duties were set according to Article 14 of the EEC 
Treaty on 1 January 1957; third, while Article 12 is not specifically concerned 
with individuals, both individuals and the Community must be protected against
the types of adverse effects which infringement of the article might produce; and
fourth, national courts, in accordance with the article, must refuse new or
16 Ibid., 5-6.
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increased customs duties. The Commission argued that by establishing the
Communities, the Member States sought not only to undertake certain
commitments but also to form a body of Community law; therefore, the internal 
effect of Community law is bound by itself and cannot be determined by national
law. Further, the national courts have the duty to guarantee the prevalence of 
Community law even when subsequent, contradictory national laws are enacted.
Moreover, the Commission held that although Article 12 is concerned with the
Member States in particular, this did not discount individuals who have an 
interest in the right to invoke the provision in national courts. Above all, the 
Commission held that Article 12 was directly applicable since the obligation was
unambiguous, not being affected or modified by any other parts of the Treaty, 
and self-sufficient, requiring no additional legislation to give it effect. The 
Netherlands, prefacing its arguments by pointing out internal effect is a pre­
condition for direct applicability, maintained that a condition of the EEC Treaty
has internal effect only in particular, limited circumstances. Based on its
reasoning of the EEC Treaty, the Netherlands further found that Article 12
constituted an obligation, thus allowing the Member States liberty in giving
effect to the provision; therefore, the Netherlands argued that since the article 
does not have internal effect, it necessarily must not have direct applicability.
Additionally, the Netherlands maintained that Article 12 does not create rights 
that individuals may invoke in national courts. Moreover, the Dutch 
government noted that the Treaty was a form of international law, in which the 
intentions of the signatories and the provisions of the Treaty were the
authoritative arbitrators of conflicts. Thus, the Netherlands asserted that it is
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under the jurisdiction of Dutch constitutional law to determine whether or not 
Article 12 is directly applicable. Similar to the Dutch position, Belgium and 
Germany also argued that Article 12 does not constitute a provision of direct 
applicability.17
Belgium and the Netherlands argued that the second question, which 
sought to answer whether or not the tariff increase was unnecessarily high, was 
inadmissible. They based their reasoning on the fact that the question dealt not 
with interpretation of the Treaty but with application, which is not a concern for 
preliminary rulings.18 Specifically, Article 177 states that “the Court of Justice 
shall have jurisdiction to give rulings concerning. . . the interpretation of this 
Treaty. . . .”19 However, Belgium and the Netherlands argued that the case 
dealt with a question of implementation not interpretation. Hence, the two 
Member States argued the Court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the case. 
The German government, while not objecting to the admissibility of the 
question, argued that Article 12 only creates an obligation on Member States, 
and therefore, under Article 177, the ECJ cannot determine whether national 
rules conform to the obligation since this would not involve the EEC Treaty’s 
interpretation. Van Gend en Loos maintained that the second question did lie 
outside of the ECJ’s jurisdiction, and thus submitted the following question in 
lieu of the original: “Is it possible for a derogation from the rules applied before 
1 March 1960 (or more accurately, before 1 January 1958) not to be in the
17 Ibid., 6-9.
18 Ibid., 9.
19 EEC, Article 177.
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nature of an increase prohibited by Article 12 of the Treaty, even though this 
derogation arithmetically represents an increase?”20
With respect to the substance of the second question, Van Gend en Loos 
re-iterated that the tariff of 8% constituted a breach of Article 12, asserting that 
it was intentionally charged, not as a result “of the inevitable effect of adapting” 
the former tariff of 3%.21 Both the Belgian and the Dutch governments argued 
that according to the Benelux Tariff of 1958, the product should have been 
charged a tariff of 10% in accordance with provision 332 bis; however, the 
product was not specified properly and was thus charged in accordance with 
heading 279-a-2. Hence, the governments argued that according to the Brussels 
nomenclature, the tariff was not in violation of Article 12. Van Gend en Loos
maintained that only very limited products could be classified under heading 332 
bis. The Commission, while stressing the fact that Article 12 did prohibit the
increase or introduction of tariffs, maintained that the particular tariff was 
applied within Article 12.22
Judgement of the Court
In contrast to the arguments by Belgium and the Netherlands, the Court
initially established its jurisdiction, maintaining that the case dealt with the 
interpretation of Article 12 in Community law, and thus, it was not an issue for
20
2]
22
Law Gend en Loos (ECR), 9. 
Ibid.
Ibid., 9-10.
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Dutch national law.23 By doing so, the Court moved to consolidate its 
legitimacy as the supreme authority to deal with Community issues. In 
answering the first question, the Court stated:
. . . the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for 
the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only 
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation 
of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only 
where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of 
obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon 
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions 
of the Community.24
Within this context, the Court found that Article 12 was, in fact, capable of 
direct applicability—or direct effect—and hence created individual rights that 
must be protected by national courts, chiefly because the provision was clear, 
requiring no additional national legislation, and imposing only a negative 
obligation 25
With regard to the second question, the Court found that it had no 
jurisdiction to provide a ruling, but it nevertheless reformulated the point of 
contention as to allow comment. Initially, the Court maintained that the
classification of custom duties for unreaformaldehyde was entirely a concern of 
the Netherlands’ customs law; however, the Court reinterpreted the intent of the 
question in light of “the meaning which should be given to the concept of duties
23 Ibid., 10-11.
24 Ibid., 12.
25 Ibid., 11-13.
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applied before the Treaty entered into force.”26 The Court then argued that an 
illegal tariff increase can be caused by any number of means, including the re­
classification of products, with respect to Article 12. Nevertheless, the Court 
maintained that the application of Article 12 within the interpretation of the 
Court was a matter for the individual national courts.27 The Court’s 
reinterpretation of the question and teleological interpretation of the Treaty 
conform to the architect’s compromise model’s assumption that the Court 
functions as a strategic actor. This and other issues in the case will be further
examined below in an examination of Van Gend en Loos vis-a-vis the architect’s
compromise model.
Van Gend en Loos and the Architect’s Compromise Model
With regard to the architect’s compromise model, Van Gend en Loos 
confirms the assumptions concerning the actors, their motivations and modified 
preferences. In terms of the first two assumptions, the Court and the Member 
States—in this case, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany—can be thought of 
as the primary actors. For the reasons explained in Chapter III (Primarily, while 
a model which examines all the possible sub- and supra-state actors is
descriptive, it has only a limited capacity for explanation; and most of these 
actors play no primary role in the decision-making process.), we are able to
eliminate the other parties involved in the case. Furthermore, in concordance
Ibid., 14. 
Ibid., 14-15.
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with the general assumption of the architect’s compromise model (as expounded 
in the previous chapter), we regard the actors as rational to the extend that they 
exhibit purposeful behaviour. Specifically, the three countries stressed the 
primacy of the Member States, arguing for the most part that the case was an 
issue entirely for Dutch jurisdiction.28 The Court, in contrast, employed a 
teleological approach to strengthen the body of European law. The assumption 
of rationality in the Court’s action is further justified through the discussion 
below with regard to the Court as a strategic actor and modified preferences.
As only a brief evaluation of the case is warranted and given that the 
Court’s role as a strategic actor and the concept of modified preferences are
related, the last three assumptions of the architect’s compromise will be
evaluated together. First, the Court did play the part of a strategic actor.
Realising that its legitimacy is directly related to the integrity of European law, 
the Court rejected the arguments of the Member States and instead followed the 
lead of the Commission to argue that it enjoyed jurisdiction to hear the case.29 
Once more against the arguments of the Member States, the Court found that 
individuals did have a right to bring grievances against a Member State, noting
that “ . . Article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating 
individual rights which national courts must protect.”30 Thus, the Court denied 
the arguments of the Member States and in contrast, established the doctrine of
direct effect—one of the central principles of European law—by its teleological
28
29
30
Ibid., 6. 
Ibid., 7. 
Ibid., 13.
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approach to the Treaties. Such manoeuvring was possible based on modified 
preferences. To explain, the short term interests of the Member States were 
clearly opposed to such a ruling; however, in order for the provisions agreed 
upon in the Treaties to establish their respective aims, there had to be a control 
mechanism. Specifically, the provisions of the EEC Treaty had to be protected
in order to achieve the economic aims of the Communities. The Member States
subsequently accepted the ruling in Van Gend en Loos, and this research argues 
that such acceptance was based on an appreciation of these modified
preferences.
In particular, the predictions of the architect’s compromise31 are 
confirmed by the ruling in Van Gend en Loos. First, since the Court’s action— 
the establishment of the doctrine of direct effect—clearly advanced European 
integration, we can assume that the action of the Court can be best represented 
by ai (an action which supports increased integration). Second, against the 
expressed submissions of the Member States, the Court ruled that individuals 
did have a right to bring actions against them for the failure of Member States 
to enact Community law. However, the Member States not only held a set of 
unbridled preferences, but also a set of modified preferences. To illustrate, the 
arguments submitted by the Commission actually demonstrate such modified
preferences:
... the Member States did not only intend to undertake mutual 
commitments but to establish a system of Community law. . . . The 
result is first that the effect of Community law on the internal law of
31 For a review of the architect’s compromise model, see the appendix following Chapter 
VIII.
174
Member States cannot be determined by this internal law but only by 
Community law, further that the national courts are bound to apply 
directly the rules of Community law and finally that the national court is 
bound to ensure that the rules of Community law prevail over conflicting 
national laws even if they are passed later.32
Hence, the Member States must accept certain unfavourable rulings in the short 
term in order to gain the benefits of the Communities. Examining the state of 
nature from the perspective which takes into account the modified preferences, 
we can assume the state of nature to be best represented by mi (modified 
preferences reflect pro-integration sentiments) since the Member States did wish 
to proceed with the process of European integration. Weiler points out that this 
is exactly the manner by which the Member States acquiesced to the ground­
breaking decisions in the formative years of European Court judgements: “The 
fundamental explanation is that the Member States, severally and jointly, 
balanced the material and political costs and benefits of the Community. Both 
the Community vision and its specific policy agenda were conceived as 
beneficial to the actors.”33 Since the Member States judged that the benefits of 
membership outweighed the costs, the Member States were generally receptive 
of European Court decisions in this groundbreaking era of the 1960s. 
Returning to the architect’s compromise model, as the Court pursued action aj 
and state of nature mi prevailed, the architect’s compromise suggests that the 
outcome is that the Member States accept the decision and that integration
deepens, or oi. This, in fact, is exactly the outcome that did occur since direct 
effect has become perhaps the most important principle of European law.
Van Gend en Loos (ECR), 7.
33 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” The Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 
(1991): 2429.
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Having sketched the origins and importance of the doctrine of direct effect, it is 
now possible to undertake a more thorough examination of the concept of 
supremacy of European law.
Supremacy
The doctrine of supremacy is of paramount importance to this research 
project since it comprises the area of EC law which will be examined to test the 
architect’s compromise model of European integration. Thus, the remainder of 
this chapter will provide the necessary background to examine the acceptance of 
the doctrine of supremacy by the United Kingdom in Chapter VI and by 
Germany in Chapter VII. This section will be composed of three parts: first, an
examination of the Treaties with regard to supremacy; second, an overview of
the reception of supremacy by the Member States; and third, an analysis of
Costa v. ENEL with regard to the architect’s compromise model.
The Treaties
As is the case with the doctrine of direct effect, the Treaties contain no
expressed provision for the supremacy of Community law. Moreover, in none 
of the amendments to the Treaties have the Member States included an explicit 
provision for the supremacy of Community law. Despite this, however, it has 
been argued by legal scholars that certain provisions of the EC Treaty, notably
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Articles 5, 6, 189 and 219, do indeed imply the supremacy of European law.34 
Nonetheless, the recognition of the doctrine of supremacy constitutes an area of 
European law in which the Court has actively worked towards further 
integration. In much the same manner as has been described previously with 
regard to direct effect, the Court has employed a teleological approach in order 
to assume that the Treaties implied supremacy in an attempt to consolidate “the 
practical foundations of the Community legal order.”35 According to 
Weatherill:
The European Court took the opportunity to deduce the existence of the 
vital constitutional principle of supremacy from the objectives of the 
Treaty, despite the absence in the Treaty of any explicit mention of the 
supremacy of Community law. This reflects the ‘teleological’ approach 
consistently favoured by the European Court. . . . Supremacy, like direct 
effect, has been deduced by the Court as a necessary, albeit, inexplicit, 
element in the practical realization of the objectives of the Treaty.36
The exact manner in which the doctrine was established, illustrating the Court’s
teleological, purposeful approach will be analysed in detail in the discussion of 
Costa v. ENEL below. However, first, the reception of the principle by the
Member States will be addressed since this will further illustrate the bargaining 
process between the Court and the Member States.
34 See, for example, Nigel Foster, EC Law, 2nd ed. (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 
1995), 101.
35 Weatherill, 102.
36 Ibid., 102-103.
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Supremacy with regard to Member States
As the doctrine of supremacy is a creation of the Court, its development 
has been a process of interpretation--in accordance with a teleological 
approach—of European law by the ECJ and then acceptance or rejection (often 
in the form of disregard) of such interpretations by the Member States. Hence, 
the growth of European law is not a static development in which the edicts of 
the Court immediately modify national law. Rather, the legitimacy of European 
law is inextricably linked to national implementation of, and respect for, such
law from the ECJ. The important mechanism for bringing cases to the ECJ
through preliminary rulings provides a good illustration of the necessity that the 
Member States adhere to European law. Specifically, without the co-operation 
of the national courts, preliminary rulings would not even be brought before the 
ECJ since the responsibility to make such appeals lies with the national courts.
More pertinent to the present discussion is the fact that the acceptance of 
supremacy has taken different forms and occurred in different time frames 
among the Member States. This will be subsequently demonstrated in the
remainder of this and the subsequent chapters. Even the fundamental cases of 
European law are dependent upon the implementation and co-operation of the 
individual Member States. Thus, the Court must remain cognisant of the fact 
that the Member States are still the masters of the Treaties when framing 
judgements. Moreover, the separate Member States have moved at various 
speeds in espousing European law, with some Member States vigorously 
supporting decisions while other have delayed bringing national law into line
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with Community law. The reasons for such variation are many, including 
different constitutional models, contrasting national legal systems and various 
assumptions regarding the authority of the European Union. Weiler describes 
this two-step process as follows:
The evolutionary nature of the doctrine of supremacy is necessarily 
bi-dimensional. One dimension is the elaboration of the parameters of 
the doctrine by the European Court. But its full reception, the second 
dimension, depends on its incorporation into the constitutional orders of 
the Member States and its affirmation by their supreme courts.37
All of these factors have resulted in different levels of development of the 
doctrine of supremacy in the different Member States,38 particularly with regard 
to the responsibilities of national legal systems to co-operate with the ECJ. For 
example, national courts may effectively halt European integration on a 
particular matter by refusing to appeal for preliminary rulings on relevant legal
uncertainties.
Sovereignty
To understand the complexity involved in the development of the 
doctrine of supremacy by the Court, the concept of sovereignty must first be 
examined since the establishment of the doctrine is only enabled through a
transference of sovereignty by the Member States. Specifically, the doctrine of 
supremacy relies on according the ECJ a greater portion of authority which
37 Joseph Weiler, “Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law 
Relevant?” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (1981-1982): 44.
38 For an examination of “the evolutionary nature of the doctrine of supremacy,” see Weiler, 
“Integration: Is the Law Relevant?,” 44-47.
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must necessarily be transferred from the Member States. The origins of the 
concept of sovereignty are often traced to Jean Bodin, who characterised the 
term by noting that . . it is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he 
cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who 
makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete 
law. No one who is subject either to the law or to some other person can do 
this.”39 Adopting the theoretic foundations of Bodin (since they have 
dominated thinking on the issue for centuries), the present research recognises 
sovereignty as the capacity and capability of an entity to exercise the ultimate 
authority regarding matters within its jurisdiction. Of particular importance to 
this research is the ability of states to limit their respective sovereignty since this 
is exactly the phenomenon which has occurred with the transfer of authority to 
the Communities by the Member States. Decisions from the Court, notably
Costa v. ENEL which will subsequently be discussed at length, confirm the 
institutional consolidation of authority which was initially firmly in the grips of
the Member States. It is this gradual, although limited, transfer of sovereignty— 
sketched in rather vague terms by the Treaties—that binds Member States but
allows them to remain the ultimate sovereign entities of the Communities. The
dichotomy between the Member States who retain supreme sovereignty and the 
real political power of the Court lies at the foundation of the manner by which
39 Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576), trans, and abrid. M. J. Tooley 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, [1955]), Book I, Chapter 8, 28. The passage is also cited in D. 
Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, 6th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1994), 283.
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Community law is incorporated into the domestic legal systems of the Member
States.
Hence, unless or until the European Union itself is sovereign, which
would involve the formal and complete transfer of sovereignty from the Member 
States, the inter-governmental structure of the Communities dictates that the 
Member States individually must remain sovereign. Therefore, this necessarily 
means that the legitimacy of the Court remains closely associated with the 
Member State’s continued willingness to adhere to its decisions. The claim that 
there can be only one supreme sovereign for a particular area is not only 
vindicated by classical thinking on sovereignty but also with regard to modern 
ideas concerning the pooling of sovereignty. First, according to classical writers 
on the subject, sovereignty is indivisible. While sovereigns may choose to 
delegate certain authority to other entities, they nonetheless retain ultimate 
authority. Second, the notion of pooling sovereignty also requires the 
sovereignty of one entity to be supreme. As explained by Obradovic, the 
doctrine of divisible sovereignty rests upon the following premise:
. . . the Treaties establishing the Community did not in any sense remove 
sovereignty from the Member States and vest it in some external 
body. . . . What is emphasized by this doctrine is that sovereignty which 
was once exercised exclusively by the individual Member States is now, 
in certain areas, exercised collectively by the Community. Under this 
approach there is no final transfer of national sovereignty to the 
Community as a political body. . . . The Community has the powers 
which it received in the Treaties, i.e. the Community holds not 
absolutely open-ended but specific powers which can be found 
throughout the EEC Treaty. That means that sovereign powers are still 
vested in the nations of the Member States, not in the Community.40
40 Daniela Obradovic, “Community Law and the Doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty,” Legal 
Issues of European Integration no. 1 (1993): 11.
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Hence, according to Obradovic, the ultimate authority must lie with a particular 
entity identified as each of the Member States, which thus means that despite 
the concept of the pooling of sovereignty, or as Obradovic terms it, divisible 
sovereignty, there remains one entity that is supreme (the separate Member 
States). It follows that the supremely sovereign entity is ultimately in control of 
the integration process. Specifically, this supremely sovereign entity demarcates 
the limits of the authority it grants to other entities.41 Thus, as alluded to 
previously, the supremely sovereign entity only ceases to be supremely 
sovereign if it actually transfers the greater part of its authority, acquiescing to a 
new sovereign. Hence, unless the Member States transfer their sovereignty to
the Communities, the authority of the Court itself remains contingent upon the
continued respect for Court decisions by the separate Member States. Further 
illustrating this point, the issue of sovereignty will be examined at length with 
regard to the United Kingdom in the next chapter. Having outlined the issue of 
sovereignty, it is useful to further examine the nature of international law and 
the manner in which states incorporate this law into their domestic legal
systems.
41 Hence, Kompetenz-Kompetenz remains with the Member States. This concept will be 
discussed in greater detail with regards to the Solange decisions in Germany in Chapter 
VII.
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Monism and Dualism and the Incorporation of International Law into National
Legal Systems
Legal theory suggests that with regard to international law, there exists 
both an internal law and an external law: one emulating from the state (imposed 
by some political authority) and the other from humanity itself (imposed by 
moral obligations). In practical terms, the dichotomy between internal and 
external law is represented by the competing theories of monism and dualism.42 
According to dualism, there exists two levels of law: the body of law within the 
state and that outside of the state. Lasok and Lasok explain:
In simple terms this doctrine presupposes the existence of two separate 
systems of law: international and national, co-existing side by side as it 
were in watertight compartments. Though international law is the 
universal law of mankind it stops at the door of the sovereign state and 
remains outside unless admitted to the territory of the state. It means 
that international law binds states in their relations with each other but 
has, subject to few exceptions, no binding force in the territory of the 
state unless transformed or translated into rules of municipal law.43
Essentially, dualism as applied to the acceptance of Community law refers to 
those states which require legislation in order to join the separate fields of 
Community law and domestic law together. Member States assuming this 
doctrine include Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Greece and the United Kingdom.44 
Through requiring additional legislation to incorporate international law into the
42 For a thorough discussion, refer to Kelsen, 553-588; and J. G. Starke, “Monism and 
Dualism in the Theory of International Law,” British Yearbook of International Law 17 
(1936): 66-81.
43 D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, 6th ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1994), 284.
44 Ibid., 289-290. Lasok and Lasok further suggest that Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg occupy a position between monism and dualism but with a leaning 
towards dualism.
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domestic legal system, national law remains the corpus of the legal system of a 
dualist country. Hence, international law is simply annexed to the pre-existing 
legal system, and thus, can likewise be severed. In the case of Britain, for 
example, an Act of Parliament was required to give effect to the British 
membership to the European Communities, and it is argued that it requires only 
a further Act of Parliament to dissolve these ties.45
In contrast to dualism, monism assumes the universality of law. Again, 
Lasok and Lasok provide a useful definition, stating the essence of monism:
Monism is the rival doctrine propounding the existence of a single 
system of norms or legal rules binding states and individuals alike. 
States are, after all, nothing but forms of organization or legal fictions 
whilst the individual is the ultimate subject of law. Both international 
and municipal law are only parts of the same structure and their rules are 
interrelated. Consequently monism cuts across sovereignty, bringing the 
individual face to face with international law and relieving the state of 
the task of transforming it into rules of domestic law.46
It follows that a monist state need not introduce further legislation to bring 
European laws into force since, according to monism, “international law and 
national law are both part of one world system.”47 Among the Members of the 
Communities, France is the most frequently cited example of a monist state
since the French Constitution automatically accords force to law “duly ratified
by the Head of State and published” even if inconsistent of French national 
law.48 Hence, in a legal sense, incorporation of international law into the French
45 See Lawrence Collins, European Community Law in the United Kingdom, 4th ed. 
(London: Butterworths, 1990), 28.
46 Lasok and Lasok, 284.
47 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 2nd ed, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 186.
48 See Lasok and Lasok, 290.
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domestic system should provide fewer problems than incorporating international 
law into dualist countries. Yet, even in a monist tradition, the bargaining 
process implicit in the acceptance of European law is evident. The following 
brief analysis with regard to the acceptance of Community law in France will 
illustrate this point.
France and the Doctrine of Supremacy
According to Article 55 of the French Constitution, international treaties 
supersede national law in authority, thus indicating France’s monist position. 
However, the French legal system can be separated into two components—a 
judicial court (civil and criminal matters) and an administrative court, and these 
separate courts have not always been uniform in their adherence to Community 
law. Specifically, the highest judicial court, the Cour de Cassation, has been 
largely committed to strictly following EC law while the highest administrative 
court, the Conseil d’Etat, has adopted a rather hostile position. Despite the 
constitutional position on the supremacy of international law, Hartley identifies 
two primary reasons for the split in the French reception of Community law. 
First, there is a “the traditional reluctance of all French courts to question the
validity of a statute and of the judicial courts to query actions of the 
administration, whether legislative or executive,” and secondly, the supremacy 
granted to international treaties in Article 55 of the French constitution is 
conditional upon the application of the treaty by other parties. For these 
reasons, the incorporation of Community law into French law has not been
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without its difficulties.49 Given France’s prominent position in the 
Communities, such difficulties have been particularly threatening to the Court’s 
legitimacy as will be further outlined below.
As previously stated, the Cour de Cassation has been largely supportive 
of European law, establishing this precedence in its decision in Directeur 
General des Douanes v. Societe des Cafes Jacques Vabre & Societe Weigel et 
Cie50 in 1975. In the case, Vabre, who had imported a soluble coffee extract 
into France from the Netherlands, sued for the repayment of the difference in 
the higher tax charged on the imported goods according to a French statute of 
1966 in comparison to the lower tax on French products. The Cour d'Appel 
found in favour of Vabre; however, this decision was appealed to the Cour de 
Cassation, and in the appeal, the Customs Director General argued that Article
55 of the French Constitution was irrelevant in this case since adherence to
international treaties was contingent upon observance by other signatories, and
it was unclear as to whether or not the Netherlands, the other country involved 
in the case, had abided by this condition of the French constitution.
Additionally, the Customs Director did not acknowledge the authority of the 
Cour d’Appel to review the constitutionality of a statute. However, the Cour
de Cassation agreed with the decision of the Cour d'Appel, noting that national
courts were bound to respect the new special legal order established by the 
Community Treaties.51 Hence, French national courts dealing with civil and
49 Hartley, 228-229.
so French Cour de Cassation. Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jaques Vabre 
and J. Weigel et Compagnie S.a.r.l., Common Market Law Reports 2 (1975): 336- 381.
51 Hartley, 229-230.
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criminal issues in France have complied with the doctrine of supremacy 
following the lead of the Cour de Cassation.
In contrast to the warm reception with which the Cour de Cassation has 
incorporated Community law, the Conseil d'Etat long approached Community 
law with marked hostility.52 The Conseil d'Etat exhibited this hostility to EC 
law by simply refusing to acknowledge its supremacy over French national law 
and ignoring both the doctrine of direct effect and the obligation for preliminary 
rulings, as exhibited in cases such as Syndicat General de Fabricants de 
Semoule de France53 However, in the late 1980s, the Conseil d'Etat reversed 
its hostility towards the European Court as evidenced in decisions such as 
Nicolo54 This initial reluctance of the Conseil d’Etat to acquiesce to European 
law is thus indicative of the bargaining process that lies at the heart of the 
European Court’s impact on integration. Hence, without co-operation by the 
French national courts, Community law is irrelevant is France. Such dynamics
form a central assumption of the architect’s compromise, as illustrated by the 
Court’s role as a strategic actor and the importance of modified preferences, 
which will be discussed in the following two chapters with regard to British and
German acceptance of Community law. For the moment, however, the example
of the Conseil d’Etat is reflective of this bargaining procedure.
52 For an examination of the possible reasons for the defiance of ECJ decisions by the 
Conseil d’Etat, see Hartley, 229.
53 French Counseil d’Etat. Syndicat General de Fabricants de Semoules de France, 
Common Market Law Reports (1970): 395-408.
54 French Conseil d’Etat. Raoul Georges Nicolo and Another, Common Market Law 
Reports 1 (1990): 173-192. For comment on the case, see Philippe Manin, “The Nicolo 
Case of the Conseil d’Etat'. French Constitutional Law and the Supreme Administrative 
Court’s Acceptance of the Primacy of Community Law Over Subsequent National Statute 
Law,” Common Market Law Review 28 (1991): 499-519.
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Francois Froment-Meurice, a member of the Conseil d’Etat, underlined 
the conflict between the French court and the acceptance of European law (and 
hence the results of the bargaining process between the ECJ and France) in his
statement:
... the Conseil d’Etat. . . has been the slowest in enacting in its own 
decisions what had been decided previously by the European Court of 
Justice. We had to wait until 1989 with the case of Nicolo (the primacy 
of Community law on a law coming afterwards, la loi posterieure) to 
see the Conseil d’Etat change its mind about the direct applicability of 
Community law. We had to wait another year for the Boidet case to see 
that applicable for regulations. Then we had to wait until 1992 for the 
case of Rothmans and Philip Morris to have it applicable for the 
directives. So it was nearly 30 years after Costa v. ENEL that the 
French Conseil d’Etat admitted that the fundamental principles of this 
construction were in use in our country.55
Froment-Meurice’s comments illustrate the essence of the process by which 
European law is actually integrated into the separate Member States. As has 
been shown with regard to the Conseil d’Elat, this process occurs as the 
Member States, through their judiciaries and other means, individually choose 
whether or not to accept ECJ decisions. It is true that the Member States 
generally choose to respect these decisions; however, the examples of rebellion 
by various Member States and national courts is illustrative of the limited 
“constitutional” authority vested in the ECJ.
55 Francois Froment-Meurice, “The Positioning of the Court of Justice,” The Developing 
Role of the European Court of Justice (London: European Policy Forum and Frankfurter 
Institut, 1995), 87.
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Costa v. ENEL
If Van Gend en Loos laid the foundation which would subsequently 
allow the doctrine of supremacy by establishing the concept of direct effect, the 
case of Costa v. ENEL firmly established the doctrine as a cornerstone of 
European law. In Costa, the Court, using a teleological approach to the Treaty, 
looked beyond the explicit text to determine that European law holds 
supremacy over national law. A rehearsal of the facts of the case is necessary 
before analysis can be made, and the following paragraphs will provide such a
sketch of the background of the case.
Summary of the Case
The case arose out of a challenge to an Italian law adopted in December
1962. Law No. 1643, along with other legislation, nationalised both the 
production and distribution of electricity under the auspices of the newly created 
Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Elettrica (ENEL). Mr. Flamino Costa—a lawyer
who held shares in Edison Volta, which was affected by the nationalisation- 
refused to pay a bill of 1925 lire demanded by ENEL for the supply of 
electricity. Mr. Costa held that the Italian law was inconsistent with the EEC 
Treaty, and thus, contrary also with Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.56 The
56 Article 11 of the Italian Constitution states:
“Italy renounces war as an instrument of offence to the liberty of other peoples or as a 
means of settlement of international disputes, and, on conditions of equality with the 
other states, agrees to the limitations of her sovereignty necessaiy to an organisation 
which will assure peace and justice among nations, and promotes and encourages
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Italian court in the case, the Giudice Conciliatore, honoured Mr. Costa’s 
request for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 as to the interpretation of 
Articles 37, 53, 93 and 102, referring the case to the European Court of Justice 
in early 1964.57
In the case, arguments were advanced by the Italian government, the 
Commission and Mr. Costa. The Italian government first objected to the
admissibility of the case, stating that the preliminary ruling requested was 
inadmissible since “ . . the Giudice Conciliatore did not restrict itself to asking 
the Court to interpret the Treaty but also asked to declare whether the Italian 
law in dispute was in conformity with the Treaty. . .”58 Instead, the Italian 
government maintained that “Article 177 cannot be used as a means of allowing 
a national court, on the initiative of a national of a Member State, to subject a
law of that State to the procedure for a preliminary ruling for infringement of 
the obligations of the Treaty.”59 Mr. Costa and the Commission did not 
question the reasons for the national court’s request for a preliminary ruling nor 
did they challenge the Court’s jurisdiction for addressing the preliminary 
ruling.60
In the appeal for a preliminary ruling, the Giudice Conciliatore asked
the Court of Justice if the Italian law in question was an infringement of Articles
57
58
59
60
international organizations constituted for this purpose. “Ente Nazionale Energia 
Elettrica (ENEL),” Common Market Law Review 2 (1964-1965): 224.
Costa v. ENEL (ECR), 588-589.
Ibid., 589.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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102, 93, 53 and 37 (EEC). Mr. Costa initially accused the Italian government 
of a breach of Article 102,61 which states that “where there is reason to fear that 
the adoption or amendment of a provision laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action may cause distortion within the meaning of Article 101, a 
Member State desiring to proceed therewith shall consult the
Commission.........”62 While the Commission did not recognise a distortion, it
noted that if there were any question as to its existence, then the Italian 
Government should have consulted the Commission before adopting the 
nationalisation legislation. However, the Italian Republic—whose arguments
were supported by ENEL—noted that:
. . . the Commission, when informed by a written question submitted by 
a German deputy, accepted nationalization in this case and referred to 
Article 222. There is no distortion within the meaning of Article 102 as 
long as it is a question of setting up a public service intended to achieve 
the objectives of public utility indicated in Article 43 of the Italian 
constitution and as long as the conditions of competition are not 
adversely affected.63
Again, the separate parties were divided over the interpretation of
Article 93. The article states that the Commission must intervene in the event
that there exists a violation of Article 92,64 which states that:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, an aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the Common Market.65
61 Ibid., 589-590.
62 EEC Treaty, Article 102, 1.
63 Costa v. ENEL (ECR), 590.
64 Ibid., 590.
65 EEC Treaty, Article 92, 1.
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Mr. Costa argued that nationalisation constituted providing “hidden aid” to the 
industry and hence, argued that the Commission had the responsibility to act as 
described in Article 93. While the Commission acknowledged its right to take 
action against Member States who violate Article 93, it did not specifically find 
fault with the law in question. Rather, the Commission was concerned over the 
Italian Republic’s failure to notify the Commission of the legislation. Arguing
that the nationalisation had “nothing to do with Community law,” the Italian 
Republic and ENEL maintained that the case demonstrated no incompatibility 
between the nationalisation and Article 93.66
To appreciate the arguments concerning Article 53 (EEC), it is useful to 
quote the provision, which states: “Member States shall not introduce any new 
restrictions on the right of establishment in their territories of nationals of other 
Member States, save as otherwise provided by this Treaty.”67 Mr. Costa argued 
that not only did nationalisation violate Article 53, but it was also inconsistent 
with Article 222, which Costa maintained could not “justify the legality of every 
conceivable system of property ownership,” including the elimination of private 
property.68 Both the Italian Government and ENEL argued that the 
nationalisation did not infringe upon Article 53 specifically because the 
legislation did not discriminate based upon nationality. While the Commission 
reiterated its position on nationalisation being justified under Article 222, it 
reasoned that “Article 53 however applies to possible restrictions on the right of
66 Costa v. ENEL (ECR), 590.
67 EEC Treaty, Article 53.
68 Costa v. ENEL (ECR), 590.
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establishment of nationals of other States which might result from a case of
nationalization, such restrictions not being justified by technical requirements in 
the sector in question.”69
The final dispute in the case lay in the interpretation of Article 37, of
which the relevant provision reads:
Member States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a 
commercial character so as to ensure that when the transitional period 
has ended no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States.
The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through which a 
Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervises, 
determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between 
Member States. These provisions shall likewise apply to monopolies 
delegated by the State to others.
Member States shall refrain from introducing any new measure which 
is contrary to the principles laid down in paragraph 1 or which restricts 
the scope of the Articles dealing with the abolition of customs duties and 
quantitative restrictions between Member States.70
Mr. Costa maintained that this article should be applied to nationalisation since
it establishes a commercial monopoly, which, as he argued, inherently makes
trade more difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, Costa argued that Article
37 must apply not only to actual discrimination, but also to potential 
discrimination, and that it must not be restricted to addressing existing cases but 
also must prevent the establishment of discrimination. The Italian Republic 
countered Mr. Costa’s argument by arguing that Article 37 cannot apply to 
public services or with enterprises concerned with limited natural resources;
69 Ibid., 591.
70 EEC Treaty, Article 37, 1 and 2. For clarification of this provision, see the remainder of 
Article 37.
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therefore, the Treaty’s regulation of commercial enterprises is not equivalent for 
the operation of public services. ENEL’s reasoning echoed that of the Italian 
Republic and argued that Article 37 applied to public and private organisations 
whose chief objective was to interfere with the free movement of goods. The 
Commission regarded the case as the establishment of a new monopoly to 
obstruct the free movement of goods and services and thus prohibited by Article 
37. However, the Commission further maintained that “there is no need to 
inquire whether the creation of a monopoly of a commercial character is 
inconsistent with Article 37 (2), where the importation and exportation of the 
said commodity are not subject to the discretionary power of the administering 
body.”71
The Court’s Decision in Costa
Although the Court could not rely on any specific provision in the EEC 
Treaty to verify supremacy of Community law, the ECJ nonetheless argued that 
the nature of the Treaty assumes the supremacy of European law.72 Stein points 
out that provisions of Community law “would be meaningless if a member could 
defeat its obligations simply by enacting a contrary national law.”73 Moreover, 
Article 177 obliges national courts to appeal for preliminary rulings; if the 
national courts could then simply ignore these rulings, then Community law 
would quickly lose legitimacy. It was such logic that led the Court to simply
71 Costa v. ENEL (EEC), 591-592.
72 Louis, 167.
73 Eric Stein, “Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin 
of the Costa Case,” Michigan Law Review 63 (January 1965): 500.
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formulate the doctrine of supremacy despite its absence from the Treaty. The 
Court justified this reasoning by arguing:
The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic 
legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its 
character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the 
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the 
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, 
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept 
of the Community cannot prevail.74
Before this pivotal reasoning by the Court, it was unclear as to the exact 
authority of Community law given that the Treaty contains no provision for its 
supremacy over domestic law.
In providing interpretations on Articles 102, 93, 53 and 37, the Court 
firmly defended Community law despite making concessions to the Member 
States. To begin, the Court ruled that while Member States have bound 
themselves in Article 102 to consulting the Commission when a piece of 
legislation might create a distortion in Community law, this does not necessarily 
result in the establishment of individual rights which must be protected by the 
separate national courts. Similarly, the Court held that Article 93 did not 
provide for individual rights with regard to this case although it did 
acknowledge the creation of certain individual rights in the final provision of the 
Article. The Court held that “this obligation [to consult the Commission] does
not, however, give individuals the right to plead, within the framework of
74 Ibid., 593-594.
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Community law and by means of Article 177, either failure by the State 
concerned to fulfil any of its obligations or breach of duty on the part of the 
Commission.”75 With regard to Article 53, the Court reasoned that this 
provision was met as long as a particular Member State introduced no more 
severe regulations for non-nationals as for nationals of that State. Therefore, 
the Article may create individual rights which must be protected by national 
courts. Finally, the Court found that Article 37 strictly prohibited the 
establishment of new monopolies, and since the article contained no 
reservations, it constituted a direct effect obligation on the Member States.
Therefore, Article 37 created individual rights which must be protected by the
national courts.76
Analysis of Costa v. ENEL
Having briefly outlined the case, we are now in a position to examine 
Costa according to the five assumptions of the architect’s compromise model 
and its predictions on expected outcome. For the purposes of this research, the 
above reasoning by the Court is extremely significant since it illustrates the 
Court’s willingness to deviate from the precise wording of the Treaty and 
espouse a teleological approach in concurrence with the assumptions of the 
architect’s compromise model. An analysis of the case will illustrate the
75 Ibid., 596.
76 Ibid., 595-600.
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pertinence of the architect’s compromise model to explaining the nature of the 
decision and the subsequent acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy.
To begin, while Mr. Costa, ENEL and the Commission were all 
instrumental in offering perspectives on the questions framed by the Giudice 
Conciliatore, the chief actors must be the Court and Italy (or the Member 
States in general) since the Court ultimately issues the ruling that establishes a 
fundamental principle of Community law. Furthermore, the Member States are 
the only actors that possess the ability to mount a serious challenge to the 
Court’s authority by amending the Treaties. In addition, the primary actors (the 
Court and the Italian Republic) exhibited purposeful behaviour. In particular, 
the Italian Republic vigorously defended its supposed right to nationalise the 
production of electric power in Italy. Likewise, the Court made a calculated 
attempt to further integration with one of the boldest decisions it has ever made.
In terms of the Court’s role as a strategic actor, the events of the case
conform to this assumption of the architect’s compromise. Specifically, the 
Court greatly enhanced the legitimacy and authority of European law through 
passing such a determined, “strong statement.”77 Stein’s analysis of the case 
adds further credence to the claim that the Court played the role of a strategic
actor:
The Community Court must, of course, keep in mind at all times that it 
is not a federal court backed up by an integrated federal power, and it 
must be aware of the dangers inherent in pressing “legal integration” too 
far ahead of integration in the economic and political fields. There is,
77 Weatherill, 106.
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however, evidence that the court calculated the risk correctly when it 
declared the supremacy rule in the Costa case. ... 78
By appreciating the de facto political constraints on the Court by the Member 
States and the Court’s responsibility to further European integration, the Costa 
decision illustrates clearly the manner in which the Court strategically balanced 
these two opposing forces to best maintain its own legitimacy, which will 
become even more apparent in the discussion of modified preferences below.
As the architect’s compromise model assumes, modified preferences 
played a particularly important role in the acceptance of the case by the Member 
States. As has been previously noted, the doctrine of supremacy is not specified 
by the Treaties; therefore, the Court invented a mechanism by which 
Community law could be advanced. As the legitimacy of the decisions of the
Court are ultimately contingent upon their acceptance by the Member States,
the decision in Costa v. ENEL was entirely justified. If the case were truly the 
work of an activist court, the Member States could have curtailed the power of
the Court. This, however, did not happen. While there was opposition to the 
doctrine of supremacy at some levels, including the French Conseil d’Etat and 
the Italian Corte Constituzionale, Mancini argues that “. . . the Court’s 
supremacy doctrine was accepted by the judiciaries and administrations of both 
the original and the new Member States. . . .”79 Recognising the Court’s role as 
a strategic actor, Weiler suggests also that:
78 Stein, 516.
79 G. Federico Mancini, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe,” Common A-farket Law 
Review 26, 1989: 600.
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... it would be naive to imagine that in these developments the Court 
was simply motivated by legal principles. Prodded along by and in 
alliance with the Commission, which intervenes as of right in all cases 
coming before it, the Court was undoubtedly inspired by a political 
conception of a Community which was to evolve into an integrated 
union. Charged, together with the other institutions in Article 4 of the 
Treaty with the carrying out of the tasks entrusted to the Community the 
Court was merely doing its “bit” to fulfil one of the tasks enumerated in 
Article 2, namely bringing about closer relations between the States 
belonging to the Community.80
Hence, the architect’s compromise model is vindicated by the Costa case in its 
assumption of the Court as a strategic actor guided by modified preferences.
As has been established, the events of Costa clearly conform to the 
assumptions of the architect’s compromise model.81 To begin, the action of the 
Court is clearly represented by ai (pro-integration decision) since the decision 
unquestionably advanced European integration. Next, despite the Italian 
opposition to the case, Stein suggests that the modified preferences of the 
Member States were sympathetic to further integration.82 Such desires, 
however, to achieve the aims of the Treaty were tempered by the real political
impact that the doctrine of supremacy would have on the Member States. 
Hence, it was with some resignation that the Member States approached this 
decision.83 Since the model does not rely on unbridled preferences, and 
recognises instead modified preferences, the state of nature can be represented 
by m2 (modified preferences indifferent to integration) since the Member States
80 Weiler, “Integration: Is the Law Relevant,” 46.
81 See the appendix following Chapter VIII for a review of the architect’s compromise 
model.
82 Stein, 516-517.
83 Peter Hay, “Supremacy of Community Law in National Courts,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law 16 (1968): 543-550.
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did wish to accord Community law the character that would allow for its 
effective regulation of the Communities (although they were not necessarily 
ready to completely recognise the supremacy of European law). Based on the 
action of the Court (ai) and the state of nature (m2), the outcome of the case as 
predicted by the architect’s compromise is represented by 04, or a decision in 
which the Member States accept the decision but reserve the right to alter the 
authority of the Court in the future. This prediction appears reflective of reality 
since the Member States did accept the decision although certain countries 
delayed fully accepting the doctrine of supremacy until much later. Moreover, 
the authority of the Court has constantly been attacked although not altered.
Hence, the architect’s compromise once again provides a concise and predictive 
means to examine the Court’s role in European integration.
Conclusion
Given that the development of the concept of supremacy is a creation of 
the Court, its development is dependent upon the acceptance of the separate 
Member States. Having examined supremacy in a general sense, we turn now 
to examining it in a national context to further test the architect’s compromise 
model. The following chapter will thus examine the doctrine of supremacy and 
its acceptance in the United Kingdom. General comments will initially be made, 
and then, several cases will be examined using the architect’s compromise 
model to further demonstrate the model’s ability to explain the integration
process.
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Chapter VI
British Acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy
Having first derived the architect’s compromise model and second 
examined the theoretic foundation of the principle of supremacy of European
law, we now turn to testing the model. To further analyse the effectiveness of 
the architect’s compromise model, this study will trace the history of Britain’s 
participation in the European Union with respect to the supremacy of European 
law. The model will be examined first in light of the events that preceded and
surrounded Britain’s accession to the Communities and then with regard to 
three significant cases involving Britain’s acceptance of the doctrine. Through 
examining these events, the chapter will illustrate the suitability of the 
architect’s compromise model for explaining the ECJ’s role in European 
integration in the United Kingdom
Debate Preceding Britain’s Accession
The dialogue that preceded Britain’s accession to the European
Communities provides the initial focus for examining Britain’s relation to 
European law since it is indicative of the purposeful actions and decisions which 
have characterised the process of legal integration. As has been discussed 
previously, earlier negotiations were characterised by a lack of French support 
for the membership of the United Kingdom, which twice led to futile attempts
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by the British government to join the Communities.1 In the debates that 
preceded Britain’s accession, it was clear that the British Parliament made a 
calculated decision in foregoing an element of sovereignty to gain the benefits of 
the Communities as will be illustrated by an examination of the House of 
Commons debates on joining the EEC, Euratom and the ECSC. Once again, 
neofunctionalist arguments are particularly discredited with neofunctionalism’s 
notion that integration occurs organically. Rather, the following discussion will
demonstrate that Britain’s accession followed careful consideration of the future
impact and thoughtful study of the commitment involved. Hence, these events 
appear to reflect the pattern of bargaining which is a theoretical assumption of 
the architect’s compromise model. Specifically, the process of legal integration 
in Britain has been characterised by an initial transfer of authority to the Court
to fill in the gaps of the Treaties, and subsequent acceptance of ECJ rulings by 
the United Kingdom based on modified preferences.
Legal and Constitutional Implications of Membership
Concern regarding “legal and constitutional implications,” such as the 
impact of membership on Parliamentary authority and the harmonisation of 
British laws to conform to European laws, occupied an important position in the
discussions over British membership in the Communities. From the Command
For a discussion of the history of the British application for membership, see Neill 
Nugent, William E. Paterson and Vincent Wright, eds., The Government and Politics of 
the European Union, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1994), 27-30.
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Paper2 commissioned on this subject, it is apparent that the British government 
was aware of the significant impact that joining the Communities would exert 
on the British legal system and structure. Such an appreciation for the scope 
and depth of the influence that membership could have on Britain is a 
fundamental assumption of the architect’s compromise model, which recognises 
the rationality of the actors. In other words, Britain faced the decision whether
or not to join the Communities and sought to make a strategic decision as to 
maximise its preferences.3 We can see this in the fact that a majority in 
Parliament acknowledged membership in the Communities as a means to
maximise security and economic growth in the Parliamentary debates 
concerning membership in October 1971, which will subsequently be discussed
at length. Furthermore, in contrast to the neofunctionalist model which assumes
that integration occurs from a virtual organic growth of the Communities
themselves, the Command Paper is clear on the ultimate implications that 
joining the Communities would have on the United Kingdom. Recognising that 
the (less than) “revolutionary developments” that have occurred during the past 
few decades were actually anticipated by the British Government in the 
Parliamentary debates of October 1971 completely discredits the 
neofunctionalist argument that spillovers organically led to further integration.
United Kingdom. Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership 
of the European Communities, Cmnd. 3301 (May 1967).
3 United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and the European Communities, Cmnd. 4715 
(July 1971). This paper made the argument for British membership, particularly pages 7­
17. See also Central Office of Information, British Membership of the European 
Community, Pamphlet 109 (1973), especially pages. 18-20, for a concise account of 
benefits of membership for Britain.
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Such factors further confirm the problems inherent in neofunctionalism outlined 
earlier in this research and conform to the current study’s research question.
Preliminary Discussion Concerning British Accession
The manner and events that surrounded Britain’s accession to the
Communities also reflect the rational choice assumptions of the architect’s 
compromise model. Specifically, Parliament weighed the prospects for joining 
the Communities to determine whether or not the economic and security
benefits believed to be associated with membership merited the surrender of a 
portion of sovereignty necessary to gain these advantages. Command Paper 
3301 made the effects of membership on Britain strikingly clear, by explaining 
that “if this country became a member of the European Communities it would 
be accepting Community law. By ‘Community law’ is meant the whole body of 
legal rights and obligations deriving from the Treaties or their instruments, 
whether conferred or imposed on the Member States.”4 Thus, in joining the 
Communities, Britain would be bound by not only the Treaties but also the 
acquis communitaire, as is every other Member State. Britain (at a time before 
the country accepted the position of one of the “architects” of the Communities) 
acknowledged in 1967 that “the structure of the Treaties and of the regulations
and other instruments issued by the authorities of Communities differs from that 
of statutes and subordinate legislation in the United Kingdom; provisions are
4 United Kingdom. Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership 
of the European Communities, Cmnd. 3301 (May 1967), 8.
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framed in more general terms and more is left to judicial interpretation.”5 Given 
its clear wording, one may infer from the Command Paper that Britain knew full 
well of the potential for integration brought by the Courts that membership 
would inevitably bring, or, to refer to it in contemporary jargon, how the Court 
would be responsible for “filling in the gaps” of the Treaties. Moreover, the
United Kingdom recognised that the legal climate of the Communities would
not rest solely on the specific provisions contained in the Treaties, but rather,
these Treaties would provide the framework, and the body of European court 
cases would fill out the skeleton as is further discussed in the White Paper. 
Accordingly, the White Paper reads:
On the United Kingdom joining the Communities, United Kingdom 
courts would be enabled, and in the case of final courts would be 
required, to refer any questions raised before them on the interpretation 
of the EEC or EURATOM Treaties to the European Court for a ruling. 
Thus provisions of Community law raising difficulties in their application 
to our legal system would in time become clarified by decisions of the 
European Court.6
Therefore, Britain perceived that membership would ultimately produce a 
complex and interdependent legal system long before joining the Communities. 
While it is obvious that Parliament could not possibly foresee the specifics of the 
actual development of the European legal system, it is nonetheless clear that the 
British Parliament realised the ftindamental—although far from complete- 
surrender of sovereignty that accession to the Communities would entail.
5 Ibid., 10.
6 Ibid.
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In addition to the clear understanding of the deep implications that 
membership would eventually have for the United Kingdom, the media 
confirmed the significance of joining the Communities. According to The Times 
on 1 June 1967, “Legislation accepting in advance that future rulings by 
Common Market institutions must automatically become part of British law 
would be necessary if Britain’s application to join the E.E.C. were 
accepted. . . ,”7 The article went on to be even clearer on the significance of 
membership on Parliament:
Technically, of course, these rulings would derive all their force under 
British law from the original enactment by Parliament. But in practice 
Parliament would have no control over them, and they would take 
priority over any domestic law that clashed with them. Nor would 
Parliament be able to pass fresh legislation inconsistent with them.8
Further, the same article described the “process of filling in the gaps” which has
been the role of the Court for bringing the aims of the Treaties to fruition:
The powers of the Community institutions are fixed by the treaties, and 
so are the general aims that they may pursue. There is no danger that 
they might be changed so as to conflict with Britain’s interests after we 
joined the E.E.C., for these parts of the treaties can only be modified 
with the unanimous consent of member countries.9
Based on the Government papers and the views of the press, it is reasonable to 
assume that Parliament clearly understood that the Treaties contained the broad 
blueprint for constructing the Communities which could only be altered by the
Member States themselves. By agreeing to such a broad outline for the 
Communities, Britain essentially delegated to the institutions of the
7 “Basic rights not destroyed,” Times, 1 June 1967, 17.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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Communities the responsibility of transforming these broad guidelines set forth 
in the Treaties into effective policies for achieving the aims of the Communities.
Although the Communities would be granted authority to achieve the 
goals of the Treaties, the White Paper addressed the future of Britain’s 
sovereignty:
The Community law having direct internal effect is designed to take 
precedence over the domestic law of the Member States. From this it 
follows that the legislation of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
giving effect to that law would have to do so in such a way as to 
override existing national law so far as inconsistent with it. This result 
need not be left to implication, and it would be open to Parliament to 
enact from time to time any necessary consequential amendments or 
repeals. It would also follow that within the fields occupied by the 
Community law Parliament would have to refrain from passing fresh 
legislation inconsistent with that law as for the time being in force.10
According to such reasoning, it is clear that in joining the Communities,
Parliament would forego an element of sovereignty, and thus would be 
responsible for complying with the obligations arising out of transferring such 
authority. However, the White Paper suggested that doing so would not truly 
constitute a radical transfer of sovereignty and Parliament would retain the 
ability to legislate according to its will although it must not impinge upon the 
element of authority granted to the Communities.
Hence, supremacy for European law in the United Kingdom actually 
flows from the powers granted by the British Parliament and not from the
Communities themselves; put simply, Kompetem-Kompelenz remains with
10 Cmnd. 3301, 8.
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Westminster according to the European Communities Act 1972. To illustrate, 
Command Paper 3301 states that future Community laws would be accepted in 
advance and would “derive their force under the law of the United Kingdom 
from the original enactment passed by Parliament,” just as ordinary legislation,11 
Thus, the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom was not fundamentally 
altered to grant the Communities a supreme legal position to Westminster; 
rather, Parliament remains sovereign despite having transferred an element of its 
sovereignty to the Communities. On a practical level, it is revealing to note that 
without the willingness of the British government to abide by norms and 
regulations of the Communities, the United Kingdom could relinquish its 
membership. Although such an act might lead to a myriad of legal uncertainties, 
it is nonetheless possible according to Parliament. Lawrence Collins explains 
that “the 1972 Act proceeds on the basis of the legal sovereignty of Parliament, 
and is expressive of and subject to the principle of sovereignty of Parliament. It 
has been enacted but there is no fetter on Parliament—it can amend or repeal 
it.”12 Given the voluntary position which the British government has 
undertaken, it must be recognised that a lack of British willingness to abide by 
these laws would render them inapplicable to the United Kingdom. However,
before engaging in a discussion of the effects of the European Communities Act 
and its impact on European integration in the United Kingdom, it is first 
necessary to examine the debate that preceded it to illustrate the manner in
11 Cmnd. 3301, 8.
12 Lawrence Collins, European Community Law in the United Kingdom, 4th ed. 
(Butterworths: London, 1990), 28.
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which Parliament itself conformed to the logic underlying the architect’s
compromise model.
Parliamentary Debate
On 21 October 1971, the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home began “‘the great debate,’” 
and brought the motion forward “that this House approves Her Majesty’s 
Government’s decision of principle to join the European Communities on the 
basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated” by the Government.13 
While it is axiomatic to note that the debate served to confirm Britain’s ambition
to join the Communities, a careful study of the substance of the debate reveals 
inconsistencies with Slaughter and Mattli’s neofunctionalist model and Garrett 
and Weingast’s neorationalist model. In contrast, a rehearsal of the events of 
the debate will highlight the effectiveness of the logic underlying the architect’s 
compromise to explaining legal integration in the UK.
As has already been noted, the impact of membership on Britain’s
sovereignty occupied a key role in the discussion. Given this concept’s 
importance to law and particularly with the principle of supremacy of law, the 
debate concerning sovereignty merits a thorough discussion to illustrate
Parliament’s treatment of the matter. In the debate, the British loss of an
13 House of Commons Official Report, 21 October 1971, col. 912.
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element of sovereignty was certainly recognised. Sir Gerald Nabarro quotes the
former Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhourne:
The Rome Treaty, while leaving intact the separate existence of the 
member States and their constitutional organs. . . creates a Community, 
a new international person, with its own organs of Assembly, Council, 
Commission and Court of Justice. These organs. . . have in the spheres 
in which they operate, and in those spheres only, certain supra-national 
powers which override those of the national constitutional bodies, and 
which also are incapable of challenge in the national courts of the 
member States.14
J. Enoch Powell’s reasoning was representative of those who feared joining the
Communities:
I do not think the fact that this involves a cessation—and a growing 
cessation—of Parliament’s sovereignty can be disputed. Indeed, I notice 
that those who are the keenest proposers of British entry are the most 
ready to confess—not to confess, but to assert—that of course this 
involves by its very nature a reduction of the sovereignty of the House. 
Nevertheless, it is worth while reminding the House that the advice 
which it was given by the Lord Chancellor in Cmnd. 3301—The highest 
source of legal advice which the House can receive—put the nature of 
the transfer of sovereignty very succinctly in paragraph 22:
“The constitutional innovation would lie in the acceptance in advance 
as part of the law of the United Kingdom of provisions to be made in the 
future by instruments issued by the Community institutions.”15
Additionally, in a display of intense fear over the constitutional future of Britain, 
Anthony Wedgwood Benn argued “. . . that the Government have set out upon 
a course that can only be interpreted in terms of a major federal structure for
Western Europe. ... By playing down the politics of it, one can be sure that the 
public do not understand what it is really about.”16 Such a statement conforms
14 House of Commons Official Report, 21 October 1971, col. 977. (Quoted from House of 
Lords Official Report, 2 August 1962, vol. 243, col. 418.)
15 House of Commons Official Report, 28 October 1971, col. 2186.
16 House of Commons Official Report, 27 October 1971, cols. 1758-1759.
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to neofunctionalist reasoning regarding sectoral spillover and an organic 
extension of Community competencies; however, history has failed to confirm 
Benn’s fear. On the contrary, Community competencies have only been 
extended by the agreement of the Member States through Treaty revisions.17
Moreover, far from conforming to neofunctionalist theory, a number of
Members clearly appreciated the bargaining and co-operating situation that 
membership in the Communities entails. According to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Anthony Barber,
... we have to weigh costs and benefits of very different kinds. The fact 
is that they cannot be translated into a common measure, involving, as 
they do, political values, economic values and social values. In the last 
analysis, and it is, after all, the last analysis which we are trying to make 
in this debate, when all the arguments and all the statistics and all the 
historical analogies and all the economic forecasts are exhausted, it must 
be a matter of judgment.18
Thus, the House of Commons decided the issue by weighing the pros and cons 
of membership and finally determined that the United Kingdom’s interests were 
best served by membership in the Communities. Hence, the bargaining logic 
and reliance on purposeful actions implicit in the architect’s compromise model
conforms to the actual events that led to Britain joining the Communities. 
Moreover, rather than conforming to the neofunctionalist logic that spillovers 
and sectoral expansion are responsible for the growth of the Communities, this
17 The extension of Community competencies in the Single European Act, Treaty on 
European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty, for example, is indicative of the willingness 
of the Member States to expand the authority of the Communities.
18 House of Commons Official Report, 27 October 1971, cols. 1736-1737.
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present research maintains that this growth was a result of calculated, rational
choices.
Furthermore, it is axiomatic to point out that the decision to enter the 
Communities has not functioned to settle all disputes over sovereignty and
related tensions between the British government and the Communities. Despite
the doctrine of supremacy of Community law, the present research continues to 
argue that the Member States themselves—and in this case, the British 
government—ultimately enjoy a particular “supremacy” over the Court: namely, 
the Court enjoys supremacy over specific areas of law in the UK only because
the British Parliament allows this to be. As Jowell and Oliver note, “. . . the
whole raison d’etre of the Community is that power can be shared and
sovereignty divided so as to create a political entity capable of carrying out 
common policies without compromising the identity of the component units.”19 
Before turning to the architect’s compromise model, it is necessary to examine 
the idea of the sovereignty of Parliament to provide a sketch of the political and 
philosophical framework upon which European integration occurs in the United 
Kingdom. Only then can the dynamics underlying the architect’s compromise 
be fully understood.
19 Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver, eds., The Changing Constitution, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 19.
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Sovereignty and Parliament
Reflecting the orthodox view of sovereignty, A. V. Dicey defines the 
concept by stating: “The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means. . . that 
Parliament. . . has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake 
any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law 
of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.”20 Bradley summarises Dicey’s arguments by noting that “there are 
no legal limits to the legislative authority of Parliament.”21 However, 
membership in the Communities does represent a restraint—although voluntary- 
on Parliament’s authority; therefore, it is prudent to address the criticism aimed 
at the traditional view of sovereignty espoused by those such as Dicey. Craig 
argues that “the existing debate on sovereignty pays scant attention to the 
reasons why Parliament should be said to be sovereign and to the conclusions 
drawn from this reasoning. Each generation of writers continues to quote 
scholars from an earlier generation without any real understanding of why the 
latter had claimed that Parliament was sovereign, and without any discussion of 
whether the reasoning used was still applicable today.”22 Since the present
20 A. V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 9th ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1939), 39­
40. Bradley and Ewing point out that “. . . Dicey was writing at a time when England 
was often used as a loose synonym for Great Britain or the United Kingdom. . . .” See A. 
W. Bradley and K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed. (New 
York: Longman, 1993), 69.
21 Bradley, A. W., “The Sovereignly of Parliament--in Perpetuity?,” The Changing 
Constitution, 3rd ed., eds. Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 81.
22 P. P. Craig, “Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament After Factortame," 
Yearbook of European Law 11 (1991): 234.
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research relies on these classical arguments regarding sovereignty, a justification 
for their relevance it pertinent in light of Craig’s comments.
Sovereignty: A Historical Note
Any being possessing sovereignty must enjoy a form of authority within 
a particular area for which the being is sovereign. Furthermore, the being must 
have the status as the supreme authority within this area of its sovereignty. This 
is not to suggest that threats upon this sovereignty cannot be lodged by those 
wishing to usurp the supreme authority of a sovereign, however. The history of 
human interaction reflects a system built on a concept of sovereignty, whereby
civilisations in varied forms have been organised in a manner that reflects the
ultimate authority in the society. Primitive humans, Greek city-states, Native 
American tribes and African kingdoms all had a power structure whereby a 
particular entity possessed the authority to govern the community just as the 
European state model following the Peace of Westphalia possesses such a 
power structure. These societies all reflect human organisation based on the 
concept of a “sovereign” which possesses the authority to exercise the supreme 
power for a particular group. Such “sovereigns” have taken many forms (as has 
been mentioned previously); however, they are all similar in the fact that they 
each contain some entity—be that in the form of a single person, a small group, a
combination of groups or even much larger forms—in which the authority to 
exercise supreme power lies.
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Given that the United Kingdom has no written constitution which might 
be relied upon for settling constitutional disputes, supremacy lies with 
Parliament itself. Specifically, unlike the American system of judicial review 
based on the decision Marbury v. Madison?3 “in the United Kingdom the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament appears to be the fundamental rule of 
constitutional law and this supremacy includes power to legislate on
constitutional matters. In so far as constitutional rules are contained in earlier
Acts, there seems to be no Act which Parliament could not repeal or amend by 
passing a new Act.”23 4 Wade notes that “there is one, and only one, limit to 
Parliament’s legal power: it cannot detract from its own continuing 
sovereignty.”25 To illustrate this assertion, Wade cites, in particular, arguments 
in the English case Ellen Street Estates Ltd. v. Minister of Health26
The legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the 
form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to 
enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter 
there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act Parliament 
chooses to make it plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent 
repealed, effect must be given to that intention just because it is the will 
of the legislature.27
Hence, according to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament 
cannot be bound by any other entity.28
23 The United States Supreme Court established the convention of judicial review of Acts of 
Congress in which the Court decides whether or not such Acts are constitutional in 
Marbury v. Madison. See United States Supreme Court. William Marbury v. James 
Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, United States Supreme Court Reports, 
Cranch 1 (1803): 136-179.
24 Bradley and Ewing, 71.
25 H. W. R. Wade, “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty,” Cambridge Law Journal 13 (1955): 
174. The passage is also quoted in Craig, 223.
26 King’s Bench Division. Ellen Street Estates, Limited v. Minister of Health, King’s Bench 
Law Reports 1 (1934): 590-598.
27 Quoted in Wade, “Basis of Legal Sovereignty,” 175; and in Craig, 223.
28 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 66.
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Clearly, given these arguments within the field of European law, such 
reasoning seems contradictory since the British government must comply with 
European Court decisions or risk facing the payment of damages for non­
implementation of Community legislation.29 However, as Josephine Steiner 
points out, the threat of a penalty or even an actual penalty is rife with problems 
since, for example, “there is no provision. . . for periodic payments, or for the 
enforcement of fines and penalties.”30 As such, the threat of penalties provides 
only a partial explanation of the Member States’ willingness to obey the Court.
Instead of such punitive threats, this research has suggested that the 
Member States are compelled by modified preferences to abide by ECJ 
decisions, and thus, restrain their actions, which might possibly take the form of 
refraining from making certain legislation. However, none of this is severely 
damaging to the concept of Parliamentary supremacy. On the contrary, the
relationship between the United Kingdom and the Court underlines the 
supremacy of the Member States. It is undeniably true that the Member States 
have transferred a significant element of their sovereignty to the Communities.
The fact, however, that the Communities is more inter-governmental than
supra-national and that enforcement mechanisms lack practical effectiveness
necessarily means that the Member States themselves remain the masters of the
Treaties, in keeping with the architect’s compromise model.
29 See Cases C-6/90 & C9/90, Andrea Francovich and Another v. The Republic (Italy), 
Common Market Law Reports 2 (1993): 66-116; or European Court Reports (1991): I- 
5357-1-5418.
30 Josephine Steiner, Enforcing EC Law (London: Blackstone Press, 1995), 12.
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Hart’s reasoning on the concept of sovereignty is particularly relevant to 
the present discussion. Explaining sovereignty, Hart states that . the theory 
simply asserts that there could only be legal limits on legislative power if the 
legislator were under the orders of another legislator whom he habitually 
obeyed. . . . [T]he theory does not insist that there are no limits on the 
sovereign’s power but only that there are no legal limits on it.”31 Hence, within 
the United Kingdom, there are no legal limits on the actions of Parliament in the 
strictest of terms. However, Parliament has wilfully transferred an amount of its 
sovereignty to the Communities. The decisive point here lies in the fact that the 
United Kingdom might at any time leave the Communities. De Smith and
Brazier note that:
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has undoubtedly been 
changed, but it would fully revive in its traditional form if Parliament 
legislated to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European 
Community. For economic and political reasons it is most unlikely that 
Parliament would attempt to do that, but such a step would be effective 
in English law (although the European Court would probably hold that it 
was ineffective in Community law).32
De Smith and Brazier’s suggestion that Britain’s exit from the Communities 
would be permissible according to English law—although problematic at the 
very least according to European law—is further considered by Bradley and 
Ewing. They suggest a myriad of complexities:
. . . what Parliament has legislated to achieve in the European 
Communities Act, it could undo by the simple process of passing a 
different Act. ... In such an event, the problems raised would be as 
much political as legal; there would seem little point in wrangling over 
the legal niceties of the situation where there had in fact been secession.
31 Hart, 66.
32 Stanley de Smith and Robert Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. 
(London: Penguin Books, 1994), 89.
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More practical problems along the same lines would be posed if the UK 
Parliament decided in a particular instance to legislate in express 
defiance of Community law, whilst at the same time making clear its 
continued acceptance for the generality of cases of supremacy of 
Community law. The most difficult legal questions of all arise in the 
context of implied, rather than express, repeal. Logically, what can be 
repealed expressly must also, in some circumstances, be capable of 
implied repeal; the difficulty is to know in what circumstances such 
implied repeal occurs. In particular, would it occur where, after the 
entry into force of the European Communities Act, UK legislation was 
enacted which simply contradicted an already-existing provision of 
Community law? Would that be taken by the courts as an indication that 
Parliament’s most recent intention was to deny supremacy to the 
Community law involved, so that the European Communities Act’s 
provisions on this score would be impliedly repealed?33
Thus, the fact that the British Parliament possesses the authority to withdraw
from the European Communities necessarily illustrates that sovereignty 
ultimately resides at Westminster. This theoretically has a very significant 
impact on the Court’s relationship with the United Kingdom. Practically 
speaking, however, factors such as reputation and credibility naturally bar 
withdrawal as a serious alternative except in the most grave circumstances. 
(Specifically, any Member State considering such behaviour risks a loss of
credibility if its threats are not substantiated, leading to the loss of the 
threatening State’s reputation for making credible threats if the behaviour 
persists over time.) Nonetheless, since withdrawal does exist as a possible 
option, the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of a sovereign have 
particular relevance. Hence, we turn to further examining the nature of a
sovereign.
33 Bradley and Ewing, 146.
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Sovereignty: Some Preliminary Conclusions
By definition, there can be but one sovereign. On the surface, such an 
axiom appears problematic with regard to our reasoning. As a neofunctionalist 
would be correct to point out, the Court has issued decisions that have 
fundamentally changed the nature of the relationship between Member States 
and the European Communities, codifying into law the necessary measures for 
the completion of the broad designs of the Treaties. One might attempt to 
argue that such manoeuvring by the Court is evidence that the Member States 
no longer enjoy sovereignty. This research project disagrees, justifying its 
assumption that Member States still maintain their respective sovereignty based 
on Hart’s reasoning. According to Hart, . . the order given by the
subordinate will only rank as law if it is, in its own turn, given in pursuance of 
some order issued by the sovereign. The subordinate must have some authority 
delegated by the sovereign to issued orders on his behalf.”34 Following such 
reasoning, we turn to Colin Munro’s analysis of the relationship between the 
Communities and Britain. Munro notes that “. . . the status of Community law 
in this country is a matter of constitutional law, not Community law, and here it 
does owe its force entirely to an Act of Parliament.”35 Because the source of 
the Communities’ authority (at least in the United Kingdom) flows from an Act 
of Parliament, Westminster retains ultimate sovereignty despite the fact an 
element has been granted to the European institutions. Moreover, as there can
34 Hart, 45.
35 Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (London: Butterworths, 1987), 128.
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be but one ultimate sovereign for a particular entity, the British Parliament 
continues to occupy this position based on the fact that the sheer authority it 
holds has not been surpassed by that of the Communities. Finally, the 
cornerstone of the British Constitution36 allows Parliament to reserve the power 
to absolve the transfer of sovereignty, necessarily indicating that Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz remains at Westminster. Having briefly explained the related 
concepts of Parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty as they relate to the 
European Communities, it is now possible to examine the European 
Communities Act 1972-Ah& legislation which enabled the accession of the 
United Kingdom to the Communities.
European Communities Act 1972
The United Kingdom entered the European Communities as a result of 
the European Communities Act 1972. In the legislation, the United Kingdom
declared:
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time 
to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies 
and procedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, 
as in accordance with the Treaties are without further enactment to be 
given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised and 
available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and 
the expression “enforceable Community right” and similar expressions 
shall be read as referring to one to which this subsection applies.37
36 Namely, Parliament cannot bind its successor.
37 European Communities Act 1972, Part I, 2 (1).
220
To be sure, the British government had to adopt in full both the body of existing 
European law and the law that would emerge in the future. With regard to the 
Court, the British Government recognised that this meant the following:
For the purposes of ail legal proceedings any question as to the meaning 
or effect of any of the Treaties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of 
any Community instrument, shall be treated as a question of law (and, if 
not referred to the European Court, be for determination as such in 
accordance with the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of 
the European Court).38
Despite such a broad commitment to the Court, however, the United Kingdom 
has not always accorded to the ECJ unyielding co-operation or unwavering 
commitment, although the UK has shown considerable restraint in abiding by
EC law.
It was through the European Communities Act 1972 that the British 
Parliament embarked on a course which has dramatically altered the country’s 
(unwritten) constitution. Adopting the act in full, the United Kingdom was able 
to reconcile its dualist approach to international law with the necessity to agree 
in advance to future provisions which might arise. On the surface, such a 
limitation on the sovereignty of Parliament appears problematic. However, as 
has been previously argued, Parliament is, in fact, capable of imposing limits on 
its own authority. Nevertheless, Parliament ultimately remains free to absolve 
itself of these commitments although practical considerations make this very 
unlikely. Illustrating this issue, Imelda Maher points out that “. . . the political 
belief is that Britain cannot afford economically to be outside the European
38 Ibid., Pari I, 3 (1).
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Community therefore political and economic circumstances would have to be 
very different before Parliament would exercise its power to repeal the 
European Communities Act and with it its membership of the Communities.”39 
While expressing considerable disregard for the rule of law, Richard Crawshaw 
did express the opinion of more than an insignificant minority in the Commons 
debate on British membership in the Communities in his statement:
. . . insofar as there is a court, it is of course there to give decisions, but 
whether a country accepts a decision in the ultimate is a question of fact. 
Of course this must be so.
France signed the N.A.T.O. treaty. It decided not to keep forces 
within N.A.T.O. Was it bound to keep them there? Of course.
. . . sovereignty is a matter of power, and where power resides, is 
sovereignty. Whatever the issues are, ultimately it comes down to 
whether that country wishes to accept.40
Conceding the legal problems posed by Crawshaw’s argument, in an extreme 
sense, Parliament does retain both theoretically and practically the authority to 
ultimately exit the Communities. This underlines the logic of modified 
preferences in that the Court’s decisions must be palatable to the Member States 
since they have the power to alter its authority. As the case studies of this 
research verify, despite the EC J’s legal responsibilities, it cannot ignore the legal 
implications of its decision or it will risk losing legitimacy.
In examining the press in the months preceding British accession to the 
Communities, a fair assessment of the impact of membership was for the most
39 Imelda Maher, “A Question of Conflict: The Higher English Courts and the 
Implementation of European Community Law,” Implementing EC Law in the United 
Kingdom, ed. Terence Daintith (Chichester: Chancery Law Publishing, 1995), 315.
40 House of Commons Official Report, 27 October 1971, col. 1931.
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part presented. There was little doubt in the press in 1972 over the potential 
impact that joining the Communities would have upon Britain’s constitutional 
order. The Times, for example, on 18 April 1972 reported that “the present Bill 
[The European Bill] can and does make community law prevail over existing 
Acts of Parliament. It also expressly attempts to make it prevail over future 
Acts. . . ,”4i Moreover, it was certainly clear by 1973 that joining the European 
Communities would revolutionise British law. The Times reported in early 
January that “the treaty and its regulations contradict our domestic law time and 
again. How are the courts to cope with the contradictions? The answer is 
plain. If there is any conflict between a previous Act of our own Parliament and 
the treaty, then the provisions of the treaty will prevail.”42 Incidentally, such a 
clear understanding of the commitment of membership contrasts to the spillover 
logic of neofunctionalism.
Despite a transference of an element of sovereignty to the Communities,
the British Parliament certainly did not transfer Kompetenz-Kompetenz as is
evidenced by Article 3, Section 1, Part 1 of the European Communities Act
1972’.
If Her Majesty by Order in Council declares that a treaty specified in the 
Order is to be regarded as one of the Community Treaties as herein 
defined, the Order shall be conclusive that it is to be so regarded; but a 
treaty entered into by the United Kingdom after the 22nd January 1972, 
other than a pre-accession treaty to which the United Kingdom accedes 
on terms settled on or before that date, shall not be so regarded unless it
41 H. W. R. Wade, “The Judges’ Dilemma,” Times, 18 April 1972, 14.
42 Lord Denning, “Every Resource and Skill Needed in Grafting New Laws on to the Old,” 
Times, 2 January 1973, “Forward Into Europe,” ii.
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is so specified, nor be so specified unless a draft of the Order in Council 
has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.43
Thus, the British Parliament reserved the authority to either approve or reject 
further treaties on European integration, thereby retaining sovereignty except in 
those limited fields specified by the Treaties approved by Parliament.44 This 
necessarily meant that Kompetem-Kompetenz remained with Westminster and
was not transferred to the Communities. This further illustrates that Parliament
is capable of exercising ultimate control over the Community’s impact on the 
United Kingdom. As the historical and political background that surrounded 
Britain’s entry into the Communities has been sketch, it is now appropriate to 
examine the architect’s compromise model with regard to these circumstances.
The Architect’s Compromise and British Entry
In reflecting over the events which led to the British accession, the 
architect’s compromise model appears to conform well with the actual
circumstances. First, these negotiations were characterised by bargaining in 
which the advantages and disadvantages of Community membership were 
carefully weighed as we have seen. Tom Boardman, summed up the House of 
Commons debate on British accession, stating that “it has been said throughout
43 European Communities Act 1972, Section 1, Part 1.
44 See E. C. S. Wade and A. W. Bradley, who note that:
. . the Court of Justice has explained that Community law achieves supremacy as a 
consequence of a transfer of legislative powers from the member states to the 
Community. . . . [I]t is beyond doubt that this has not been achieved by the European 
Communities Act 1972, albeit that the devices called upon in the Act go a long way. . . to 
safeguard the primacy of Community law as far as UK courts are concerned.” 
(Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed. [London: Longman, 1996], 145-146.)
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the debate that this is a matter of personal judgment. It is a matter of weighing 
the advantages and disadvantages in the balance and deciding on which side to 
come down.”45 The process of decision-making reflects a similar reliance on 
rationality and modified preferences as is assumed by the architect’s 
compromise model. While the model is built upon decision-making by the ECJ, 
it is nonetheless possible to examine the model’s assumptions with regard to 
Britain’s accession to the Communities. Hence, the following discussion will 
further justify the assumptions of the model through examining Britain’s 
decision to join the Communities.
In line with the logic underlying the architect’s compromise model, we 
can identify two major actors: the British Parliament and the ECJ. Although 
the decision to join the Communities was based on an assessment of the overall 
impact of the Communities on Britain, this research focuses on the Court, and 
we thus assume it to fill a role as a primary actor. Furthermore, at the time 
Britain joined the Communities, the Court had already laid the cornerstones of 
EC law—direct effect and supremacy—and thus, the British government joined 
the Communities with the knowledge that the Court held such significant
authority.
While a host of actors both above and below the state was a factor in the
debate over Britain’s accession to the Communities, Parliament alone decided
that Britain would join the Communities. It should be stressed that this research
45 House of Commons Official Report, 27 October 1971, col. 2009.
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project is not concerned with the evolution of public opinion and the manner in 
which national governments arrive at decisions.46 Rather, we are concerned 
with the manner in which the Court affects integration and the development of 
European law in the Member States. Therefore, it is possible to regard the 
United Kingdom as a single, solitary actor since the Government negotiated the 
terms of entry with a single voice and accepted membership in full for the
country.
We also assume rationality in the behaviour of the actors. As was 
established previously, rationality implies that the actors have a set of goals, and 
their preferences are identified as the actions which appear to maximise their 
respective goals. Rationality, in this sense, does not imply that the actors have 
complete information. Choices, therefore, between preferences are made based 
on the knowledge to which an actor has access. Parliament’s decision to join 
the Communities conforms to rational expectations since it represents the 
collective belief of Members of Parliament that membership would be in the best 
interests of Britain. As has been discussed above, the advantages of joining the
Communities consisted of a wide range of arguments although the economic 
argument appeared to tip the scales in the direction of Membership.47 Such 
reasoning was the result of thorough study, including a Government-
46 For an analysis of the impact of domestic politics on the process of European integration, 
see Simon Bulmer, “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy Making,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 21, no. 4 (1983): 349-363.
47 In reviewing the arguments of the “European Communities Debate” in Parliament, the 
issue of economics is often claimed as the decisive issue by a number of supporters (and 
challengers) alike.
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commissioned “Economic Assessment,”48 of the expected outcomes that joining 
the Communities would precipitate.49 In the Government’s White Paper of July 
1971, the Government’s conclusions on accession were presented:
. . . Her Majesty’s Government are convinced that our country will be 
more secure, our ability to maintain peace and promote development in 
the world greater, our economy stronger, and our industries and people 
more prosperous, if we join the European Communities than if we 
remain outside them. The Government are also convinced—and this 
conviction is shared by the Governments of the present six members of 
the Communities—that British membership of the Communities will 
enhance the security and prosperity of Western Europe. The 
Government are satisfied that the arrangements for our entry agreed in 
the negotiations will enable us to adjust satisfactorily to our new 
position as members of the Communities, and thus to reap the full 
benefits of membership.50
Hence, the Government concluded that given the prevailing circumstances at the 
time—and later a majority of Members of Parliament likewise concluded—that 
Britain’s goals could best be met by joining the Communities.51
The events that led to Britain’s accession appear to conform precisely to 
the logic of modified preferences as Parliament ultimately held that the benefits 
of membership were significant enough to transfer an element of its sovereignty. 
It is axiomatic to mention that in the years preceding the British accession,
48 See Britain and the European Communities: An Economic Assessment, Cmnd, 4289 
(February 1970).
49 See, for example, Geoffrey Rippon et al., Europe: The Case for Going In (London: 
George C. Harrap and Co. for the European Movement, 1971), which consists of a series 
of essays outlining the particular economic, security and political advantages of joining as 
well as the positive effect membership would have upon democracy in the United 
Kingdom.
50 Cmnd. 4715, 2.
51 With regard to the other primary actor--the Court--we assume that rationality, as is 
constant feature of the architect’s compromise model. However, the decision to join the 
Communities was a national decision taken by the United Kingdom and it is problematic 
to gauge the rationality of the Court based on this particular event. Therefore, this 
section focuses on the United Kingdom instead of the Court.
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opinion inside and outside Parliament was greatly divided on the supposed 
benefits of membership.52 In the Parliamentary debates themselves, John Biggs- 
Davison expressed the opinion of many supporters of entry both in the 
Government and in the Opposition in stating, “the terms. . . as set out in the 
White Paper are not perfect. They are, however, the best now obtainable.”53 
Thus, the argument to join the Communities was tempered by modified 
preferences. Particularly, Britain was faced with ceding an element of its 
sovereignty, redirecting trading preferences away from the Commonwealth and 
towards the Communities, adopting common policies on agriculture and 
regional development and conforming to other requirements of the Communities 
in order to secure the economic and security gains of membership. As the final 
vote in the Commons concerning Britain’s accession revealed, the majority in 
Parliament concluded that even with the disadvantages of joining the
Communities, it was in Britain’s best interest to seek membership. Hence, 
Parliament’s modified preferences led Britain to accept the disadvantages of 
membership in order to gain the benefits. To refer back to the theoretical 
debate of this study, the accession of the United Kingdom appears to conform 
to the architect’s compromise. Specifically, Britain surrendered its short-term 
and unbridled preferences and instead, evaluated membership with regard to 
modified preferences, believing that membership would bring greater economic 
and security benefits in particular. The expectation of such long-term interests 
made the transference of sovereignty palatable. Having examined these events
52 See, for example, “We have Waited Ten Years,” The Economist, 8 May 1971: 14-15, and 
“Battle Positions,” The Economist, 2 January 1971: 16-18.
53 House of Commons Official Report, October 27, 1971, cols. 1994-1995.
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that led to Britain’s membership, we now turn to examining the incorporation of 
the doctrine of supremacy of European law into British law.
Acceptance of the Doctrine of Supremacy by the United Kingdom
Despite formal constructions, the principle of supremacy of European 
law was not practically accorded to the ECJ in the early years of British 
membership. Rather, acceptance came slowly in the form of a type of 
bargaining process. Specifically, Britain accepted the concept gradually as the 
ECJ interpreted the limits of prior Treaty agreements in cases such Macarthys 
Ltd. v. Smith,54 Garland v. BREL,55 Marshall v. Southampton56 and the 
Factortame cases.57 This, in fact, did constitute a revolutionary change in the 
authority of the British Parliament. It will be demonstrated, however, that such 
a change occurred because of modified preferences--a central assumption of the 
architect’s compromise model—rather than from neofunctionalist logic. In 
Marshall, for example, the English Court was able to accept that national 
statutes should be interpreted with the assumption that they are not supposed to
54 Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd. v. Wendy Smith, European Court Reports (1980): 1275­
1297.
55 Case 12/81, Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Limited, European Court Reports 
(1982): 359-376.
56 Case 152/84, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching), European Court Reports (1986): 723-751; or Common Market 
Law Reports, 1 (1986): 688-713.
57 Case 213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. 
And Others, European Court Reports (1990): I-2433-I-2475; and Case 221/89, Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited and Others (No. 2), 
Common Market Law Reports 3 (1990): 589-632.
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conflict with European law.38 Such reasoning is a clear break from according 
Parliament unfettered sovereignty. P. P. Craig points out that:
The courts are willing to allow Community law to take precedence over 
national law in the event of a clash between the two. They reach this 
result by the use of a strong rule of construction, the tenor of which is 
that the relevant national rule should, whenever possible, be read as not 
intending to be in conflict with Community law.58 9 60
Craig goes on to cite the Litster™ case as evidence of such an approach. 
Britain’s piecemeal approach to recognising the supremacy of European law 
appears to conform to the logic of the architect’s compromise model. To 
illustrate the strength of this assertion, three pivotal cases with regard to 
Britain’s acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy—Macarthys, Marshall and
Factortame—vfiW be examined according to the architect’s compromise model. 
The remainder of this chapter will consist of initial reviews of the facts of these 
cases followed by an analysis of each. Finally, the chapter will conclude with 
general remarks on the concept of supremacy and its reception by the United
Kingdom.
Macarthys Ltd, v. Smith
Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith arose when Wendy Smith, an employee of 
Macarthys Ltd. in Wembly claimed that she had been discriminated against
based on her sex, Mrs. Smith became the stockroom manager of the warehouse
58 T. R. S. Allan, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning’s Dextrous Revolution,” 
Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies 3, no. 1 (1983): 32.
59 Craig, 241.
60 House of Lords. Litster and Others v. Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Company 
Limited, Common Market Law Reports no. 2 (1989): 194-223.
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on 1 March 1976, after the departure of the former manager. Although her 
predecessor received sixty pounds per week, Mrs. Smith’s salary was fifty 
pounds per week. Mrs. Smith left her job on 9 March 1977.61
Claiming that the discrepancies in her salary and that of her predecessor 
violated the amended Equal Pay Act 1970 (Sections 1.1 and 2.a), Mrs. Smith
brought suit against her employer in the Industrial Tribunal in London. On 27 
June 1977, the Tribunal upheld Mrs. Smith’s claim, and Macarthys Ltd.
subsequently appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which rejected the
appeal on 14 December 1977. Macarthys Ltd. then appealed to the Court of 
Appeal, Civil Division, of the Supreme Court of Judicature, which appealed to 
the European Court of Justice under Article 177 for a preliminary ruling.62 
According to Lawrence Collins:
The short point was whether the Equal Pay Act 1970, as amended by the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, applied only where men and women were 
employed contemporaneously at different rates of pay, or whether it was 
broader in scope and applied in particular to a man and a woman 
employed in succession. Lord Denning thought that the Equal Pay Act 
was not limited to men and women working contemporaneously, but 
Lawton and Cumming-Bruce LJJ thought that is was. As a result the 
court thought there was a potential conflict between the legislation and 
art 119 of the EEC Treaty and art 1 of the first Council Directive on 
equal pay [75/117], . . ,63
While Lord Denning was unconvinced of the argument concerning 
contemporaneous work, his comments regarding the supremacy of Parliament
are pertinent to the discussion at hand. Specifically, Lord Denning stated:
61 Macarthys v. Smith (ECR), 1277.
62 Ibid., 1277-1278.
63 Lawrence Collins, European Community Law in the United Kingdom, 4th ed. (London: 
Butterworlhs, 1990), 32.
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Thus far I have assumed that our Parliament, whenever it passes 
legislation, intends to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. If the time 
should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the 
intention of repudiating the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally 
of acting inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I should 
have thought that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute 
of our Parliament.64
Hence, it is obvious that Lord Denning did not accord EC law a higher authority
than that of the British Parliament itself. However, Lord Denning further
acknowledged that such a blatant attack on the Community by Britain was 
unlikely, and in Macarthys, he “assume[d] that the United Kingdom intended to 
fulfil its obligations under art 119.”65 Given the uncertainty surrounding the 
case, the Court of Appeal requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ in which 
the Civil Division asked if the principle of equal pay for equal work was 
contained in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty and in subsequent legislation.66 The 
Court of Appeal further inquired of the nature of the principle of equal pay for 
equal work and asked if the Council Directive on the issue is directly applicable 
to Member States.67
In the proceedings before the Court, Mrs. Smith, the United Kingdom 
and the Commission all submitted arguments. Mrs. Smith argued that 
legislation from Britain and Communities, including the Equal Pay Act 1970, the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Article 1 of Council Directive 75/117/EEC,68
64 English Court of Appeal. Macarthys Ltd v. Smith, All England Law Reports 3 (1979): 
329.
65 Ibid., 329.
66 Specifically, Article 1 of the EEC Council Directive of 10 February 1975 (75/117/EEC). 
See Official Journal of the European Communities vol. 18, L 45 (19 February 1975).
67 Macarthys v. Smith (ECR), 1278.
68 Council Directive 75/117/EEC.
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prohibited sexual discrimination. Further, Mrs. Smith and the Commission both 
argued that Article 119 of the EEC Treaty guaranteed equal pay for equal work 
even in situations when women or men are contemporaneously working in the 
same position. With regard to contemporaneous employment, the Commission 
noted that “such a qualification is justified neither by the purpose nor the 
language of the texts, is not supported by the case-law and has no foundation in 
common sense or policy.”69 In contrast, the United Kingdom argued that 
neither Article 119 nor Article 1 of the directive are sufficiently specific or 
precise to give rise to direct effect, and thus, the United Kingdom argued that 
the “implementation [of the directive] is a matter for national legislation.”70
Here again, it appears that modified preferences determined the actions
of the United Kingdom. T. C. Hartley has explained that . in practice 
priority will be given to Community law: in view of the high degree of party 
discipline in the House of Commons, it is unlikely that Parliament would 
repudiate the Treaties unless the Government had decided on such a course of 
action.”71 While recognising Parliament’s sovereignty to override the European 
Communities Act 1972 and subsequent legislation, it appears Britain forgoes
this temptation in order to ensure a well-functioning Community. Hence, the 
architect’s compromise model with its emphasis on modified preferences offers 
a useful explanation of the relationship between the Court and the United 
Kingdom. Specifically, the United Kingdom voluntarily agreed to transfer its
69 Macarthys v. Smith (ECR), 1283.
70 Ibid., 1283.
71 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press: 1988), 243-244.
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absolute authority in legislative matters in return for membership in the
Communities.
Upon review by the European Court of Justice, Mrs. Smith was found to 
have suffered discrimination based on her sex. Citing the Defrenne22 
judgement—a case which well illustrates the Court’s piecemeal approach and 
increasing influence, the Court argued that Article 119 applied directly “without 
the need for more detailed implementing measures on the part of the 
Community or the Member States,”72 3 and thus, “the principle that men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work. . . is not confined to situations
in which men and women are contemporaneously doing the equal work for the 
same employer.”74 Furthermore, the Court held that the dispute could be 
decided solely by Article 119 and therefore, did not give a judgement on other 
legislation which had been mentioned in the proceedings.75
When the case was returned to the Court of Appeals, the British Court 
accepted the ECJ’s ruling and accordingly determined that Mrs. Smith had, in 
fact, suffered discrimination. In the judgement of the English court, Lord 
Denning explained precisely the events that led to Britain acquiescing to the 
supremacy of the ECJ:
The majority of this court felt that Article 119 was uncertain. So this 
court referred the problem to the European Court at Luxembourg. We 
have now been provided with the decision of that Court. It is important
72 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyine Beige de Navigation Aerienne 
Sabena, European Court Reports (1976): 455-493.
73 Macarthys v. Smith (ECR), 1288.
74 Ibid., 1289.
75 Ibid., 1290.
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now to declare—and it must be made plain—that the provisions of Article 
119 of the Treaty of Rome take priority over anything in our English 
statute on equal pay which is inconsistent with Article 119. That 
priority is given by our own law. It is given by the European 
Communities Act 1972 itself. Community law is now part of our law: 
and, whenever there is any inconsistency, Community law has priority. 
It is not supplanting English law. It is part of our law which overrides 
any other part which is inconsistent with it.76
Recognising the primacy of European law in the limited competencies delegated 
to the European Communities by the Member States, the English court accepted 
that Article 119 was not restricted to employees who worked at the same time
in an equal capacity.
The Architect’s Compromise and Macarthys
With regard to the architect’s compromise model, the case is relatively 
simple. We begin with the actors: in Macarthys, Mrs. Smith, the UK and the 
Commission all lodged submissions to the ECJ. Despite Mrs. Smith’s role in 
bringing the case to the attention of the Court, and hence, helping to fill in the 
gaps of the Treaty, the parameters of the decision were established much earlier 
when Article 119 was drafted by the Member States. By joining the 
Communities, the United Kingdom chose to abide by these regulations. The
Commission was instrumental in that it vocalised Community preferences at 
large; however, it did not have a role in the actual decision-making process. 
Thus, we assume the primary actors to be the Member States (in this case 
Britain) and the Court itself.
76 English Court of Appeal. Macarthys, CMLR, 218.
235
As is a feature of the architect’s compromise model, we assume the 
rationality of the actors. In the case of the United Kingdom, it is clear from 
Lord Denning’s initial comments that Britain would prefer to retain the 
unfettered sovereignty of Parliament. However, the benefits of membership in 
the Communities compensated for the loss of this particular national authority 
as will subsequently be demonstrated with regard to modified preferences. With 
respect to the Court, we have previously established that the term rationality 
refers to the ECJ’s purposeful action in achieving the goals of the Community as 
set out by the Treaties. In Macarthys, the Court relied on a teleological 
approach to the Treaties as to afford a more liberal interpretation of Article 119, 
which ensured the supremacy of European law over British domestic law.
With respect to modified preferences, the Court appeared rather 
unconcerned about a possible conflict with regard to its argument for the 
supremacy of European law. However, Macarthys does actually represent a 
logical point in the development of the concept of supremacy begun in Costa 
and Van Gend en Loos', given that the Member States had accepted these 
revolutionary decisions dealing with supremacy, the Court most likely judged 
that a decision that further bolstered supremacy of European law likewise would 
be accepted. In terms of the architect’s compromise model,77 we can assume 
that that modified preferences of the Member States as represented by the state 
of nature could be represented by mi, given that the Member States had 
relatively pro-integration sentiments. Weiler confirms the assumption that the
77 Please refer to the appendix following chapter 8 for a review of the architect’s 
compromise model.
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Macarthys decision was taken in a period receptive to further integration, 
noting that “the expansion of Community jurisdiction in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s was. . . willed by all actors involved.”78 In terms of the action of the 
Court, the decision in Macarthys is clearly represented by ai since the case 
represented a distinct move towards further integration as the Court further 
secured the integrity of the Communities. From the architect’s compromise 
model, we thus expect outcome oi, or acceptance by the Member States and a 
resulting deepening of integration, which is exactly what did occur.
In terms of the reception of the case by the United Kingdom, the 
architect’s compromise model proves a reliable model for illustrating the ECJ’s 
role in the process of European integration. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith represents 
an early victory for European law and illustrated that courts in the United 
Kingdom were bound to comply with Community law despite Lord Denning’s 
initial assumption that an intention of Parliament to repudiate the Treaty should 
guide national court decisions. As described above in this analysis and famously 
elsewhere,79 the English Court did accept the authority of the ECJ based on the 
fact that the legislation establishing Britain’s membership in the Communities 
was actually an Act of Parliament itself. Therefore, it is clear that ultimate 
sovereignty still theoretically lies with Parliament: the European Communities 
Act transferred authority to the Communities but is also subject to repeal. 
T. R. S. Allan describes this with great clarity:
78 J. H. H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe,” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2435.
79 See Allan, 22-33.
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... it must be admitted, the judgments, though significant, hardly look 
revolutionary. They expressly affirm the ultimate sovereignty of the 
contemporary Parliament. . . . Indeed, the reasoning is essentially that, 
in according priority to Community law, the court was giving effect to 
Parliament’s (present) intention. The object of the Equal Pay Act was to 
implement the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Treaty of Rome 
to ensure the equality of the sexes in terms and conditions of 
employment. Parliament could not, therefore, have intended there to be 
any conflict or incompatibility between the United Kingdom statute and 
Community law.80
Additionally, Evelyn Ellis, through demonstrating that express and implied 
repeal of the European Communities Act are both legal, illustrates that 
Parliament still exhibits a de facto authority over the Court. Hence, Britain was
able to both accept the authority of the Court and continue to respect the
concept of Parliamentary sovereignty.
Marshall
While previous European Court cases illustrated the ability of the Court 
to interpret in a manner to accord formidable steps to further integration, the 
legal reasoning of Marshall v. Southampton stands as an example of possible 
judicial restraint. Such restraint is a reflection of greater appreciation of stricter 
modified preferences of the Member States, therefore allowing the Court less
freedom to issue overtly integrationist decisions. While Marshall was 
essentially a case of conflict between domestic law and Community law, and 
thus a question of legal supremacy, perhaps the most interesting facet of the
Ibid., 28-29.
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decision surrounded the Court’s reasoning on direct effect. A summary will lay 
the foundation for analysis of the case’s impact on European integration.
The facts of the case are straightforward. Until 31 March 1980, Miss
M. H. Marshall was employed by the Southampton and South West Hampshire 
Area Health Authority. Although Miss Marshall was physically capable and 
willing to continuing working, her employment was terminated shortly after 
reaching the age of 62. This termination was due to her employer’s policy of 
observing a normal retirement age of 65 for men and 60 for women; Miss 
Marshall worked until the age of 62 as a result of an earlier exemption, which
was later withdrawn. Based on her loss of job satisfaction and income, Miss 
Marshall brought proceedings against her employer before the Industrial 
Tribunal, arguing that Southampton breached section 6 (2) (Z>) of the Sex
Discrimination Act, 1975. The Tribunal held that section 6 (4) of the Sex
Discrimination Act was in violation of Article 5 (1) of the Equal Treatment 
Directive since the national act excluded retirement from the types of activities
which constitute discrimination while the directive granted equal working and
dismissal conditions without regard to sex. After an appeal by the Health
Authority, the Employment Appeal Tribunal—while agreeing that 
Southampton’s employment policy which distinguished between the sexes with 
respect to retirement ages was in conflict with Article 5 (1)—found that the 
Industrial Tribunal did not have the authority to rule that the act was overridden 
by the directive. The case was then referred to the European Court of Justice 
by the Court of Appeal. In its request for a preliminary ruling, the Court of 
Appeal asked if Miss Marshall’s dismissal constituted discrimination as
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prohibited in the Directive 76/207, and if in the affirmative, whether Miss 
Marshall could rely on this directive despite any inconsistency between it and 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.81 82
In the proceedings before the Court, Miss Marshall, the Commission, the 
Southampton Health Authority and the UK all submitted statements. Miss 
Marshall asserted that she had experienced discrimination based on her age as 
prohibited by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Directive 76/207. 
Discounting the conflict between Article 5 (1) of the Directive and section 6 (4) 
of the Sex Discrimination Act, Miss Marshall argued that when domestic law is 
in conflict with Community law, national courts are obliged to rule in such a 
manner as to conform to the latter. Supporting Miss Marshall, the Commission
maintained that the judgement by the English courts with regard to Section 6 (4) 
of the Sex Discrimination Act was in conflict with the directive. In contrast, the
Southampton Health Authority and the UK argued that Miss Marshall’s 
dismissal did not constitute an act of discrimination based on Article 7 (1) of 
Directive 79/7, which permits individual Member States to determine their 
particular regulations with regard to the age at which one is entitled to
retirement and old age pensions. The Southampton Health Authority and the 
UK justified their reasoning, citing the Court’s ruling in Burton,*2 in which the 
Court approved a voluntary retirement scheme which applied a different age 
threshold for men and women. The Southampton Health Authority and the UK
81 Marshall v. Southampton (ECR), 738-740.
82 Case 19/81, Arthur Burton v. British Railways Board, European Court Reports (1982): 
555-592.
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further argued that the directive was not capable of direct effect, and moreover, 
that an unimplemented directive could not be relied upon by one individual 
against another individual. Arguing that the state—when acting as an employer- 
should be treated as a private employer since to do otherwise would constitute
discrimination between private and public employers, the state was thus not 
liable despite its failure to give effect to the directive.83
Following the advice of the Advocate General, the Court ruled that Miss
Marshall had suffered discrimination based on her sex and that Directive 76/207
took direct effect notwithstanding the arguments by Southampton Health 
Authority and the UK with regard to the reasoning in the Burton case. The 
judgement is particularly interesting in that the Court not only addressed the 
specific legal difficulty of the case before it but also expounded that directives 
cannot have horizontal effect according to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. 
Specifically, the Court declared that directives are only binding on Member 
States and not on individuals. Thus, one may rely upon a directive in a claim 
against a recalcitrant Member State but not against an individual. The Court 
justified this position by noting that first, such a situation did not discriminate 
against those either publicly or privately employed since individuals in both 
cases are able to rely on the directive against a recalcitrant Member State, and 
second, this logic was designed to disallow a Member State from benefiting
from failure to enact a directive (the doctrine of estoppel).
83 Marshall \>. Southampton (ECR), 743-748.
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While the Court has developed alternative remedies for individuals 
suffering a loss as a result of a recalcitrant Member State,84 the case itself 
represents a cautious move by the Court. Given the Court’s unsolicited 
preclusion of horizontal direct effect as a principle in European law, the 
Marshall case closely conforms to the assumptions of the architect’s 
compromise model. To begin, while Miss Marshall, the Commission, the 
Southampton Health Authority and the British Government all submitted 
arguments before the Court, it is more useful to examine the case with regard to 
the Member States of the Communities and the Court itself. First, Miss
Marshall and the Commission can be regarded as representing the argument for 
further integration. As has been argued previously, the plaintiff in the cases 
before the ECJ is significant to the extent that he or she brings the unsettled 
legal issue to the attention of the Court for clarification; however, he or she 
does not affect the scope of integration to which the Member States have
committed themselves and to which the Court exists to ensure: Miss Marshall,
thus, served as such a conduit. While the Commission certainly played a 
significant role in arguing the case for the Communities at large, it had the 
authority neither to make the final decision nor to set the general guidelines for 
integration as outlined in the Treaties. Both the UK and the Southampton 
Health Authority argued a case for less integration since they essentially wished 
to avoid the requirements of Directive 76/207. As with Miss Marshall, 
Southampton was a factor in the case but devoid of any decision-making
84 Jason Coppel, “Rights, Duties and the End of ALarshall,” Modern Law Review 57 
(November 1994): 861-862.
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authority. In this particular case, we can effectively collapse Southampton with 
the British position since the two entities shared largely the same legal 
arguments and the Court itself recognised Southampton “to constitute an organ 
of the state.”85 The particular legal discussions that resolved the difficulty in 
Marshall is a matter of legal theory, while the architect’s compromise examines 
the progress of European integration and the acceptance of law by the Member 
States. Hence, the individuals in the court proceedings are incidental to the 
scope of integration to which Member States have pledged themselves and of 
which the Court must interpret. In contrast, we identify the primary actors as
the Court and the Member States (in this case, the United Kingdom although 
the Court did consider the ramifications of its decision with regard to the
Member States at large).
As with the initial assumption of the Member States and the Court being 
the primary actors, the assumption of rationality of the actors is a constant in the 
architect’s compromise model: the situation in Marshall appears to verify this 
rationality assumption. To begin, the British Government’s submissions to the
Court demonstrate rationality in two respects. First, Britain deliberately chose 
to oppose Miss Marshall’s argument that she had suffered from discrimination. 
The justification for this position can be found in the anticipated financial burden
that the United Kingdom might face should Miss Marshall win the case.
Evidence of this burden is apparent in the Financial Times's report on the day
following the ruling with estimates as high as £2.5 billion per year in the event
85 Coppel, 861.
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that the retirement age for both sexes was lowered to 60, and over £500 million 
if the retirement age for both sexes was set at 63.86 Second, Britain chose to 
support the argument that the Southampton Health Authority should be 
considered a private employer. Such a tactic was designed to relieve the 
Government from responsibility of the actions of the Southampton Health 
Authority since the Government further maintained that private individuals were 
not liable when a Member State had failed to implement a directive. Likewise,
the Court itself played the part of a rational actor. (As can be recalled, this 
assumption is held constant for the Court according to the model.) Since the 
Court’s ruling draws a distinction between public and private employers, it has 
been argued that the Court’s reasoning regarding direct effect in the Marshall 
case “appears to be an abdication of the responsibility of the Community with 
respect to rights arising under Community legislation and may set a dangerous 
precedent for the future. . . [and] flies in the face of the Van Gend en Loos 
judgment. . . .”87 However, as an analysis of the Court’s strategic manoeuvres 
will demonstrate, the Court pursued purposeful actions—although not openly 
aggressive attempts at further integration—which would be the most tolerable 
course given the constraints of the Member States’ modified preferences.
Corresponding to the architect’s compromise, the Court played the part 
of a strategic actor. In terms of the legal issues involved in the case, the Court 
was clearly convinced of the validity of Miss Marshall’s claim. As will be
86 “Ruling on retirement age set to affect public sector workers,” Financial Times, 27 
February 1986, 1.
87 Nigel Foster, “Equal Treatment and Retirement Age,” European Law Review 11, no. 3 
(1986), 228.
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described below, “even commentators who support the reasoning behind 
Marshall recognize that the decision was largely shaped by political realities,”88 
and some would argue that “the formal legal justifications given in Marshall are 
unconvincing.”89 Thus, it is the precise reasoning of the Court regarding direct 
effect which best illustrates the strategic actions of the Court. Specifically, 
Coppel notes that in the body of its case law prior to Marshall, the Court has 
formulated its most important decisions based on “a teleological method of legal 
reasoning and ‘une certaine idee de l’Europe.”’90 However, “the real 
explanation for continuing denial of horizontal direct effect for directives may 
well be found in the field of politics rather than law,” as is suggested by the 
hostility of French and German national courts, in particular, towards “the initial 
decision to confer direct effect upon directives.”91 Since EC law relies on the 
goodwill of the national courts given their responsibilities both to appeal for 
preliminary rulings under Article 177 (EEC) and to respect decisions from the 
ECJ, the Luxembourg Court must be cognisant of the fact that hostility from
these national courts in response to its decisions could result in a loss of 
legitimacy of EC law as national courts simply refuse to acknowledge such 
decisions. Hartley recognises the ECJ’s strategic actions in noting:
. . . one would have thought that the Court’s policy of enhancing the 
effectiveness of Community law would have led it to come down in 
favour of horizontal direct effect. If the question had arisen for decision
88 Robert Scarborough, “Directives and the Doctrine of Direct Effect: A Critique of 
Marshall v. Southampton Area Health Authority," The University of Chicago Legal 
Forum: Europe and America in 1992 and Beyond: Common Problems. . . Common 
Solutions? (1992): 333.
89 P. E. Morris, “The Direct Effect of Directives—Some Recent Developments in the 
European Court-II,” Journal of Business Law (July 1989): 313.
90 Coppel, 863.
91 Ibid., 878.
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ten years earlier, this might well have been the result; but since then two 
national courts of considerable influence, the French Conseil d’Etat and 
the German Bundesfinanzhof, have rebelled against the whole idea. . . . 
This was obviously a serious matter and, while the European Court 
refused to retreat from the position it had adopted, it probably 
considered it expedient not to press on any further. The denial of 
horizontal direct effect to directives can, therefore, be seen as an offer of 
a compromise under which the European Court will limit the direct 
effect of directives to vertical direct effect if national courts will accept it 
to that limited extent.92
Hence, the Court, as a strategic actor, realised the limits of its authority and 
refrained from pursuing an issue that might cause rebellion among the Member 
States. Coppel also notes the opposition by the Member States, stating that 
“there is no doubt that the feeling amongst the Member States remains 
overwhelmingly against horizontal direct effect for directives.”93 Hence, the 
Court faced the predicament of granting direct effect to directives for private 
individuals which would conform to the Court’s preference for further 
integration. By doing so, however, the Court would risk losing legitimacy with 
national courts and governments: the compromise on this issue illustrates the 
Court’s ability to strategically weigh both its preferences and potential 
outcomes to determine the optimal position to adopt. Given the cumbersome
and uncharacteristically restrained reasoning of the Court in the case and 
appreciating the political factors facing the Court, the ECJ’s judgement appears 
to be a result of strategic manoeuvring: namely, the Court gauged the 
opposition by the Member States to be significant enough to issue a restrained
judgement.
92 Hartley, 209.
93 Coppel, 878.
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Similarly, the Court demonstrated a clear appreciation for modified 
preferences in its restrained approach to Marshall. As has been mentioned in the 
discussion of the Court as a strategic actor, the Court was constrained in the 
political realities outside the courtroom. Robert Scarborough argues that 
“much of the direct effect jurisprudence preceding Marshall suggested that the 
ECJ might have applied the direct effect doctrine to directives to the same 
extent that it covers provisions of the Treaty.”94 95However, as has been 
discussed above, the Court did not rule accordingly; Christopher Greenwood 
explains the constraining factors conditioning the ECJ’s decision in the case:
The European Court is dependent upon the co-operation of the national 
courts and its restraint in Marshall may encourage the more recalcitrant 
national tribunals to accept its earlier decisions on the direct effect of 
Directives. Reassuring the national governments and their electorates 
that individuals would not be bound by unimplemented Directives 
(which do not even have to be published) may also have assisted in
persuading the national parliaments to ratify the Single European Act. . .
*95
Recognising that the Court might antagonise “national sensitivities if it insisted] 
on deepening the impact of Community law in the national legal order,”96 the 
ECJ instead restrained its unbridled preference for further integration and issued
a compromise which would be palatable to sceptical Member States. In terms 
of the architect’s compromise model, the Court’s action could be represented by 
a3 (action against further integration) since the legal reasoning represented a
retreat from earlier case law as is described above. It is true, as in the words of
94 Scarborough, 321-322.
95 Christopher Greenwood, “Directives—Time to Retire,” The Cambridge Law Journal 46, 
no. 1 (1987): 11.
96 Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EC Law, 3rd ed. (London: Blackstone Press, 
1992), 92.
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Anthony Arnull, that “the Court attempted to sugar the pill with its statement 
that provisions contained in directives which were sufficiently clear and precise 
could be enforced against Member States irrespective of the capacity in which 
they acted.”97 However, denying horizontal direct effect to directives represents 
a restrained action by the Court, underlining the importance that its decisions 
conform to modified preferences. Morris further describes the dilemma which
the Court faced:
If the Court develops its case-law in disregard of national fears it will be 
faced with a loss of authority and legitimacy. Once this process is under 
way the effectiveness of Community law is jeopardised, since 
observance of Community law on the national plane rests on the co­
operation and goodwill of the national courts, both in properly applying 
rulings by the Court and making proper use of the preliminary reference 
procedure.98
Hence, by foregoing the short-term possible benefits of a broader interpretation 
of direct effect—although such an act might have seriously risked the legitimacy
of the Court—the ECJ ensured a more amicable reception by the Member States
as will be demonstrated below. In the long term, however, the approach taken 
by the Court might lead to confusion among the Member States as to the 
legislation required to satisfy the Equal Treatment Directive.99
The decision in Marshall was accepted by the Member States. In 
Britain, the 1986 Sex Discrimination Act ended sex discrimination with regard
97 Anthony Arnull, “The Direct Effect of Directives: Grasping the Nettle,” International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 35, no. 4 (October 1986): 944.
98 P. E. Morris, “The Direct Effect of Directives--Some Recent Developments in the 
European Court--II,” Journal of Business Law (July 1989): 314.
99 Gina L. Ziccoleila, “Marshall II: Enhancing the Remedy Available to Individuals for 
Gender Discrimination in the EC,” Fordham International Law Journal 18, no. 2 
(December 1994): 680-681.
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to retirement age.100 Weatherill describes both the process the Court might 
have undertaken in reaching its decision in Marshall and the payoff the Court 
received from conforming to modified preferences:
Probably the Court was concerned to strike an indirect package deal 
with national courts. It showed itself prepared in Marshall to recognize 
the limits of the Treaty and of its own interpretative role; it set a 
boundary to the spread of direct effect. In return for such clarification 
and such restraint it hoped to gain from the national courts an 
acceptance of that more restricted notion of direct effect—against the 
state alone. The tactic seems largely to have worked.101
Hence, we can assume that the state of nature, which is reflective of the
modified preferences of the Member States, could be represented by m3 (the 
Member States are hostile towards further integration) based upon the
arguments above. Combining this state of nature with the action of the Court,
a3, we anticipate that the outcome would be represented by 09 (accepting the 
decision), which was exactly the response of the Member States to the ruling. 
Hence, the architect’s compromise model does appear useful for explaining 
Marshall's impact on European integration. Moreover, the model once again
provides a meaningful tool to depict the manner in which European law is 
incorporated into the domestic law of the Member States.
100 For explanation, see Eric Short, “Retirement ages made uniform,” Financial Times, 7 
November 1987, 5.
101 Stephen Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 124.
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Factortame
Before testing the case against the architect’s compromise model, a
review of the facts in Factortame will allow for a further discussion of its
importance in the British acceptance of European law. The case grew out of 
the British government’s replacement of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 with 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in response to the EEC common fishing policy 
to prevent over-fishing. The 1988 act aimed to reduce the number of ships 
which would be considered as part of Britain’s quota, thereby protecting British 
fishing interests. To this end, the new act required that the owners or
shareholders of the fishing vessels either hold British citizenship or reside in the 
United Kingdom. As a result of the new act, ninety-five vessels which had been 
registered as British under the older act did not meet the criteria for registration 
owing to the fact that their directors were Spanish nationals. These companies 
thus challenged the British law, claiming that it contradicted European law with 
respect to Articles 7, 52, 58 and 221 of the EEC Treaty.102 After being brought 
before the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division on 16 December 
1988, the English court appealed to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on 10 
March 1989, in which the English court sought advice on the impact of 
Community law on the registration conditions for ocean-going vessels, 
especially in light of “the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, the right of establishment and the requirement of proportionality.”103
102 Factortame, No. 2 (CMLR), 595-596.
103 Ibid., 596-597.
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In the proceedings before the Court, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the 
fishing companies and the Commission all lodged statements. According to the 
United Kingdom, Acts of Parliament are assumed to be compatible with 
Community law until proven otherwise. While courts do have the power to 
“quash the acts of public authorities” which conflict with Community law, 
British courts cannot annul an Act of Parliament except according to Article 2 
(1) and (4) of the European Communities Act 1972, and in which “the matter is 
finally determined and not for the grant of interim relief.”104 The United 
Kingdom further pointed out that such conventions regarding interim relief are 
not discriminatory since they apply equally to domestic and Community law, 
and that the impossibility of interim relief was precluded by public policy issues. 
Along with Ireland, the United Kingdom argued that the ECJ’s decision in Rewe 
v. Hauptzollamt Kiel™5 recognised that “the concept of direct effect of certain 
Treaty provisions cannot create new remedies in national law.”106 Noting “that 
they have never suggested that in the ordinary event the grant of interim 
protection should be mandatory,”107 the fishing companies argued their 
particular case was a special request for interim relief, reasonable given the 
possible financial devastation they could incur in its absence. In citing the 
reasoning in Simmenthal,™* the appellants maintained that “ . . . any provision 
of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice 
which may impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the
104 Factortame (ECR), 1-2439-2440.
105 Case 158/80, Reyve-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v. 
Hauptzollamt Kiel, European Court Reports (1981): 1805-1856.
106 Factortame (ECR), 1-2441. For the reasoning of Ireland, see 1-2442-2243.
107 Factortame (ECR), 1-2443.
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national courts the power to give appropriate protection is itself incompatible 
with Community law. . . ”108 09 Moreover, the appellants maintained that a 
request for a preliminary ruling “is rendered pointless” since the assumption of 
compatibility precludes the court from safeguarding the interests of the party 
before the court until the ECJ has issued a ruling.110 The Commission argued in 
favour of granting the appellants interim relief based on a comparison of 
national approaches to interim relief, on the possibility of suspension contained 
in Article 185 of the EEC Treaty and on the basis of the principle of
effectiveness.111
A clear victory for European law, Factortame “strikingly reinforced” the 
supremacy of European law.112 Aidan O’Neill argues that the Factortame cases 
led to the judicial review of Parliament by national courts, which thus translates 
into the fact that the British Parliament is held to abide by its commitments 
under the Treaties or risk being reprimanded by its own national courts.113 The
Court ruled that:
. . . the full effectiveness of Community law would be . . . impaired if a 
rule of national law could prevent a court seised of a dispute governed 
by Community law from granting interim relief in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights 
claimed under Community law. It follows that a court which in those
108 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., European 
Court Reports (1978): 629-657.
109 Factortame (ECR), 1-2443.
1,0 Ibid., 1-2444.
111 Ibid., I-2445-I-2447.
112 Michael Binyon, “Landmark Ruling Gives EC Power over UK Law,” Times, 20 June 
1990, 24.
113 Aidan O’Neill, Decisions of the European Court of Justice and Their Constitutional 
Implications (London: Butterworths, 1994), 48-49.
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circumstances would grant interim relief, if it were not for a rule of 
national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.114
The Times suggested that the Court was aware that the judgement “would raise 
hackles in Britain.”115 However, closer scrutiny of the case reveals, as Jay J. 
Aragones demonstrates, “a willingness of the Court of Justice to allow the 
United Kingdom to adhere to its traditional view of Community law 
precedence.”116 Specifically, the same “interpretative” method which British 
courts have adopted by which Acts of Parliament are assumed to conform to the 
European Communities Act 1972 can allow national courts “to disapply an act 
of Parliament at an earlier stage.”117 Factortame hence represents an aggressive 
step by the Court to clarify European law, which led to further integration and 
conforms to the architect’s compromise model as will be demonstrated below.
The Architect’s Compromise and the Factortame Case
To begin, we recognise the Court and Britain as the primary players in 
the case. As has been previously argued, despite a number of other actors 
(including the Commission, the Spanish fishing companies and Ireland), the 
entities which actually took the decisions that led to further integration were the 
Member States and the Court. Likewise, we assume these actors to be rational,
as is a primary assumption of the architect’s compromise model. To review,
114 Factortame (ECR), 1-2474.
115 Binyon, 24.
116 Jay J. Aragones, “Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex Parte Factortame Ltd.'. 
The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Community Law,” Fordham 
International Law Journal 14 (1990-1991): 781.
117 Aragones, 811-813.
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rationality in this context simply means that we assume that the actors took 
those actions which appeared to maximise their respective utility.
We further assume the Court to be a strategic actor. Factortame 
represents one of the fundamental steps the Court of Justice has taken to 
enhance European law, applying its teleological approach to the Treaty. As the
Court has found that European law must be enforceable before national courts 
and take precedence over all types of national law—including constitutional- 
delegated to the Communities by the Treaties, the case represents a logical step 
for preventing injury to parties who might suffer unjustly in the absence of such 
interim protection.118 Hence, “. . . the Factortame ruling emphasizes the 
Court’s commitment to building the principle of effectiveness.”119 Specifically, 
the ECJ, “invoking its previous case law that no law of the Member States
should compromise the full effectiveness of Community law,” found that courts 
should not allow national laws to preclude interim relief.120 While the Court did 
rule in a manner to enhance the effectiveness of Community rights, its ruling 
appeared conscious of the necessity to avoid creating a new legal remedy. 
Nevertheless, by ruling that a lack of interim relief was inconsistent with 
European law, the Court appears to have required a new legal remedy, albeit de
118 Robert Lane, “Interim Suspension of Acts of Parliament: The Armada Returns,” Journal 
of the Law Society of Scotland 35, no. 8 (August 1990): 311.
119 Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, 120. Weatherill defines the 
doctrine of effectiveness as follows:
“This [the principle of effectiveness! requires national courts to adjust, perhaps even to 
create national procedures in order to secure effective protection of EC law rights. Article 
5 ‘effectiveness’ is a manifestation of the capacity of principles of Community law to 
intrude into what might initially appear to be areas of reserved national competence.” 
(Weatherill, 120)
120 D. Lasok and K. P. E. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union (London: 
Butterworths, 1994), 363.
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facto.121 Such a paradox of issuing a strong ruling but refusing to clarify its 
actual implications illustrates the Court’s role as a strategic actor and will be
discussed more fully with regard to modified preferences below.
In Factortame, the reasoning of the Court appeared to conform to
modified preferences since the Court refrained from a more aggressively
integrationist ruling and instead provided one more palatable to the Member
States. As has been presented above, despite the ECJ’s willingness to grant 
interim relief, the Court fell short of providing guidance on the conditions under 
which to utilise the tool. Robert Lane explains the cautious approach of the
Court:
The House of Lords expressly called upon the Court of Justice to lay 
down the criteria to be applied in the grant of interim relief. With no 
specific guidance from the Treaty, the court would normally, in response 
to such a question, distil from the practices and procedures of the 
various member states general principles in order to construct a 
Community rule. But it did not. Rather it dodged the question by 
reading into the reference a clear case for interim relief and merely 
indicating that the House of Lords must set aside the constitutional bar 
to granting it. The clear disinclination of the court to set out criteria 
when expressly invited to do so stems from the huge diversity of the 
relevant law throughout the member states.122
This cautious approach appears to conform to the expectations of the architect’s 
compromise model in that the Court did, as has been shown above with regard 
to the Court’s role as a strategic actor, attempt to further European integration. 
However, it did demonstrate an understanding of the constraints of the Member 
States. In particular, “rather than stray[ing] into this minefield” of issuing
121 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 211-212.
122 Lane, 311.
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specific guidelines dealing with interim relief (which would have proven 
extremely difficult given the wide variety of forms of interim relief among the
Member States), the ECJ simply established the principle but left its 
implementation to the Member States.123 With respect to the architect’s 
compromise model, we recognise that the Court’s decision represented an 
action which favoured deeper integration, or aj.
According to Jowell and Oliver, “Factortame aroused something of a 
stir, but. ... in truth it stated nothing new or surprising in terms of supremacy of 
Community law.”124 While Factortame might pose a problem for the traditional 
Diceyan doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty,125 “. . . it is suggested that the 
British courts can provide that [interim relief] protection without any, or any 
further, compromise of Parliamentary sovereignty,”126 as was explained earlier 
by the reference to Aragones.127 It is true that the ruling sparked a rather hostile 
criticism in the House of Commons with Teddy Taylor’s request for an 
immediate debate concerning the sovereignty of Parliament128 in addition to 
frequent cries of fear in the press. However, it was Parliament it self-through 
the House of Lords—which accepted the move towards further integration by 
“suspending a statute for the first time and in practical terms, giving full effect
124 Jowell and Oliver, 51.
125 Josef Drexl, “Was Sir Francis Drake a Dulchman?--British Supremacy of Parliament after 
Factortame f American Journal of Comparative Law 41, no. 4 (1993): 562-571.
126 Nigel P. Gravells, “Disapplying an Act of Parliament Pending a Preliminary Ruling:
Constitutional Enormity or Community Law Right?,” Public Law (1989): 581. See
pages 579-585 for a fuller discussion.
127 Aragones, 811-813.
128 House of Commons Official Report, 20 June 1990, cols. 923-924.
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to the supremacy doctrine.”129 It is interesting to note that Lord Bridge did 
respond to the criticism; however, the other “law lords were no doubt happy to 
leave the relationship between the law-making sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom Parliament and Community law where it currently stands. That is in a 
vague, yet relaxed, coexistence, which maintains the primacy of both.”130 
Specifically, such an arrangement is possible since the ECJ, as evidenced by the 
Costa decision, recognises its supreme authority in the area of European law 
based on the transfer of sovereignty by the Member States. The Member
States, however, tend to base the authority of the Court upon national 
constitutional provisions^1 which allows Kompetenz-Kompetenz to remain 
with the individual Member States. Nevertheless, discussion in Britain 
concerning implementing a system of interim relief preceded the Factortame 
case (independent of the case), and influential elements of the legal community 
had urged the Government to grant courts such a tool.132
With respect to the architect’s compromise model, we can assume the 
modified preference of the United Kingdom to have been rather apathetic to 
integration in this instance, or m2. While the Thatcher Government often took 
an antagonistic approach to the Communities, such hostility was more indicative 
of unbridled preferences as the acceptance of the Single European Act suggests
129 Maher, 323.
130 B. V. Harris, “Parliamentary Sovereignty and Interim Injunctions: Factortame and New 
Zealand,” New Zealand Universities Law Review 15, no. 1 (June 1992): 62.
131 This will be explored more fully in the next chapter on the German reception of European 
law and the role of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in interpreting the Grundgesetz.
132 See Ami Barav, “Interim relief and English law,” New Law Journal 140, no. 6461(22 
June 1990): 896.
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that with regard to modified preferences, the United Kingdom took a more 
conciliatory stance. This view is reinforced by the fact that the House of Lords 
actually did not support the idea of interim relief prior to the ECJ’s preliminary 
ruling but was willing to appeal to Luxembourg for further guidance. 
Moreover, it was Parliament that decided “in black and white that Community 
law was to prevail over common law and statute law alike” when the European 
Communities Act 1972 was passed as has been earlier demonstrated.133 Finally, 
Parliament itself--through the House of Lords--accepted the move towards 
further integration by giving full effect to the doctrine of supremacy. As the 
House of Lords did grant interim relief to the Spanish fishermen shortly after the 
ruling,134 it is clear that the United Kingdom did accept the Court decision. In 
examining the architect’s compromise model, this is the outcome (o4) which we 
would expect. However, the ruling still did not exactly bring the British 
government under the authority of the Court. Concerning Factortame,
Lawrence Collins concludes:
It is suggested, therefore, that, at present, whatever may be the position 
in the future, the correct position in the United Kingdom constitutional 
law is the orthodox one, that the courts must and will give effect to 
subsequent United Kingdom legislation, even if it is inconsistent with 
Community law, subject to the important rule of construction in s 2(4) 
[European Communities Act 1972],135
Thus, the relationship between the Court and the United Kingdom remains a
series of bargains by which the Court attempts to achieve the aims of the
133 H. W. R. Wade, “What has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?,” Law Quarterly 
Review 107 (January 1991): 3.
134 Ian S. Dickinson, “European Court Decisions and the British Courts,” Journal of the Law 
Society of Scotland 35, no. 12 (December 1990): 516.
135 Collins, 39.
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Treaties while Britain attempts to conform to its modified preferences regarding 
European integration. In this manner, Parliament retains ultimate supremacy 
over the pace and scope of integration in the United Kingdom. However, 
Parliament is largely restricted in its ability to “fine tune” such integration since 
modified preferences demand that Britain acquiesce to decisions of the ECJ 
which often have negative effects on Britain’s unbridled preferences. It is this 
bargaining process that is captured by the architect’s compromise model.
Britain, the ECJ and Supremacy: A Postscript
While the British government has largely been supportive of the 
European Court, this does not imply that there are not serious reservations 
regarding the ECJ and its growing authority. While many political points have 
been scored by aiming criticisms at the European Court from the debates in the
House of Commons, such rash and political statements reveal more about the 
fears of a desperate Government on the edge of collapse136 than responsible 
criticisms of the Court. However, politics encourages more criticisms of the 
former type, and thus gauging reasonable criticisms of the Court became much
more difficult toward the end of the Conservative Government. However, the
Memorandum by the United Kingdom on the European Court of Justice for the
1996 Inter-governmental Conference did present such a reasonable critique of 
the Court and is thus worthy of attention. Identifying itself as “a champion of
136 Witness the BSE crisis in the last few months of the Conservative’s Government, 1996­
1997.
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the Court,” the United Kingdom expressed general satisfaction for the Court in
the report:
The single market, one of the Community’s central achievements, is 
inconceivable without the power of the Court of Justice to ensure 
universal application of the common rules of Community law on which it 
depends. The Court of Justice plays a central part in upholding the legal 
order established in the Community Treaties. The independence and 
authority of the Court needs to be confirmed and strengthened, 
especially in the perspective of further enlargement.137
Nevertheless, along with the praise, the United Kingdom also registered 
concerns about the Court, particularly focusing on three areas.
First, the United Kingdom expressed concern about the possibly of 
Member States—who, in fact, have made genuine efforts to comply with 
Community legislation—facing liability for damages.138 The United Kingdom 
expressed concern over financial liabilities:
In the view of the United Kingdom it is in the interests of the citizens of 
the Union, as tax payers, that governmental liability in respect of a 
breach of Community law prior to any judgment of the Court of Justice 
establishing that breach should be limited in ways which strike a fair 
balance between the protection of individual rights and the protection of 
the public interest.139
Britain was particularly concerned that such rulings as Francovich^ and 
Emmott™1 could lead to unreasonable liability for damages.142
13?
138
139
140
141
142
United Kingdom. The 1996 European Union Intergovernmental Conference 
Memorandum by the United Kingdom on the European Court of Justice (July 1996), 1. 
Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 4.
Cases C-6/90 & C9/90, Andrea Francovich and Another v. The Republic (Italy), Common 
Market Law Reports 2 (1993): 66-116: or European Court Reports (1991): I-5357-I- 
5418.
Case C-208/90, Theresa Emmott v. Minister for Social Welfare and the Attorney General, 
European Court Reports (1991): I-4269-I-4300.
Memorandum on the European Court of Justice, 3.
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Second, the United Kingdom expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that 
most decisions of the Court are retrospective even though some decisions result 
in “disproportionate financial and administrative burdens.”143 Although the 
United Kingdom held that a Member State which failed to comply with a Court
judgement was guilty of “a manifest and grave breach of an obligation under the 
Treaty” and recognised the importance of the Commission’s power to fine such 
Member States under Article 171,144 the United Kingdom expressed concern 
over the lack of limitations regarding such fines. Specifically, the United 
Kingdom further argued that such fines should not be excessive and limited to 
three years from the time the case was brought by the claimant.145
Third, the United Kingdom criticised “the non-applicability of national 
time-limits in certain cases.”146 Specifically, the United Kingdom wanted to 
write into the Treaties “the power which the Court has exercised since its
judgement \nDefrenne v. Sabena in 1976 to limit the retrospective effects of its 
judgments.”147 The United Kingdom further identified two manners in which 
such an amendment would influence European law: “Firstly, it would enable the 
Court to take account of the consequences for Member States’ finances of 
giving a judgment retrospective effect. Secondly, in exercise of this power the 
Court would be able, in exceptional circumstances, to limit the retrospective 
effect of a judgment even though the relevant issue of law had been settled in a
143
144
145
146
147
Ibid., 2. 
Ibid., 5. 
Ibid., 5-6. 
Ibid., 2. 
Ibid., 8.
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previous case.”148 Despite these concerns, the memorandum was largely 
supportive of the Court in contrast to the frequent political protests as 
mentioned previously.
Conclusion
Following an initial sketch of the political events that led to Britain’s 
entry into the Communities, this chapter has examined the reception of the 
doctrine of supremacy by the United Kingdom to further test the model 
developed in Chapter II. Through the three cases evaluated, the chapter has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the architect’s compromise model for 
explaining the expansion of European law in the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
through a brief analysis of the UK’s position toward the 1996 Inter­
governmental Conference, it becomes even clearer that the process of 
integration is a two-stage process: an initial demarcation of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction followed by the Court’s “filling in the gaps.” With every Treaty 
amendment and subsequent actions by the Court, this process constantly repeats 
itself. This process will be further examined and illustrated in the next chapter 
with an assessment of Germany and the doctrine of supremacy of European law.
For now, however, we can conclude that, in the case of Britain, the architect’s
compromise model provides a comprehensive explanation of the manner in
148 Ibid.
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which the decisions of the European Court of Justice contribute to the process 
of European integration.
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Chapter VII
Germany and the European Court of Justice
While the German1 acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy in European 
Community law has been accomplished—in legal terms, at least—in a manner
unlike that of the United Kingdom, this chapter will demonstrate that the 
architect’s compromise still offers a useful model for explaining this 
phenomenon. This chapter will focus on significant events involving the legal 
and political culture in Germany vis-a-vis the supremacy of European law and 
selected notable cases involving the doctrine. This will illustrate the two-step 
process involved in the expansion of EC law which is implicit in the architect’s 
compromise model. Specifically, the chapter will examine the German legal 
structure since the Second World War and Germany’s commitment to European 
integration. With regard specifically to German law, the chapter will discuss the 
Grundgesetz (the German Constitution) and the Bundesverfassiingsgericht (the 
German Federal Constitutional Court). Two cases by the ECJ, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft2 and Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft2 will then be analysed 
according to the architect’s compromise model. Finally, the chapter will 
examine the position of EC law and the European Court vis-a-vis Germany
In this chapter, the designation “Germany” refers to the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), commonly referred to as West Germany prior to reunification in 1989.
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbHv. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur 
Getreide und Futtermittel, European Court Reports (1970): 1127-1128.
Case 126/81, Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, European Court Reports (1982): 
1479-1501.
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following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, especially in light of the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichf s decision in the Brunner* case. This will further test 
the ability of the architect’s compromise model to explain European legal 
integration. However, before engaging in an analysis of Germany’s acceptance 
of the doctrine of supremacy, it is necessary to provide some background on 
German legal culture and the history which formed it. Only then is it possible to 
appreciate the obstacles that the doctrine of supremacy has faced in its 
incorporation into German law.
The German Legal Environment
Unlike Britain, Germany’s legal system is based on a written 
constitution, the Grundgesetz, or “Basic Law.” Drafted in the aftermath of
World War II, it nevertheless owes much to former German legal culture,
although it was also profoundly influenced by the legal precepts of the 
occupying Allied powers, especially American. Since the framers of the 
Grundgesetz hoped that the reunification of the occupied areas of Germany 
would occur in due course, the Grundgesetz was only intended as a temporary
constitution. Nonetheless, given its success in West Germany prior to 1989, 
and subsequently in the entire Federal Republic, it has become the permanent 
constitution. An appreciation of the importance of the Grundgesetz upon
4 Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union 
Treaty, Common Market Law Report 1 (1994): 57-108.
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Germany is thus fundamental to a full understanding of the German legal
climate.
German Legal History
In the political and economic devastation which followed World War II, 
Germany was “a burnt-out crater of great power politics.”5 The Berlin 
Declaration of 5 June 1945 divided Germany among the victors of World War
II, and subsequently, during the Potsdam Conference, Truman, Churchill (later 
Atlee) and Stalin established a broad plan of administration. This included 
dealing with Germany as an economic whole. Soon, however, the conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the Western powers left the area of pre-World 
War II Germany divided into four sectors, Berlin divided, and the eastern 
fringes ceded to the Soviet Union and Poland. From the beginning, any notion 
of co-operation was rife with difficulties, as the French resisted political 
centralisation and the Russians demanded greater reparations from the western 
sectors. The seeds of a separate East and West Germany had been sown. In
1947, the British and American sectors were joined economically, and an
Economic Council, representing the Parliaments of the participating Lander,
was established. France and Russia were invited to join; Russia declined while
France displayed initial reluctance. However, as a result of unsuccessful
negotiations in London and Moscow—combined with the growing Soviet threat,
the Marshall Plan and the French fear of being isolated—France agreed to join its
5 Gunter Kloss, West Germany: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1990), 4.
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sector to the British-American administered United Economic Area.6 In
response to this American, British and French co-operation, the Soviet Union 
laid the foundation for the German Democratic Republic in the Soviet sector. 
Thus, with little German participation, two separate states emerged: one, “a
liberal, pluralistic democratic state,” and the other, “a communist, worker or 
peasant state.”7 The Allied countries “insisted that any future government of 
Germany must be federal, democratic, and constitutional.”8 Upon the
recommendation of the Western military governors and the
Ministerprasidenten, a convention was held beginning on 1 September 1948, to 
formulate a constitution for the Western sectors. After several months, the
Grundgesetz was ratified by the state parliaments as the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany.9
Typical of the constitutions of most liberal democracies, the 
Grundgesetz focuses on human rights; provides for a divided system of 
government; establishes a constitutional court with the power of judicial review; 
and decrees the Grundgesetz as “the supreme law of the land.”10 Although the 
Grundgesetz is often regarded as being heavily influenced by American ideas, it
bears a close resemblance in parts to the Frankfurter Constitution of 1849 and
the Weimar Republican Constitution. However, rather than containing 
“statements of political ideals and guidelines to political action,” as was
6 Ibid., 1-3.
7 David P. Conradt, The German Polity, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 1989), 15.
8 Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 2nd ed., rev. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 7.
9 Conradt, 16.
10 Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence, 31.
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characteristic of earlier German constitutions, the Grundgesetz “is a law of 
superior force and obligation and is directly enforceable as law” in the court 
system headed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or Federal Constitutional 
Court.11 Through the Grundgesetz, “legalism was reintroduced into the German 
political system.”12 The result was a “reliance on authoritative judicial decisions 
to resolve political disputes rather than a preference for purely political 
methods.”13 The judiciary was thus accorded a significant share of the 
government’s power.
Germany and European Integration
The establishment and growth of channels of European integration were 
not only prescribed by the Grundgesetz, but they were also encouraged by 
German politicians who regarded such an institutional framework as a means of 
achieving a greater degree of autonomy and of normalising international 
relations.14 Chiefly as a result of Konrad Adenauer’s willingness to co-operate 
with the West and of the increasing tensions between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, Germany was eventually included in the Western European 
Union and NATO. Moreover, Germany enthusiastically seized the opportunity 
for further European integration by becoming a charter member of the EC SC
11 Donald P. Kommers, “The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany: An 
Assessment After Forty Years,” The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty, ed. Peter H. 
Merkl (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 134-135.
12 Gisbert Brinkmann, “The West German Federal Constitutional Court: Political Control 
Through Judges,” Public Law (1981): 85.
13 Ibid.
14 For a more thorough discussion on this matter, see Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial Politics 
in Europe: An Impact Analysis (New York: Peter Lang, 1986), 93-97.
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through the Schuman Plan; seven years later, Germany was firmly integrated in 
Europe as a charter member of both the EEC and Euratom.15 Importantly, such 
“strong support for Europe was one way of forgetting about being German after 
1945 and of reestablishing relations with Germany’s neighbors. It was also 
highly advantageous to the German economy.”16
The German enthusiasm for European integration was motivated, 
however, not only by political and economic factors. Constitutionally, Germany 
is bound to work towards European integration. Specifically, in an attempt to 
prevent another war by anchoring Germany in a pan-European institutional 
framework, the drafters of the Grundgesetz expressed the aspiration for a 
“united Europe” in the document’s Preamble.17 Thus, West Germany18 joined 
the European Communities based on Article 2419 of the Grundgesetz. 
However, with the reunification of Germany in 1990, the Grundgesetz (which
was amended for this purpose) became the constitution for the enlarged Federal 
Republic.20 At the same time, a new Article 2321 was adopted, providing the
15 Kloss, 8-9.
16 Conradt, 227. For a further discussion on the German government’s early support for 
Europe and the Wirtschaftswunder, see Gareth Pritchard, “National Identity in a United 
and Divided Germany,” European Integration and Disintegration: East and West, eds. 
Robert Bideleux and Richard Taylor (London: Routledge, 1996), 157-160.
17 The first sentence of the Preamble of the Grundgesetz expresses this desire: “Im 
Bewuhtsein seiner Verantwortung vor Golt und den Menschen, von dem Willen beseelt, 
als gleichberechtigtes Glied in einem vereinten Europa dem Frieden der Welt zu dienen, 
hat sich das Deutsche Volk kraft seiner verfassungsgebenden Gewalt dieses Grundgesetz 
gegeben.”
18 The former East Germany joined the European Communities when it became part of the 
Federal Republic of Germany by the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990. For details of 
legal issues involving the reunification of Germany, see Gilbert H. Gomig and Sven 
Reckewerth, “The Revision of the German Basic Law. Current Perspectives and 
Problems in German Constitutional Law,” Public Law (1997): 137-158.
19 Grundgesetz, Article 24.
20 For further discussion on the challenges of reunification, see C. W. A. Timmermans,
“German Unification and Community Law,” Common Market Law Review 27 (1990):
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legal basis for Germany’s membership in the Communities. Specifically, this 
new article allows, upon consent of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, sovereign 
powers to be ceded to the European Communities. Moreover, both the 
Parliament and Federal Council must approve of any modification to the 
Treaties, along with the approval of the Lander?2 which “ensures that a 
complete parliamentary process is observed” before a further transfer of 
sovereign power can occur.* 21 22 23 In this manner, Germany is only able to 
participate in greater European integration if approved both on a Lander and 
Federal level, which greatly enhances the democratic control of Germany’s
relations with the Communities.
While the Grundgesetz is clear on supporting European integration, the 
incorporation of EC law has been met with some difficulty, particularly with 
regard to the doctrine of supremacy—the area of EC law with which we are 
concerned. At its inception, Community law was grafted onto domestic law
437-449; Christian Tomuschat, “A United Germany Within the European Community,” 
Common Market Law Review Y1 (1990): 415-436; and Franziska Tschofen and Christian 
Hausmaninger, “Legal Aspects of East and West Germany’s Relationship with the 
European Economic Community After the Collapse of the Berlin Wall,” Harvard 
International Law Journal 31 (1990): 647-659.
21 Basically, Article 23 allows and even calls for Germany to participate in the development 
of a united Europe.
22 Loss of competences by the separate Lander has been an important issue in the German 
approach to European integration. The new Article 23 was partly intended to compensate 
the Lander for lost competences. For a full discussion see Michael Borchmann, 
“Bundesstaat und europaische Integration,” Archiv des Offentlichen Rechts 112 (1987): 
586-622; Konrad Hesse, “Bundesstaatsreform und Grenzen der Verfassungsanderung,” 
Archiv des Offentlichen Rechts 98 (1973): 1-52; and Klaus Kroger, Einfuhrung in die 
Verfassungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 1993): 151­
159.
23 Nigel Foster, German Legal System and Laws, 2nd ed. (London: Blackstone Press 
Limited, 1996), 73.
270
according to a dualist approach. Nigel Foster explains this phenomenon as
follows:
The discussion from the German point of view lies essentially with the 
relationship of international law, and in particular the membership of the 
Community, to the provisions of the Grundgesetz. Traditionally, 
Germany adopted a dualist approach to the reception of international 
law, whereby some form of transformation or adoption of international 
law was necessary in order for it to have any direct applicability in the 
state. In practical terms it meant that there had to be a process of 
incorporation by statute. Once incorporated, a law would simply rank 
as with other Gesetze, and if a later law was in conflict with an earlier 
law, the latter would prevail.24
Approaching European law from such a dualist legal background, Germany has 
essentially regarded the body of EC law as international law. Hence, the 
ultimate legitimacy of Community law in terms of German adherence is based 
on the Grundgesetz, and not upon the Treaties. What this means, and according 
to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, is that German acceptance of European 
Community law is a result of the provisions of German national law and not 
from an inherent source of authority flowing from the Communities as assumed 
by the ECJ. It is this lack of agreement on the origin of supremacy which is at
the heart of the debate.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court)
Owing to contrasting legal interpretations, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht25 and the European Court of Justice have been at
24 Ibid., 67.
25 For an account of the Bundesfassungsgericht's authority vis-a-vis the Grundgesetz, see 
Wolfgang Zeidler, “The Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of
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odds over the precise basis of the doctrine of supremacy. While the ECJ has 
assumed since Costa26 that the doctrine of supremacy is “an inherent feature of 
Community law,” the Bundesverfassungsgericht has held that only through 
German law--Article 34 of the Grundgesetz—has European law been granted 
supremacy in certain fields in the Federal Republic.27 This indicates that in 
German eyes, primacy remains with German law. Moreover, while Article 24 
originally provided the mechanism for Germany’s accession to the 
Communities, it was through Article 2528 that the relationship between German 
law and EC law was defined. However, this Article provided simply for 
international law to enjoy primacy over ordinary law; the issue of constitutional 
law was not addressed.29 Thus, with no established convention on this 
uncertainty, it has been left to the Bundesverfassungsgericht to resolve the 
issue, and the German constitutional court has consistently upheld the primacy
of German law as will be demonstrated below.
Hence, the power of the Bundesverfassungsgericht has proven to be a 
formidable obstacle to the categorical acceptance of EC law. The exact powers 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht at its inception were unclear since the 
Grundgesetz assigned broad powers to the Federal Constitutional Court yet
Germany: Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms,” Notre Dame Law Review 
62(1987); 504-525.
26 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
27 Wulf-Henning Roth, “The Application of Community Law in West Germany: 1980­
1990,” Common Market Law Review 28 (1991): 142.
28 Article 25 reads: “Die allgemeinen Regeln des Volkerrechtes sind Bestandteil des 
Bundesrechtes. Sie gehen den Gesetzen vor und erzeugen Rechte und Pflichten 
unmittelbar fur die Bewohner des Bundesgebietes.”
29 Raymond Youngs, Sourcebook on German Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
1994), 15.
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provided that it should be administered under the consultation of the Parliament. 
However, after considerable pressure from the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it
was eventually recognised as a completely separate branch of government, and 
the ultimate guardian of the Grundgesetz ^ This necessarily translated into a 
significant position within the German governmental structure. Klaus H. Goetz
adds:
Undoubtedly the Court is politically influential. In fact it is sometimes 
held that the Court’s position is supreme, as it has the authority to 
control the executive, the legislature and the ordinary judiciary. 
Accordingly the Court is seen as a superlegislature, ultimately more 
powerful than the federal parliament, the Bundesrat, the federal 
government and the federal president combined. According to this view 
the Court is not just the guardian (Hater) of the constitution, but has 
evolved into its master (Herr), against the intention of the framers of the 
Basic Law and with problematic consequences for the health and vitality 
of German democracy.30 1
Without attempting to address Goetz’s critique of the domestic politico-legal 
system in Germany, it is nonetheless clear that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
occupies an eminent position within the German government. It is exactly this 
which has provoked significant challenges to the incorporation of European law 
into the German legal culture. Specifically, the doctrine of supremacy was not
accepted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht for some time, and even when
accepted, the Federal Constitutional Court reserved the right to withdraw its
support for the supremacy of EC law should it find the basic rights in the 
Grundgesetz no longer adequately protected under EC law.32 Thus, despite
30 Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15-16.
31 Klaus H. Goetz, “The Federal Constitutional Court,” Developments in German Politics 2, 
eds. Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson and Steven Padgett (London: Macmillan, 1996), 
96-97.
32 Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft, Common 
Market Law Reports 3 (1987): 225-265.
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Germany’s apparent enthusiasm regarding European integration, circumstances
such as these are indicative of the actual bargaining process which takes place 
between Germany and the Communities~a bargaining process which will be 
illustrated by the cases examined in the remainder of this chapter.
The Solange Cases and the Doctrine of Supremacy
The two most important German cases dealing with the supremacy of 
European law are Internationale Handelsgesellschaft?3 commonly known in 
Germany as Solange I (“so long as”), and Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft?* or 
Solange II. More recently, Brunner,33 34 5 or Solange III—& case before the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichf—has further clarified the standing of European 
Community law vis-a-vis the Grundgesetz. Briefly, in the first case, the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichf ruled that as long as Community law did not provide
as stringent protection for human rights as the Grundgesetz, German courts 
were to refer questions of constitutionality to the Bundesverfassungsgerichf, 
which could ignore such European Community law. The German Court 
adopted such a position because EC law is considered derivative law by the
33 Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Common Market Law Reports (1974): 540-592. For the 
case decided by the ECJ, which preceded this decision by the Bundesverfassungsgerichf 
see Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fir 
Getreide und Futtermittel, European Court Reports (1970): 1127-1128. In the
remainder of this chapter, the two cases will be distinguished by reference to the 
respective court which issued the ruling.
34 Re Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft. For the ECJ case, which preceded this decision by the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichf, see Case 126/81, Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, 
European Court Reports (1982): 1479-1501.
35 Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Onion 
Treaty, Common Market Law Report 1 (1994): 57-108.
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German Constitutional Court and thus must conform to the Grundgesetz. The 
second case represented a change of attitude by the Bundgesverfassungsgericht 
since it found that the protection of human rights was sufficiently guaranteed by 
the European Communities vis-a-vis the Grundgesetz. These cases will now be 
examined more fully in turn, and subsequently analysed through the architect’s 
compromise model.
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
The case arose out of a grievance against the partial forfeiture of a 
deposit the import-export company Internationale Handelsgesellschaft of 
Frankfurt am Main had lodged in order to receive a licence for the export of 
20,000 metric tonnes of maize meal. In conformity to Council Regulation No. 
120/67/EEC,36 the licence was effective from 7 August 1967 until 31 December 
1967, and conditional upon lodging a deposit ensuring that the amount of meal 
would, in fact, be exported. Since only 11,486.764 metric tonnes of the meal 
had been exported during the period granted for the licence, the Einfuhrund 
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel held that a portion of the deposit 
(DM 17,026.47) was to be forfeited under Regulation No. 473/67/EEC,37 The 
dispute was brought before the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) in 
Frankfurt am Main, which appealed to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
Specifically, the Verwaltungsgericht initially questioned the legality of the
36 Official Journal of the European Communities, special edition (19 June 1967): 33-45.
37 Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes, vol. 10, no. 204 (24 August 1967): 16­
20.
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deposit and forfeiture guidelines in Council Regulation No. 120/67/EEC, and 
subsequently, in the event that the said regulation was found to be legal, 
enquired if Council Regulation No. 473/67/EEC was legal since it excluded
forfeiture only with respect to force majeure. The referral to the ECJ stemmed 
from the Verwaltungsgerichf s concern that the regulations in question failed to 
respect the fundamental rights laid down in the Grundgesetz (namely Articles 2 
[1] and 14).38
In the proceedings before the ECJ, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
the Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the Commission all submitted arguments. Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft criticised the system of deposits and forfeitures, arguing 
that the Treaty did not authorise the Commission or Council to impose fines 
(claiming that a forfeiture was, in fact, a fine), and claimed that the deposit and 
forfeiture system was contrary to the principle of proportionality, ineffective and 
excessive. Further, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft also argued that to limit 
disapplying the forfeiture only to cases of force majeure was too restrictive. 
The Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel argued that the 
system of deposits and forfeiture did not violate any principles of European 
Community law, and further, that it was the optimal system for regulating the 
market. Moreover, the defendant argued that force majeure was broad enough 
to include all reasonable instances of exceptional circumstances which might 
prevent a grantee from exporting the full amount specified. Despite the
38 ECJ. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1127-1128.
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Verfcissungsgerichf s ruling to the contrary (as will be discussed subsequently), 
Germany, discounting the argument concerning basic rights, maintained that the 
system of deposits and forfeiture was just and necessary. The Netherlands and 
the Commission, which stressed that the Community is only bound by its own 
law, both supported the system of deposits and forfeitures.39
In its decision, the European Court of Justice was clear in arguing the 
supremacy of European law over that of the Member States. In the decision,
the ECJ stated:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge 
the validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community 
would have an adverse effect on the uniform and efficacy of Community 
law. The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of 
Community law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an 
independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be 
overridden by rules of national law, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis 
of the Community itself being called in question. Therefore the validity 
of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be 
affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights 
as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a 
national constitutional structure.40
Hence, as Hartley comments on the case, “. . . even a violation of the
fundamental human rights provisions of a Member State’s constitution could 
not impair the validity of a Community provision.”41 In its final analysis, the 
ECJ further approved the system of deposits and forfeiture.42
39 Ibid., 1128-1133.
40 Ibid., 1134.
41 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 134.
42 ECJ. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1133-1139.
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With regard to the ECJ’s preliminary ruling, the Verwaltungsgericht was 
hostile and unsatisfied. In particular, the Verwaltungsgericht held that the 
Community lacked not only a written bill of rights but also a parliament with the 
authority to establish such a guarantee of basic rights. Moreover, according to 
Rudden, the German court “found in the ECJ’s approval of what it continued to 
regard as the iniquitous deposit system a powerful confirmation of its deepest 
suspicions about the ‘legal vacuum’ of Community law.”43 As a result of its 
discontent, the Verwaltungsgericht appealed the case to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Hartley notes that the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
faced two questions: first, whether or not the case was admissible and second, 
whether or not the system of deposits was justified.44
In the first place, the Bundesverfassungsgericht examined the
relationship between the constitutional law of Germany and EC law to 
determine whether or not the case was admissible. Beyond recognising that 
European law is separate from both national and international law, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht agreed that the respective jurisdictions of the ECJ
and the Bundesverfassungsgericht constitute separate legal domains: hence, the 
two courts cannot legally impinge on the jurisdiction of the other.45 
Accordingly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht argued that:
The binding of the Federal Republic of Germany (and of all member-
States) by the Treaty is not, according to the meaning and spirit of the
Treaties, one-sided, but also binds the Community which they establish 
to carry out its part in order to resolve the conflict here assumed, that is,
43 Bernard Rudden, Basic Community Cases (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 67.
44 Hartley, 224.
45 Bundesverfassungsgericht. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 545-550.
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to seek a system which is compatible with an entrenched precept of the 
constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Invoking such a 
conflict is therefore not itself a violation of the Treaty, but sets in motion 
inside the European organs the Treaty mechanism which resolves the 
conflict on a political level.46
Hence, the Bundesverfassungsgericht plainly held that the ECJ cannot expand 
its own jurisdiction based on the Treaties: any such expansion could occur only 
through the acts of the Member States to grant additional areas of competence 
to the ECJ. This conforms to the architect’s compromise model’s emphasis on 
the bargaining between the Court and the Member States. Specifically, the 
expansion of EC law is a two step process, which requires both the clarification 
of a legal dispute by the ECJ and the acceptance of this ruling by the Member
State or States.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, in contrast to the reasoning of the ECJ, 
essentially held that ultimate sovereignty rests in the Grundgesetz, and hence 
with the German nation-state. Further, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explained
that “Article 24 does not actually give authority to transfer sovereign rights, but 
opens up the national legal system (within the limitations indicated) in such a 
way that the Federal Republic of Germany’s exclusive claim to rule is taken 
back in the sphere of validity of the Constitution and room is given, within the 
State’s sphere of rule, to the direct effect and applicability of law from another 
source.”47 The German Federal Court was concerned that the basic rights 
outlined in the Grundgesetz were not sufficiently protected by the European
46
47
Ibid., 550. 
Ibid.
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legal system given that the European Parliament (at that time) was not directly 
elected and the Communities lacked a bill of rights, just as the
Verwaltungsgericht had argued.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, moreover, argued that:
In accordance with the Treaty rules on jurisdiction, the European 
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to rule on the legal validity of the norms 
of Community law (including the unwritten norms of Community law 
which it considers exist) and on their construction. It does not, 
however, decide incidental questions of national law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (or in any other member-State) with binding force 
for this State. Statements in the reasoning of its judgments that a 
particular aspect of a Community norm accords or is compatible in its 
substance with a constitutional rule of national law--here, with a 
guarantee of fundamental rights in the Constitution—constitute non­
binding obiter dicta.48
Hence, while recognising that the European Court did enjoy supremacy in its 
particular area of jurisdiction, the Bundesverfassungsgericht clearly conditioned 
the ECJ’s authority upon respect for the Grundgesetz. Moreover, the German
Federal Court stressed that if the ECJ failed to appreciate the limits to its
jurisdiction and issued decisions accordingly, such decisions could not be 
expected to bind the Member States. This constituted a direct challenge to the 
authority of the ECJ. The Bundesverfassungsgericht further held that “. . . only 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht is entitled, within the framework of the powers 
granted to it in the Constitution, to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Constitution. No other court can deprive it of the duty imposed by 
constitutional law.”49 Finally, the Bundesverfassungsgericht justified its
Ibid., 551.
Ibid., 552.
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authority to hear the case since “a Community regulation. . . implemented by an 
administrative authority of the Federal Republic of Germany or dealt with by a 
court in the Federal Republic of Germany. . . is an exercise of German State 
power; and in this process, the administrative authority and courts are also 
bound to the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany.”50 Based 
on these issues, the Bundesverfassungsgerichf found that “so long as” basic 
rights guaranteed by the Grundgesetz were not sufficiently protected by the 
European legal system, Community provisions were subject to review by the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichf51 Thus, Germany essentially balked at the doctrine 
of supremacy in EC law and instead, asserted the primacy of the Grundgesetz, 
points to which we will return in our later analysis of the architect’s 
compromise.
In the actual substance of the case, the Bundesverfassungsgerichf found
“the challenged rule of Community law in the interpretation given by the
European Court of Justice does not conflict with a guarantee of fundamental 
rights in the Constitution, neither with Article 12 nor with Article 2 (1) of the 
Constitution.”52 However, the importance of the case lies in its impact on the 
doctrine of supremacy; therefore, this research mentions the actual substance
solely for the purpose of providing a background for understanding the events
Ibid., 553.
Ibid., 554.
Ibid., 556.
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of the case. In actuality, the ECJ subsequently found that the deposit system for 
licence export breaches European Law.53
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Architect’s Compromise
With regard to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the architect’s 
compromise model of European integration54 appears to explain the events 
surrounding the case very well. To begin, we can consider the primary actors to 
be Germany (which includes the Bundesverfassungsgericht} and the Court. As 
has been explained previously, the other institutions, individuals and Member 
States involved do make an important contribution to the case; however, the
model is concerned with the acceptance of European law into the domestic law
of a Member State, in this case Germany. Having justified this assumption with
a thorough explanation in Chapter III, it is acceptable to eliminate these other 
players from the analysis. Accepting the Court as a primary actor poses no 
particular challenge, as this is a fundamental assumption of the model. Given 
that it is assumed that the national courts (particularly the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in this case) represent a component of the Member 
State, namely Germany, accepting Germany as the other primary actor should 
pose no problems either. Moreover, Karl Doehring also recognises the 
relevance of following this “construction”: “One could argue that the judiciary
53 Rudden, Basic Community Cases, 68. See Case 181/84, The Queen, ex parte E.D. & F. 
Man (Sugar) Ltd v. Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP), European Court 
Reports (1985): 2889-2906.
54 For a review of the architect’s compromise model, please refer to the appendix following 
Chapter VIII.
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also belongs to the state power of the people, since the judges of the 
Constitutional Court are elected by the parliament.”55 Thus, we accept the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht as a component of the actor designated “Germany.”
With regard to the rationality assumption (specifically, that actors pursue 
purposeful actions), the Court unquestionably conforms to the model although
at first glance, Germany appears to pose a few problems. It is true that the
Federal Republic of Germany supported the system of deposits and even went
so far as to argue that:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is of the opinion 
that in order to reply to the questions put it is unnecessary to examine 
whether there may be deduced from the EEC Treaty an unwritten 
reservation in favour of the constitutions of the Member States and, 
more particularly, of fundamental rights recognised by those 
constitutions or whether the Community Treaties provide individual 
rights analogous or equivalent to the fundamental rights generally 
recognised in the Member States or stipulated by the European 
Convention on Human Rights.56
Such an argument stands in stark contrast to the subsequent reasoning of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. However, this discord between the legal arguments 
of Germany before the ECI and the attitude adopted by the German courts does 
not provide a significant obstacle for the architect’s compromise model. First, 
the very fact that the model regards the Member State as a unit dictates that we 
cannot consider the German courts and the Government separately. (This is a 
fundamental assumption first introduced in Chapter II and held steady for the
55 Karl Doehring, “Functions and Limits of Judge-Made Law in German Constitutional Law 
and European Community Law,” Federalismdn-the-Making: Contemporary Canadian 
and German Constitutionalism, National and Transnational, eds. Edward McWhinney, 
Jerald Zaslove and Werner Wolf (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 55.
56 ECJ. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1131.
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entire examination of the model.) Second, we consider the substance of the 
case: the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the government reached the same 
conclusion that the system of deposits was legally acceptable. Third, as the 
Grundgesetz provides for a division of powers in the government, it is only 
natural to assume that the actor of the highest level of the judiciary is an 
acceptable unit of analysis since the architect’s compromise model not only
includes the decision of the ECJ but also the reaction of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht.
In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, the European Court 
played the role of a strategic actor. As was evident in the discussion of the 
case, the ECJ was careful to stress that depriving European law of supremacy
could result in the failure of the entire European legal system. Following the
advice of the advocate general, the ECJ denied that provisions of the 
Grundgesetz could restrict the judgements of the ECJ to respect particular 
rights, arguing that . the validity of a Community decision could not be 
judged in the light of the Basic German Law.”57 However, the Court softened 
its insistence on the primacy of European law at the expense of the Member
States by noting:
Does that mean that the fundamental principles of national legal systems 
have no function in Community law?
No. They contribute to forming that philosophical, political and legal 
substratum common to the Member States from which through the case- 
law an unwritten Community law emerges, one of the essential aims of 
which is precisely to ensure the respect for the fundamental rights of the 
individual.58
57
58
Ibid., 1146. 
Ibid.
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Yet, despite these conciliatory remarks, the Court refused to acquiesce to the 
Member States and resolutely rendered a decision in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft which was in keeping with prior judgements regarding 
supremacy of European law that began almost a decade before with Costa v.
ENEL.
In respect to the assumptions concerning modified preferences, the case 
illustrates the willingness of a Member State to reject a decision by the ECJ 
when it fails to conform to modified preferences. Specifically, the Court passed 
a decision which Germany would not accept even accounting for the 
concessions necessary to secure the effectiveness of the Communities. While 
one might argue that the German Government’s submission approving the 
system of deposits and forfeitures suggests that the German Government had 
modified its preferences for retaining ultimate authority, such an argument falls 
apart when one considers the antagonistic position the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht adopted. Moreover, since the model defines the 
actor “Germany” as not only the German Government but also the judicial 
system, it is clear that modified preferences did not prevail. Likewise, modified 
preferences did not prevail vis-a-vis the Court. As has been argued, the Court 
took a strict position with regard to the primacy of European law; this was 
unacceptable to Germany. Clearly, the response of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht represents rebellion against a decision by the ECJ. 
According to J. A. Frowein, the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
response to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft “was clearly not in line with the 
obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany under European Community
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Law.”59 Hence, Germany simply ignored the decision, which had significant 
implications on the prestige of European Community law in Germany. Namely, 
the case meant that the doctrine of supremacy would not clearly be accepted in 
Germany for another decade, which in the meantime, undermined the integrity 
of the ECJ vis-a-vis the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
In examining Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the assumptions of the
architect’s compromise clearly seem to verify its ability to explain the Court’s 
impact on integration. The Court’s actions were clearly pro-integration in 
nature, and thus, we assume the action can be represented as ai from the set of 
actions A.60 We can also assume that modified preferences were anti­
integration to the extent that the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not wish 
Community law to expand into basic rights issues. Hence, from the set of states 
of nature, m3 represents such modified preferences. At this juncture, it might be 
interesting to speculate on the Court’s decision to proceed with a pro­
integration action when we, in retrospect, are aware that Germany’s modified 
preferences were, in fact, anti-integration in nature. Possibly the most 
reasonable explanation is that the ECJ did not expect the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to adopt such a contentious position towards the
decision. Moreover, since the German Government did not lodge a concern 
regarding fundamental rights in the proceedings before the ECJ (rather, the
German Government submitted that it was not even an issue of fundamental
59 J. A. Frowein, “Solange II (BVerfGE 73, 339). Constitutional complaint Firma W.,” 
Common Market Law Review 25 (1988): 202.
60 For a review of the architect’s compromise model, refer to the appendix following chapter 
XIII.
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rights!), the European Court probably held the view that the pro-integration 
decision would be acceptable to Germany. However, the price the ECJ paid for 
not appreciating modified preferences meant that there was rebellion against 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. Thus, as the architect’s compromise 
predicts, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, while accepting the substance of the 
ruling of the ECJ, rejected the argument that European Community law
overrules German national law with regard to basic rights, which conforms to 
the outcome o7 from the set O of all outcomes. Hence, the events surrounding 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft add further credence to the architect’s 
compromise model of European integration. In contrast to this study’s other 
cases in which the rulings of the ECJ were accepted, the decision of the ECJ in
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft was rejected by Germany. Although the 
outcome was markedly different, the architect’s compromise model also proved 
capable of explaining Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, just as it has concisely 
and correctly accounted for the process of integration in the other cases
heretofore evaluated.
Wimsche Handelsgesellschaft
The response of the Bundesverfasstingsgericht (case Re Wiinsche 
Handelsgesellschaft) to the ECJ’s decision in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft 
represents a reversal of the position the Bundesverfassungsgericht adopted with
regard to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, which largely alleviated the threat
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to the supremacy of European law.61 The Bundesverfassungsgericht changed 
its position in response to the safeguards for the fundamental rights introduced 
by the Communities in the time since the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
ruling. Content that European law protected basic rights at a level comparable 
to the Grundgesetz, the Bundesverfassungsgericht thus stated that it would no
longer evaluate the compatibility of EC law to German law. However, the 
decision was carefully framed as to allow the Bundesverfassungsgericht to
reserve the authority to withdraw its approval of the doctrine of supremacy if 
the German Constitutional Court later found that EC law no longer offered as 
adequate protection of human rights as the Grundgesetz, once again making 
clear that Kompetenz-Kompetenz remained with Germany. Such a ruling is 
illustrative of the bargaining process implicit in the architect’s compromise
model which will be examined after a review of the facts of the case.
In the national case, the Bundesverfassungsgericht was asked to review 
the ECJ’s ruling in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany. In Wiinsche 
Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, the ECJ ruled that Council and Commission
legislation regarding the importation of preserved mushrooms from non­
European Union countries was justified. After initially being denied a license 
for importing preserved mushrooms and subsequently appealing to the 
Verwaltungsgericht (Frankfurt Administrative Court), the company Wiinsche 
Handelsgesellschaft was granted the requested licence based on new legislation 
before the case was decided by the Verwaltungsgericht. The appellant,
61 “June 1987: Community Primacy and Fundamental Rights,” European Law Review 12 
(1987): 161. 1
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however, did not withdraw from the case, owing to the company’s concern that 
subsequent legislation might also be overly protective. After a dismissal by the 
Verwaltungsgericht, which held that the refusal of the licence was legal, the 
company appealed to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which subsequently 
referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on whether the Commission 
legislation dealing with mushrooms infringed the Council Regulations which 
regulated the importation of fruits and vegetables. In this case before the ECJ, 
Wiinsche and the Commission submitted arguments. Wiinsche maintained that
the legislation was unjustified because there was a shortage—not a market 
disturbance by too many imports—of preserved mushrooms, and the company 
justified its claims by presenting statistics regarding the importation of preserved
mushrooms in the mid-1970s from Taiwan, Korea and China. Moreover,
Wiinsche argued that France was the only exporter (excluding lower grade
mushrooms produced by the Netherlands) at the time and could not provide 
Wiinsche’s demand. Finally, Wiinsche maintained that the Commission engaged 
in an unjustified unilateral protectionist policy which favoured French 
production. In response, the Commission maintained that such policies were 
necessary to prevent a collapse of Community producers since non-Member 
State producers provided mushrooms at a cost from 10 to 30% lower than 
Community producers during the period in question. Additionally, the 
Commission argued both that no shortage (as Wiinsche had claimed) was 
apparent in June 1976, and that the price had not increased to the extent that
Wiinsche had suggested. In its ruling, the Court, siding with the views of the 
Advocate-General, ruled that the disputed Commission legislation was valid.
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Accordingly, the ECJ held that the measures taken to regulate the importation 
of preserved mushrooms were justified and did not cause such shortages or 
price increases which Wiinsche had alleged.62
Upon receipt of the preliminary ruling in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft 
described above, Wiinsche protested that the ECJ had breached particular 
German constitutional provisions, particularly that of the right to a hearing 
since—according to the German company—the ECJ failed to weigh important 
considerations that Wiinsche had submitted. Moreover, the German company 
argued that the case should be suspended and referred to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht or appealed for a new preliminary ruling from the 
ECJ. In response, the Bundesverwallungsgericht dismissed the appeal, arguing 
that the grievances by Wiinsche were unfounded.63 Maintaining that the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht violated “procedural and substantial rights”64 of the 
Grundgesetz, the German company once again appealed the case with the result
that the matter was ultimately brought before the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
In its assessment of the case, the German Federal Constitutional Court
found that while the appeal was admissible on constitutional grounds, it was not 
“well founded,”65 as the German court reasoned—in contrast to its decision in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft—that basic rights were in fact adequately 
protected by the Communities. The Bundesverfassungsgericht then proceeded
62 See ECJ. Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 1479-1501.
63 Re Wiinsche Handelsgesellschafl (CMLR), 238-245.
64 Ibid., 240.
65 Ibid., 250.
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to defend the actions of the previous courts, arguing that fundamental rights had 
been respected and ultimately stated that it would no longer accept references 
concerned with alleged violations of fundamental rights under Article 100(1) of 
the Grundgesetz. Based on the assurance that human rights were adequately 
protected, the German Federal Constitutional Court maintained that:
In view of those developments it must be held that, so long as the 
European Communities, and in particular in the case law of the 
European Court, generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental 
rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be 
regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights 
required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far as they 
generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights, the 
Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to 
decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as 
the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the 
sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and it will no 
longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights 
contained in the Constitution. . . 66
Hence, the Bundesverfassungsgericht recognised the ECJ as a “gesetzlicher
Richter (a legal judge)” in the sense that it has the authority to give definitive 
rulings.67 According the ECJ such a position greatly enhanced the integrity of 
the European Court for the time being and contributed significantly to the 
incorporation of the doctrine of supremacy of EC law into the German legal
order. However, as Frowein notes, “It is clear that the Federal Constitutional
Court did not give up its jurisdiction or come to the conclusion that no such 
jurisdiction exists. It only states that it will not exercise the jurisdiction as long 
as the present conditions as to the protection of fundamental rights by the
66 Ibid., 265.
67 H. Gerald Crossland, “Member States: Germany: Three Major Decisions Given by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court),” European Law Review 19 
(1994): 203,
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European Court of Justice prevail.”68 As the analysis through the architect’s 
compromise model will demonstrate below, Germany retained the primacy of 
the Grundgesetz in defiance of the reasoning of the ECJ. Hence, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court did accept the doctrine of supremacy in practice; 
however, its acceptance was conditional upon the ECJ conforming to the 
principles of German national law.
Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft and the Architect’s Compromise Model
As with International Handelsgesellschaft, the events surrounding
Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft appear to conform to the assumptions of the 
architect’s compromise model. Under the initial assumption, we identify two 
actors: the ECJ and Germany. As it is a central premise of the architect’s 
compromise, we eliminate the other parties involved in the case in the interest of 
simplicity, although these certainly exhibit an influence on both the ECJ and 
Germany. However, having justified this simplification initially in Chapter III 
and in the first few case studies, the issue of eliminating the other parties from 
the model warrants no further explanation since it is a feature held constant
throughout every application of the architect’s compromise model.
Next, we assume the actors exhibit rational behaviour, as has been
defined earlier as being purposeful activity to achieve a particular outcome. The 
rationality assumption is verified by the Court’s reasoning which supported a
68 Frowein, “National Courts,” 203.
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growing continuity in European Community law. With regard to the rulings of 
the European Court, Peter M. Huber notes that the ECJ tends to decide in 
favour of expanding the competences of the Community, given its “politisches 
Mandat als Motor der Integration,”69 just as the architect’s compromise model 
assumes. Its decision in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft represented such a
purposeful decision to further define the integrity of the Communities. With 
regard to the rationality of Germany in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft, the 
Federal Republic did acquiesce to the ECJ; however, it certainly retained the 
authority to withdraw such support if human rights are no longer found to be 
adequately protected. Hence, Germany retained Kompetenz-Kompetenz while
accepting the ECJ’s supremacy in particular areas.
The third and fourth assumptions can be treated together: the Court
played the role of a strategic actor, who based its decisions on modified 
preferences. The case Wiinsche v. Germany itself did not introduce a new 
concept; as has been noted previously, the doctrine of supremacy was an 
established concept of EC law. Rather, the Court’s decision can be interpreted 
as more of an affirmation of the wide responsibilities enjoyed by the Community 
institutions, especially the Commission. However, the Court was able to adopt 
this integration-friendly attitude based on the favourable modified preferences 
towards further integration which prevailed among the Member States at the
time of the decision. Specifically, it is assumed that the Member States were
69 Peter M. Huber, “Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europaischer Gerichtshof als Hiiter der 
Gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kompetenzordnung,” Archiv des Offentlichen Rechts 116 
(1991): 213. .
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receptive to further integration based on two factors: first, the “commonly 
acclaimed. . . major step towards integration” through the Single European Act 
one year earlier70 and second, the expanding protection of human rights by the 
Community.71 These events suggest that the Member States’ modified 
preferences encouraged such further integration.
Finally, Germany, represented by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
accepted the ruling of the ECJ as it conformed to German modified preferences. 
To explain, the issue of fundamental rights did not appear in the case until it was 
referred back to the German courts following the preliminary ruling in Wiinsche 
v. Germany. Aside from the pro-integration climate that prevailed at the time,
the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the years prior to the Wiinsche 
decision reflected an increasing approval of the developing system of European 
human rights protection, as is proven by the Eurocontrol case.72 *However, it 
should be stressed that the decision did not recognise an inherent supremacy of 
EC law, which ultimately allowed the Bundesverfassungsgericht to retain a 
supreme position. Moreover, Frowein notes:
Under German law the legislature cannot intervene in Community 
matters, because of the acceptance of the priority of Community law. 
The Federal Constitutional Court wanted to preserve its final authority 
to intervene where real problems concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights in Community law could arise. As long as the 
Community system has not developed into a federal structure, questions 
of sovereignty or final priority as to sources of law have to be kept in 
suspense. Only where the rules concerning conflict between European
70 Juliane Kokott, “German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration II,” 
European Public Law 2, no. 3 (1996): 426.
71 “June 1987,” 161-162.
72 See Andreas Greifeld, “Requirements of the German Constitution for the Installation of
Supranational Authority as posited in the Eurocontrol decisions of the Constitutional 
Court,” Common Market Law Review 20 (1983): 87-95.
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Constitutional Law and National Constitutional Law lead to the same 
result can a harmonious development take place.73
Meinhard Hilf maintains that while the Bundesverfassungsgericht appreciated 
the authority of the ECJ, the German Constitutional Court certainly did not give 
the ECJ a “Blankoscheck” [blank check] since the Member States remain “die 
Herren der Vertrage” [masters of the Treaties], Furthermore, Hilf maintains 
that “es sind die Mitgliedstaaten, die das Integrationsprogramm festlegen” [it is 
the Member States which determine the integration program],74 illustrating that 
the Court is ultimately accountable to the Member States or it risks losing its 
legitimacy by restriction of its authority in Treaty revisions. Bebr further 
explains the supreme position Germany maintains by stating:
Thus the Court of Justice will have to see to it that the due process 
clause be respected even in a preliminary review procedure. Otherwise 
it could run the risk of the German Constitutional Court abandoning its 
judicial restraint and reclaiming its power to review Community acts. 
Specifically, it could mean, as the Constitutional Court observed, that a 
disregard of a minimum of due process, as embodied in the Basic Law, 
by the Court of Justice in the preliminary procedure--a contravention 
which may not even be anticipated—would deprive the preliminary ruling 
of its binding force.75
Therefore, this competence of the European Court is dependent upon the 
continued protection of human rights by the Communities. Politically, the 
decision also reserves the right for Germany to later withdraw its adherence to 
the doctrine of supremacy if the Bundesverfassungsgericht is unsatisfied with
74 Meinhard Hilf, “Der Justizkonllikt um EG-Richtlinien: gelost,” Europarecht 23 no. 1 
(1988): 9-10.
75 Gerhard Bebr, “Case Law: Court of Justice: Case 69/85, Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, Order under Article 177 (EEC) of the Court of Justice of 5 
March 1986, not yet reported,” Common Market Law Review 24 (1987): 729.
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the protection of human rights by the Communities, thus maintaining a superior 
position vis-a-vis the ECJ.
With regard to the expected utility equation underlying the architect’s 
compromise,76 we can assume that the action of the Court could be represented 
by a2 since the Court did not take any aggressive steps towards integration.77 
Next, we identify the state of nature, or modified preference as mi, or pro­
integration. Such an assumption is verified by Germany’s absence from the 
proceedings as well as the more receptive approach to EC law by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in cases such as Eurocontrol mentioned previously. 
We can thus expect an outcome of o2, or acceptance by the Member State. In 
fact, Germany, through the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Re
Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft did accept the decision, as the architect’s 
compromise predicts, and this decision dramatically enhanced the integrity of
EC law in Germany.
Brunner
Any analysis of the German acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy of 
Community law should at least mention the Maastricht Treaty and the Brunner
76 See the appendix for a review of the expected utility equation upon which the architect’s 
compromise is based.
77 It could be argued that ai adequately represents that actions of the Court since the 
function of a decision to favour the Community institutions is a de facto decision for 
further integration; however, such a conclusion is not obvious, and thus, identifying the 
Court as apathetic to integration in this particular decision is much easier to justify. 
However, given the state of nature, or modified preferences that prevailed at the time, the 
outcome would be the same. Hence, the argument is but academic.
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decision since they further clarified the position of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht regarding EC law. Since the decision is that of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and not the ECJ, a thorough discussion is beyond the 
scope of this research project; however, the findings of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the case do elucidate the position of European law 
with respect to Germany and the limits of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. Such a two- 
step development in European legal integration conforms to the bargaining 
process assumed by the architect’s compromise model since it requires action by 
both the ECJ and the Member State to accomplish further integration.
The case, brought by four Members of the European Parliament (in the 
capacity of private citizens) and a former official of the Commission, challenged 
the Maastricht Treaty on constitutional grounds. Concerned about “the erosion 
of national sovereignty and of the powers of the German Parliament,” the 
complainants charged that the legislative assent which ratified the Maastricht 
Treaty for Germany and the constitutional amendments for this purpose were in 
violation of the Grundgesetz,78 79The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, ruled 
that the ratification of Maastricht was compatible with the Grundgesetz since 
the transference of sovereignty was accomplished in accordance with Articles 
23 and 24 (Grundgesetz'}19 Hence, while this decision further recognised the 
doctrine of supremacy of EC law in Germany, it also placed new restrictions on
further integration.
78 Matthias Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional 
Restraints for an ‘Ever Closer Union,’” Common Market Law Review 31 (1994): 238.
79 Nigel G. Foster, “The German Constitution and E.C. Membership,” Public Law (1994): 
404.
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The decision formally recognised the compatibility of the new Article 23 
of the Grundgesetz with the German constitutional order.80 Through the article, 
Germany formalised into its own domestic legal order the concept of European 
law as a separate legal order which had been long recognised by the European 
Court,81 something which undoubtedly enhanced the integrity of the 
Communities. In particular, while the goal of European unity has been a goal of 
the Grundgesetz as established in the Preamble, Article 23 not only commits 
Germany to work towards a united Europe but also clarifies the meaning and 
significance of such a goal.82 Specifically, the goal of European integration will 
entail a greater degree of co-operation between the Communities and the 
Member States. Much has been made over this new “co-operation” in the 
academic literature.83 However, although the wording of Article 23 enables the 
development of a “European Union,” the article is hardly explicit on details,84 
and the exact implications of the new article are obfuscated by the qualifications 
introduced in the Brunner decision. Herdegen summarises the impact of the
reasoning in Brunner.
This concept of “cooperation” amounts to quite a flat (and renewed) 
denial of the absolute supremacy of Community law and its supreme
80 (CMLR), 82-83.
81 The European Court of Justice introduced such a distinction between traditional 
international law and European law as early as 1963, in its Van Gend en Loos decision. 
See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport—en Expedite Onderneming Van Gend en Loos 
v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, European Court Reports (1963): 1-30.
82 Karl-Peter Sommermann, “Staatziel „Europaische Union”: Zur normativen Reichweite 
des Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG n. F.,” Die Offentliche Verwaltung (1994): 603.
83 See, for example, Foster, “The German Constitution and E.C. Membership,” 406-407; 
Dieter Grimm, “The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German 
Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision’' Columbia Journal of 
European Law 3 (1997): 235; and Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional 
Court,” 239.
84 Udo Di Fabio, “Der Neue Art. 23 des Grundgesetzes: Positivierung vollzogenen 
Verfassungswandels Oder Verfassungsneuschopfung?” Der Staat (1993): 195.
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judicial organ. . . . This message from Karlsruhe will hardly cause 
unmitigated enthusiasm in Brussels or Luxembourg. However, the 
Federal Constitutional Court’s position seems conclusive as long as the 
pouvoir constituant of Germany has not yet recognized the absolute 
supremacy of Community law and as long as the powers of the 
Constitutional Court are exclusively derived from the Basic Law.85
Finally, any future expansion of the competences of the Communities, and 
hence, the European Court, can only occur within the restrictions placed on 
such transfers of sovereignty as outlined in Article 23.86 Through this article, 
the Bundestag and the Lander—through the Bundesrat—gained significant
powers to consult the Federal Government and affect future German 
participation in European integration.87 Hence, Brunner once again proved that 
the European Communities essentially remain an inter-governmental institution
in which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of
Justice.
The European Court of Justice, Supremacy and Germany: Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate the ability of the architect’s 
compromise to explain the acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy in Germany. 
Since 1964,88 89European law has in principle enjoyed supremacy over national 
law; however, such a simplification of the disputed competences fails to 
acknowledge the very real constitutional challenges the doctrine faces with 
respect to the Grundgesetz*9 Despite the clarification that first Wiinsche
85 Matthias Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court,” 239.
86 Sommermann, 604.
87 Grundgesetz, Article 23, Sections 2-6.
88 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
89 Huber, 216-217.
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Handelsgesellschaft and then Brunner provided to Germany’s position on the 
supremacy of European law, Hilf s thesis concerning a lack of clear demarcation 
between German domestic jurisdiction and ECJ authority90 remains valid. 
Specifically, it is unclear as to where the competences of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht end and those of the European Court of Justice 
begin 91 This means that European legal integration will remain a two-step 
process between Germany and the Court since it requires agreement by both 
actors to achieve progress. Despite the ambiguity concerning the limits of 
European and German jurisdictions, one certainty remains: regardless of a 
decision of the ECJ, the Federal Republic of Germany retains the authority to 
reject Community law if the European Court goes beyond its granted 
competence92 (as the architect’s compromise model predicts). More important 
still is the very nature of the German constitution itself. It is axiomatic to state 
that Article 23 grants a greater legitimacy to the Communities since transfers of 
sovereignty henceforth must have the approval of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat 
and the Lander?3 however, the Grundgesetz remains the “konkretes 
Grundgefuge”94 for the Federal Republic of Germany. As such, one may 
conclude that the Bundesverfassungsgericht retains ultimate supremacy given 
its role as “guardian of the constitution.” While the acceptance of the 
Maastricht Treaty opened the German legal order to greater integration, the 
level and speed of such integration vis-a-vis Germany remains a matter for
90 Meinhard Hilf, “The Application of Rules of National Administrative Law in the 
Implementation of Community Law,” Yearbook of European Law 3 (1983): 79-98.
91 Huber, 217.
92 Matthias Herdegen, Europarechl (Munich: Beck, 1997), 163.
93 Sommermann, 601.
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several layers of the German government and the judiciary. This is particularly 
significant for Germany, as a rechtsstaat94 5—“a. state based on the rule of law”96— 
whose identity “is largely founded on and shaped by the constitution. Instead of 
an identity based on the nation state, discredited by the Nazis, the Federal 
Republic of Germany developed a ‘constitutional patriotism’ 
(Verfassungspatriotismiis), i.e. a pride in the values protected by the 
constitution and the established political system.”97 The significance of such a 
system on European integration will be further explained below.
According to Dieter Grimm, “Since the Solange I ruling, the German 
Constitutional Court has never deviated from its view that the supremacy of 
Community law in Germany is conditioned on an adequate protection of 
fundamental rights on the Community level.”98 Through adopting such an 
approach, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has guaranteed that Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz remains with Germany.99 Regardless of the ultimate source of 
authority, however, it is undeniable that “. . . the range of public acts to be 
controlled by the German Court is gradually narrowing, while the European 
Court of Justice. . . is assuming greater importance.”100 This is evident by the 
idea of greater co-operation outlined in the Brunner decision and the manner in 
which Article 23 allows for further integration101 (albeit with limitations), which
94 Huber, 227.
95 For a full discussion on the German Rechtsstaat, see Brinkmann, particularly pages 84­
90.
96 Kommers, 34. See also 36-37.
97 Kokott, 417.
98 Grimm, 231.
99 Kokott, 434.
100 Goetz, 113.
101 Sommermann, 601.
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virtually guarantees future expansion of the European Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, the fundamental limitations cannot be overlooked: the
Bundesverfassungsgerichf s “analysis is rooted in the axiomatic understanding 
that the Treaty on European Union does not set up a supranational entity 
invested with the insignia of statehood,” and the German court further perceives
the “union” as a Staatenver bund—association of States--and not an 
association of people.102 Hence, the two-step bargaining process implicit in the 
architect’s compromise model will most likely characterise further integration. 
In addition, the Brunner decision effectively ruled out~at least in the short­
term—the evolution of the European Union into an entity in the manner in 
“which the United States of America became a state.”103 Given this prevailing 
mood, it is hard to imagine absolute supremacy being accorded to EC law. 
Accordingly, Herdegen suggests, “The unrestricted primacy of Community law 
within the domestic legal systems of the Member States would signify nothing 
less than the birth of federal statehood at the European level.”104 The European 
Communities in the late 20th Century is ill-prepared for this task. Herdegen 
farther maintains that the Communities’ largely inter-governmental—despite 
elements of supra-nationalism—structure “might deal a mild blow to a school of 
thought which tends to assimilate the framework of the Community Treaties 
with a State’s ‘constitution.’”105 Clearly, the Communities lack the authority of 
a State, which ultimately means that the Court must balance its decisions to the
102 Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court,” 241.
103 Brunner (CMLR), 90.
104 Herdegen, “Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court,” 240.
105 Ibid., 236.
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political reality of holding a narrow institutional authority, as is suggested by the 
idea of modified preferences. These matters will be addressed more fully in the 
following final chapter.
A fundamental problem with regard to the doctrine of supremacy of 
European law is the discord regarding its source, which also will be examined in 
greater detail in the next chapter. While the ECJ regards supremacy as an 
intrinsic quality of European law as initially formulated in Costa v. ENEL, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has continued to hold that Community law enjoys 
primacy over national law in Germany solely because the Grundgesetz grants 
such authority;106 however, “. . . the ECJ cannot give judgments which have the 
effect of extending the Treaty. If so, they would not be binding in Germany.”107 
Given that the Treaties can only be amended by the unanimous consent of the
Member States and the Bundesverfassungsgericht occupies the position of 
“guardian of the constitution” in Germany, the “competence to scrutinize the 
applicability of Community law, [and]. . . even. . . the actions of the ECJ” hence 
lies with Germany.108 Moreover, as long as the Communities have the character 
of an association of States, “there can never be a transfer of power to create 
powers (the Kompetenz-Kompetenz'} and the range of powers transferred can 
only be within the express and clear parameters as controlled by the Member 
States as ‘Masters of the Treaty’ (Herren der Eertrage).”109 Given these 
fundamental issues surrounding sovereignty and the position of the European
106 Roth, 142.
107 Nigel G. Foster, “The German Constitution and E.C. Membership,” 408.
108 Grimm, 236.
109 Foster, “The German Constitution and E.C. Membership,” 407.
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Court that have been brought out by the German case studies, it is evident that 
models for integration must take into account the stress, conflict and interests 
implicit in decision-making. The foregoing analysis, along with the case studies 
on Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft 
confirm the rigour of the architect’s compromise model of European integration 
with its emphasis on a two-step process of bargaining between the ECJ and the 
Member States. Hence, we conclude this chapter satisfied that the architect’s 
compromise has once again provided a suitable model for analysing the role of 
the ECJ in European integration and the reception of EC law by the Member 
States. The next, and final, chapter will summarise the findings of this research 
project and discuss their implications.
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Chapter VUI
Conclusion
The goal of this research project has been to formulate a rigorous model 
for explaining the role of the European Court of Justice in the process of 
European integration vis-a-vis the Member States. As political scientists and 
legal scholars hold markedly contrasting assumptions regarding the role and 
power of the European Court (political scientists, for example, preferring to 
focus on examining the Court as a purely political actor; whilst legal scholars
tend to discount external forces influencing the Court), a particular goal of this 
project was to examine a portion of the legal scholarship on the ECJ and to 
explain it through political science methodology. Such an approach is an 
attempt to illustrate the real political power held by the Court despite its role as 
a legal institution. Moreover, despite the acknowledgement that the Court has 
exerted a formidable influence on integration, there has been a paucity of 
research in political science on the manner in which such influence has been 
achieved. In response, it has been a goal of this research project to provide an 
initial explanation rooted in political science for the role of the ECJ in the 
process of European integration in lieu of a model built upon pure legal 
methodology. Conceding the dramatically different assumptions of legal 
analysis compared to the foregoing research’s analysis, it can nonetheless be
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concluded that this research project provides a fresh approach to explaining 
legal integration in political science terms.
The current research stemmed from the debate between two competing 
models of European legal integration: neofunctionalism and neorationalism. As 
was established at the beginning of this project, Mattli and Slaughter’s
neofunctionalist model and Garrett and Weingast’s neorationalist approach fail
to take some serious considerations into account. Moreover, these models have 
not been systematically and thoroughly tested.1 In contrast, the architect’s 
compromise model developed here has been critically examined through a series 
of cases. Granted, the examination was restricted to the area of supremacy of 
European law, and it would be premature to assume that the architect’s 
compromise would completely explain the role of the ECJ in European 
integration. However, throughout the course of this analysis, it has been 
demonstrated that the approach has proven rigorous under examination and 
thus, provides a suitable foundation for further study of the European Court. 
Moreover, the model has served to highlight challenges facing the development 
of European law. Hence, this research project has not only identified a new and 
more effective means in which to analyse legal integration, but also has exposed 
a number of issues which are fundamental to the development of a European 
legal jurisprudence. This conclusion will focus on three major themes which the 
foregoing research has identified. First, we will recognise the suitability of the
Indeed, the only case to which these models have been applied is Cassis de Dijon. See 
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundestnonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, European 
Court Reports 1 (1979): 649-675, or Common Market Law Reports 3 (1979): 494-515.
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architect’s compromise model for examining European legal integration. 
Second, we will consider the nature of European constitutionalism and its 
impact on the European integration project. Finally, we will address further 
research avenues related to this research project. Before discussing these
related issues, however, a review of the architect’s compromise is warranted.
The Architect’s Compromise Model
To begin, the analysis conducted by this research confirms the integrity 
of the architect’s compromise model as a means of examining European legal 
integration. Following the literature review in Chapter I, Chapter II initially 
provided a critique of the neofunctionalist model and Garrett’s neorationalist 
approach. This served to lay the foundation for the architect’s compromise 
model in providing an analysis of the deficiencies in existing explanations of the 
integration process. The architect’s compromise model was then outlined and 
tested against the Court’s decisions in Cassis de Dijon (selected since it was the 
only case examined by Mattli and Slaughter and Garrett) and Francovich v. 
Italy2 (examined because it provided a more recent pivotal decision), both of 
which confirmed the ability of the architect’s compromise model to accurately 
explain the manner in which legal integration occurs.
2 Cases C-6Z90 & C9/90, Andrea Francovich and Another v. The Republic (Italy), Common 
Market Law Reports 2 (1993): 66-116; or European Court Reports (1991): I-5357-I- 
5418.
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Chapters III and IV were then devoted to examining the assumptions of 
the model. Chapter III justified the selection of the Court and the Member 
State (in which all organs of the government are included as a single unit) or 
States as the primary actors. Additionally, this chapter examined the issue of
constitutionalism and the Communities and concluded that the Treaties cannot
fulfil the role of a constitution in the traditional sense. While this issue will be
addressed subsequently, for the moment, it is sufficient to note that the lack of a 
true constitution limits the growth of the European Communities despite the 
tendency of scholarship to simply overlook this theoretical obstacle.3 Chapter 
IV justified the remaining assumptions of the architect’s compromise model. 
After initially demonstrating that the primary actors conformed to the 
assumption of rationality made here—specifically, their actions are purposeful in 
nature—the chapter confirmed the manner in which the Court acts as a strategic 
actor, who finds its motivation in enhancing the integrity of the European legal 
system. The remainder of Chapter IV examined the idea of modified 
preferences and the influence this concept exerts not only on the Court’s 
decisions but also on the subsequent acceptance or rejection of ECJ decisions. 
Hence, Chapters II, III and IV demonstrated the inadequacies of existing 
models and, in response, presented the architect’s compromise as an alternative 
with its assumptions on bargaining between the Court and the Member States. 
The remainder of the research project examined these proposals and tested them 
against the actual events of European legal integration.
Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?,” European Law Journal 1, no. 3 
(November 1995): 291.
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In particular, since the research project identified the doctrine of 
supremacy and its development as the particular area of EC law to be tested by 
the architect’s compromise model, the remaining three chapters concentrated on 
this matter. The doctrine of supremacy was selected as the subject for two 
primary reasons: first, it represents a fundamental aspect of European 
Community law; and second, the concept was formulated by the ECJ and is 
absent from the Treaties, thus demonstrating the aggressive role the Court has 
adopted to filling in the gaps of the Treaties. Chapter V provided an 
examination of the doctrine of supremacy after an initial commentary on the
related concept of direct effect, followed by an examination of the case which 
established this principle (Van Gend en Loos4 5). The second half of the chapter 
then examined the doctrine of supremacy in depth. This section examined 
supremacy vis-a-vis the Treaties, the Member States, the concept of sovereignty 
and international law. An overview of the incorporation of the concept into 
French law was illustrative of the importance of the Member States in the 
acceptance of the doctrine. Finally, the chapter concluded with an examination 
of Costa v. ENElJ—Vho, case which first established the concept of supremacy. 
Chapter VI examined the incorporation of the doctrine of supremacy into the 
domestic law of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was selected for 
four main reasons: first, the UK is generally viewed as being Eurosceptic;
second, as one of the larger Member States, the United Kingdom exhibits a 
particularly influential role in European integration; third, Britain’s unwritten
4 Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transport~en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administralie der Belastingen, European Court Reports (1963): 1-30.
5 Case 6/64, Flamino Costa v. ENEL, European Court Reports (1964): 585-615.
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constitution and common law tradition contrasts significantly with the civil law 
traditions of continental Europe; and fourth, the UK joined the Communities 
relatively late. This means that, because the UK entered the Communities after 
its founding, the debates and legislation concerning Britain’s accession could be
examined in order to illustrate the manner in which such events conformed to 
the logic of the architect’s compromise model. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith,6 7 
Marshall v. Southampton1 and the Factortame cases8 were then examined to 
illustrate the gradual incorporation of the doctrine of supremacy into the British 
legal system. Each of these cases reinforced this research project’s claim that 
the architect’s compromise offers an appropriate method for analysing the 
process of British acceptance of European law. Likewise, Chapter VII 
illustrated the suitability of employing the architect’s compromise for examining 
the acceptance of European law in Germany. Germany was chosen as a subject 
of this research project based on three reasons. First, often identified as a 
champion of the integration process, Germany plays a particularly important 
role in European integration based on its size, economy and history; second, 
Germany was a founding member of the Communities; and third, Germany’s 
Grundgesetz and governmental structure have played a significant role in the 
Federal Republic’s participation in the Communities. These factors underline
6 Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd. v. Wendy Smith, European Court Reports (1980): 1275­
1297.
7 Case 152/84, M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority (Teaching), European Court Reports (1986): 723-751; or Common Market 
Law Reports 1 (1986): 688-713.
8 Case 213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. 
And Others, European Court Reports (1990): 1-2433-1-2475; and Case 221/89, Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Limited and Others (No. 2), 
Common Market Law Reports 3 (1990): 589-632.
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both the importance of German acceptance of the doctrine to the Court’s 
legitimacy and the complex route to acceptance by the Member States which 
Court decisions may face. The chapter began with an examination of the 
German legal system following World War II, which highlighted the importance 
of the Grundgesetz and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany, and hence, 
their respective impact on the acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy. Much 
of the remainder of the chapter was devoted to testing the architect’s 
compromise model in the ECJ’s judgement in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft9 10and in Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft™ along with the 
response of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to these cases. Together with 
Brunner,11 the analysis of these cases further verified the strength of the 
architect’s compromise in explaining the manner in which European legal 
integration occurs. Based on these results, this research project concludes that 
the architect’s compromise offers an appropriate means to explain European 
integration vis-a-vis the European Court of Justice. The following section will 
offer a final review of the logic of the assumptions of the model to draw final
conclusions with regard to the assumptions of the model.
9 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur 
Getreide und Futtermittel, European Court Reports (1970): 1127-1128; and Case 2 BvL 
52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbHv. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide 
und Futtermittel, Common Market Law Reports (1974): 540-592.
10 Case 126/81, Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft v. Germany, European Court Reports (1982): 
1479-1501; and Case 2 BvR 197/83, Re the Application of Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 
Common Market Law Reports 3 (1987): 225-265.
11 Cases 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union 
Treaty, Common Market Law Report 1 (1994): 57-108.
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The Architect’s Compromise Model: A Review
To begin, the actors are recognised as the ECJ and the Member State 
(or States). By limiting the actors, the model focuses on the actors which 
actually make the specific decisions that determine the scope and depth of 
integration. In contrast to neofunctionalism, the architect’s compromise model 
discounts the sub- and supra-state actors from the analysis; such exclusion is not 
a failure to recognise the influence of these actors since they undoubtedly 
represent important forces on the integration process. However, the architect’s 
compromise model is concerned with the actual decisions which lead to 
integration, stagnation or disintegration. Therefore, these sub- and supra-state 
actors are eliminated in an attempt to focus solely on the actors which have the 
authority to make decisions which determine the pace and scope of integration. 
It is the opinion of this research that the architect’s compromise model offers 
such an explanation of the primary decision-making procedure and would 
welcome research into these secondary forces.12
Second, these actors are assumed to be rational. As has been explained 
throughout this research, this use of rationality assumes that behaviour is 
purposeful to the extent that actors make decisions to maximise their respective 
goals despite incomplete information. With each case study, the assumption has
12 For an examination of the domestic forces influencing European integration, see Bulmer, 
Simon, “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy Making,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 21, no. 4 (June 1983): 349-363; for a discussion on the need for 
research into the decision-making process within the Court itself, see T. Koopmans, 
“Judicial Decision-making,” Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European 
Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart (Gosport, Hampshire: Trenton 
Publishing, 1996): 93-104.
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been justified by demonstrating the manner in which each actor exhibited 
purposeful behaviour as to best achieve the actor’s goals. Specifically, 
predisposed through its “genetic code” to rule in a manner to enhance 
Community law,13 the Court has a mandate to achieve the aims of the Treaties, 
and the case studies and analysis of this research project illustrate the Court’s 
purposeful approach in accomplishing those aims. Likewise, the Member States 
have also freely and wilfully committed themselves to the European project for 
the purpose of participating in the economic, political and security benefits it 
provides, despite the costs (most notably a loss of sovereignty).
The third assumption is that the Court plays the role of a strategic actor 
whose goal is maintaining and furthering the effectiveness of the European 
Communities. Alter explains the Court’s role as a strategic actor:
The interests of the ECJ were to be an authoritative voice on issues of
EC law, which meant having cases and interesting legal questions to rule 
on and creating a means to elicit compliance with its decisions. The 
Court used the resources it had to help realise these interests, and in the 
case of the EC legal system the resources it had were above and beyond 
that of a traditional court.14
As this research has shown, it is widely acknowledged that the Court employs a
teleological approach in its decisions. In so doing, the ECJ operates on the 
“underlying assumption that they [the objectives of the Treaties] will lead 
eventually to an economic and political union.”15 Moreover, the importance of
13 G. Federico Mancini and David T. Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court of 
Justice,” Modern Law Review 57, no. 2 (March 1994): 186.
14 Karen J. Alter, “ The European Court’s Political Power,” West European Politics 19, no. 
3 (June 1996): 480.
15 L. Neville Brown and Tom Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
4th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994), 317.
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the teleological approach to decision-making in the Court confirms the 
assumption of the architect’s compromise that the Court is a strategic actor. 
Reflecting the same conclusions of the case studies in this research, Kari 
Joutsamo adds “by its argumentation the Court of Justice tries to strengthen the 
supremacy of Community law over national law.”16 Based on the evidence 
throughout this research project, we assume the Court plays the role of a 
strategic actor, motivated by enhancing the integrity of European Community
law.
Fourth, the architect’s compromise model assumes that the Court’s 
decisions usually conform to modified preferences as to ensure further 
integration. To review, the term modified preferences characterises the 
attitudes of the Member States towards the benefits of European integration 
devoid of unbridled preferences for short-term gains from free-riding or other 
forms of evading Community obligations. Given the Court’s status as a 
strategic actor, not only does it seek to enhance the standing of European 
Community law through its teleological approach, but the ECJ also restrains its 
judgements within the boundaries of the modified preferences of the Member 
States. If it fails to do this, the ECJ risks rebellion by the Member States 
against its decisions. Such an understanding of the Court’s political role within 
the constraints set by the Member States in the Treaties is readily acknowledged 
by a number of ECJ Members. For example, referring to the operations of the 
European Court of Justice, Judge Everling has explained “. . . the work we are
16 Kari Joutsamo, “Some Aspects of the Impact of the Court of Justice on Integration in the 
European Communities,” Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret (1980): 81.
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doing is political.”17 Likewise, Judge Mancini has noted that “the painful lesson 
for the Court is that nothing that it does cannot be undone and that no aspect of 
the acquis communitaire is safe from abrogation if it proves unpalatable to the 
Court’s political masters.”18 Such clear expressions of the political constraints 
that underlie decisions by judges of the Court illustrate the political nature of 
ECJ decisions. Recognising these limitations, this research has argued that the 
Court prudently adopts decisions which conform to the Member States’ 
modified preferences.
The fifth and final assumption maintains that Member States will accept 
Court decisions which conform to their modified preferences. In most of the
case studies, the decisions of the ECJ were accepted, which thus suggests that
the Court’s decisions usually conform to modified preferences. The most 
obvious exception to this trend is the decision in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, in which the reasoning of the ECJ was rejected by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. As was explained in Chapter VII, such rejection can 
be attributed to the ECJ’s unwillingness to conform with modified preferences.
As a result, the German Constitutional Court, in declaring that Kompetenz- 
Kompetenz was retained by the Federal Republic, did not accept the doctrine of 
supremacy. The openly defiant reaction of Member States in cases such as 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft illustrates that the Member States are 
prepared to directly challenge the authority of the ECJ when EC law breaches
17 Alan Dashwood et al. The Developing Role of the European Court of Justice (London: 
European Policy Forum and Frankfurter Institut, 1995), 79.
18 Guiseppe Federico Mancini, “Crosscurrents and the Tide at the European Court of 
Justice,” Irish Journal of European Law 2 (1995): 132.
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fundamental national constitutional principles and hence modified preferences, 
which further conforms to the logic of the architect’s compromise model.
Constitutionalism
Perhaps the greatest legal issue facing the Communities is the ambiguity 
surrounding its constitutional foundation. It is not the intention of this 
conclusion to repeat the arguments developed in Chapter III.19 Hence, given 
the prior thorough discussion on constitutionalism, it is sufficient to allow Frank
Vibert’s comments summarise the problem:
. . . viewed as a constitution the Treaty is gravely defective. There is no 
enumeration of the rights and prerogatives of member-states, or attempt 
in even general terms to incorporate such principles as ‘subsidiary’ 
which might aim to demarcate responsibilities. There is no attempt to 
provide for checks and balances between executive, legislative and 
judicial functions of the type which would be regarded as essential for 
the constitution of a modern state. . . . They lay the basis for activist 
interpretations of the Treaty provisions rather than judicial limits.
The democratic rights and civil liberties of individuals are mentioned 
only in passing. The Treaty is showing its age: its framers were more 
concerned with providing a supranational platform for benevolent 
bureaucrats than a framework and processes for the exercise of political 
choice by the citizens of member-states.20
Given Vibert’s concerns and those outlined throughout this research project, 
especially that the Treaties lack of a primary source of legitimacy, we have 
concluded that the Treaties do not form a constitution for the European
19 See particularly Theodor Schilling, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An 
Analysis of Possible Foundations,” Harvard International Law Journal 37, no. 2 (Spring 
1996): 389-409; and J. H. H. Weiler and Ulrich R. Haltern, “The Autonomy of the 
Community Legal Order—Through the Looking Glass,” Harvard International Law 
Journal 37, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 411-448.
20 Frank Vibert, “Europe’s Constitutional Deficit,” James M. Buchanan et al. Europe's 
Constitutional Future (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1990): 87-88.
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Communities. The issue of constitutionalism has emerged as a significant issue 
in this research project and warrants a discussion in this conclusion given the 
ramifications for the ECJ’s authority and for the compliance of EC law by the
Member States.
While the lack of a constitution in itself certainly does not prevent the 
Court from playing a fundamental role in European economic and even political 
matters, it nonetheless permanently restricts the competences of the 
Communities. Despite the tendency of academics to refer to the
“constitutionalisation” of the Treaties, these documents remain less than a true
constitution given that the Community’s authority flows from an external 
source. As such, the institutions are limited in the actions that they can pursue.
There is, however, no need for alarm: the Member States are at liberty to 
delegate greater authority if they so choose. What is fundamentally important 
to recognise, however, is that to assume that the Treaties form a constitution is 
to disregard the political realities that frame the activities of the European 
Communities. Such oversimplification of political and legal realities contributes 
to the already complex and undemocratic reputation which the Communities 
have gained.21 Given the significant impact these issues have upon the 
legitimacy of the Court, it is in the interest of European integration to address 
these issues prudently and objectively.
21 See, among many other works on this subject, Brigitte Boyce, “The Democratic Deficit of 
the European Community,” Parliamentary Affairs 46, no. 4 (October 1993): 458-477.
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The issue of constitutionalism is necessarily wed to the ultimate political 
destination of the Communities. It is clearly beyond the scope of this research 
to speculate on the ultimate destiny of the Communities since that is a political 
decision collectively determined by the separate Member States; however, it 
must be stressed that without the necessary legal structure, the Communities are
restricted in the manner in which they might evolve. As a constitution ensuring 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz is virtually a pre-condition for a federal state, the 
European Union would face a myriad of complications should it attempt to
function as a federal state without such a constitution. However, as will be
discussed subsequently, the evolution of the Communities into a federal state— 
despite any level of political and legal posturing—might not be desirable and may 
even be impossible. Nevertheless, we overlook for a moment these obstacles in 
order to initially note a few of the conditions necessary for the creation of such
a federal state.
If European integration means the ultimate establishment of a European 
state, a constitution, vesting Kompetenz-Kompetenz with the Communities is 
essential. Vibert points out the real problems of adhering to the existing 
Treaties for building such a state:
The assumption that political integration in Europe can continue to be 
pursued through indirect methods is a false one. It insults the instincts 
and intelligence of the peoples of Europe. It provokes a myriad of ill- 
defined and contradictory fears. It stimulates irrational opposition. It 
aggravates the tensions between the ties of the old political order that 
are under challenge and the ties of the new order of political association 
which have yet to be firmly established.22
22 Frank Vibert, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium (Mfaxshol: Dartmouth, 1995), 
222.
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Despite any amount of “constitutionalising,” the Treaties remain a creature 
unlike any traditional national constitution. Although conceived from 
international law, as Schilling so convincingly proves,23 the Communities 
undoubtedly consist of an unprecedented institutional network which blurs the 
apparent authority of the Member States, having progressed beyond the realm 
of a traditional international organisation. Nevertheless, the mechanisms to 
ensure compliance rely more upon the continued willingness of the Member 
States to honour the commitments they have undertaken than upon the powers
of the Communities. To vest the Communities with power significant to 
guarantee compliance would require a decisive transfer of sovereignty from the 
Member States. To be certain, this is no minor detail as such a transfer of
sovereignty required to achieve this situation would reverse the power structure 
of the Communities from the national capitals to Brussels, Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg. Moreover, this would require substantiation by the citizens. At the 
moment, the Communities derive their power from the separate Member States 
who receive their respective authority from constitutions (written or unwritten 
as the case may be) which base their legitimacy upon their respective citizens. 
In this manner, the respective national governments receive their legitimacy 
from popular support of the citizens. Dieter Grimm explains this matter:
... it is inherent in a constitution in the full sense of the term that it goes 
back to an act taken by or at least attributed to the people. . . . There is 
no such source for primary Community law. It goes back not to a 
European people but to the individual Member States, and remains 
dependent upon them even after its entry into force. While nations give 
themselves a constitution, the European Union is given a constitution by 
third parties. It consequently does not have the disposal of its own
23 Schilling, 389-409.
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constitution. The ‘Master of the Treaties’. . . are still the Member 
States, who have not been, as it were, absorbed into the Union.24
At present, the popular support and political will to transform the Communities
into a constitutional entity simply does not exist as will be further illustrated
below.
Werner von Simson suggests that since identification remains with the
nation-state and not at the European level, a complete European administration 
simply does not work.25 Moreover, Dieter Grimm further argues:
The legal foundation that fits an association of States is the Treaty. It 
has all the features that allow legal binding of Community power, yet 
leaves the basic decisions about the Community with the Member States, 
where they can be democratically checked and accounted for. A 
European Constitution would not be able to bridge the existing gap and 
would consequently disappoint the expectations associated with it. The 
legitimation it would mediate would be a fictitious one. Accordingly, 
when it comes down to it constitutions are still something to do with 
States, and anyone calling for one for Europe should be aware what 
movement he is thereby setting going.26
Thus, the notion that the Treaties are called upon to exercise this constitutional
role is rife with theoretical problems, not the least of which is the derivative 
nature of the Court’s authority. Without significant safeguards for its authority, 
the ECJ’s continued legitimacy remains contingent upon respect from the 
Member States. Failure to recognise the limits of the Treaties provides no 
solution; rather, it further complicates an already complicated legal structure by 
prolonging, delaying and concealing—but not alleviating—conflicts between
24 Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?” 290-291.
25 Werner von Simson, “Was heiftt in einer europaischen Verfassung „Das Volk“?,” 
Europarecht 26, no. 1 (1991): 10.
26 Grimm, “Does Europe Need a Constitution?” 299.
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national and Community law. Noting these fundamental theoretical problems, it 
is the opinion of this research that these issues should be evaluated frankly and 
thoroughly, especially given that—in the words of Grimm—many experts simply 
“gloss over this.”27 Ultimately, the legitimacy of the ECJ and even the long­
term viability of the Communities is connected to these constitutional issues.
Future Research
Finally, the foregoing analysis suggests a number of avenues for future
research, two of which deserve particular mention. First, as this study has been
concerned with the doctrine of supremacy, further research concerning the
architect’s compromise model should be conducted to measure its ability to 
explain other areas of European law, as will be elaborated on below. Second, 
the foregoing research has served to highlight the importance of further study of 
the ECJ’s constitutionalism without a formal constitution, and the present 
author suggests that further research in this area, combined with an alternative 
set of assumptions regarding this “neoconstitutionalism” is warranted, as will
additionally be addressed in turn.
To explain, the model should be subjected to further rigorous testing to 
confirm the results of this research for other areas of European law. The 
current research has been focused on one particular theme in European 
Community law: the doctrine of supremacy. It is almost axiomatic to note that
Ibid., 291.
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before the architect’s compromise model can be fully accepted, it must be tested 
according to other areas of European law to determine its ability to explain 
these as well as it has explained the doctrine of supremacy. The present author 
would suggest the concept of direct effect as a logical candidate for further
testing of the model.
Second, recognising an entirely new field of law would weaken the 
temptation to make assumptions on Community law based either on traditional 
international law or on national law, as the case might be. The legal authority of 
the Court rests upon a narrow foundation, and assumptions of European 
Community law should recognise this situation. A model like the architect’s 
compromise, with its emphasis on the bargaining between the Member States 
and the Court, is warranted to adequately capture the constraints of this unique 
and unprecedented legal system. Because the sovereign powers held by the 
Communities fall short of a state but are more significant than an international 
organisation, Grimm expresses that “as a matter of political taxonomy, the 
European Community is still a novelty in want of a convincing label.”28 
Notwithstanding the recognition of a “new legal order,”29 scholarship in the 
field has relied largely on either comparing the Communities to the development
of American federalism, assuming notions of national law or employing 
international law as a starting point for analysis of European law. The problem
with these approaches is that Community law is fundamentally different these
28 Dieter Grimm, “The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German 
Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision,” Columbia Journal of 
European Law 3 (1997): 229.
29 Van Gend en Loos (ECR), 12.
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other legal orders. Despite the temptation to compare the Communities to the 
United States, such comparisons fail to recognise, among other things, the 
fundamental point that Kompetenz-Kompetenz lies with a centralised, federal 
government in the United States while it resides in fifteen national capitals in the 
Communities. Nicholas Emiliou explains, “The Communities have only the 
powers assigned to them by the Treaties, while all residual powers are left with 
the Member States. In other words, all the Communities possess is merely 
derived power. . . ,”30 This derived power ensures that the Communities will 
not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz unless the Member States transfer this 
competence to the Court. No amount of legal manoeuvring can transfer the 
ultimate power structure from the national capitals to the Communities without 
the consent of the Member States. Furthermore, neither can assumptions of 
traditional international law be used to analyse the Communities since the
competences of the Communities fall short of a state but extend further than a 
traditional international organisation. Hence, the case for an alternative means
to examine the European Court is warranted.
In fact, in Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ did recognise a “new legal order 
of international law.” Nevertheless, while scholarship in the discipline is quick
to point out this distinct field of law, it has failed to develop a theoretical 
foundation for analysing it. This has resulted in the formation of theoretical
models which either accord too much power to the European Court or fail to 
appreciate the real impact EC law exerts. These problems are precisely
30 Nicholas Emiliou, “Opening Pandora’s Box: The Legal Basis of Community Measures 
Before the Court of Justice,” European Law Revieyv 19 (1994): 488.
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mirrored in the neofunctionalist model and Garrett’s neorationalist approach 
which provided this research project with its impetus. To alleviate these 
problems, the architect’s compromise with its reliance on modified preferences 
was derived. It is the hope of this research project that the architect’s 
compromise makes such a contribution to the foundation of a new legal 
approach.
Through the manner in which the architect’s compromise model 
captures the bargaining process between the Member States and the Court, the 
model illustrates the mutually dependent relationship that characterises this 
“new legal order.” Specifically, sovereignty no longer resides exclusively with 
the Member States; rather, significant competences have been transferred to the
Communities. Granted, the Member States still retain Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 
they have the authority to modify the Communities and, ultimately, the Member 
States retain the power to dissolve the Communities. However, given the 
economic and political benefits of membership, the Member States are unlikely 
to rebel except in the most extreme circumstances. This is precisely the 
situation which is so aptly captured in the idea of modified preferences.
Moreover, the architect’s compromise model could serve as a 
methodological tool to analyse other emerging regional organisations. With the 
emergence of regional co-operative blocs around the globe, the need for a 
model to explain the expanding legal structure of such organisations is evident. 
Granted, no other regional grouping matches the European Communities in its 
level of centralisation and maturity; however, many of these other regional
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groups rely on a realm of law which is also removed from traditional 
international law. Hence, the ultimate contribution of this research project 
could be to argue that increasing international interdependence and especially 
the growth of supra-national and inter-governmental organisations necessitates 
the recognition of a new realm of law.
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Final Comments
In the final analysis, this research concludes that the legal and political 
theoretical underpinnings of the Communities should be re-evaluated. The 
foregoing research concludes that the architect’s compromise model offers an 
accurate model for explaining European integration vis-a-vis the Court of 
Justice. Moreover, the research is sceptical of attempts to accord the Treaties 
with the status of a constitution since they simply lack the necessary authority. 
The research further recognises that establishing such a constitution would give
rise to an actual federal state. However, the research registers severe doubts at
the conditions necessary to achieve this and even questions the democratic 
legitimacy of such an act. Therefore, the research suggests that the 
Communities should remain in their present form and calls for greater 
objectivity in field with an emphasis on expunging political motivations, and 
recognising both the strengths and limitations of the Communities. F. Scharpf 
captures the dynamics of the Communities, reflected by the architect’s 
compromise model, which ensures a continuing bargaining process between the
Court and the Member States:
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In short, the history of the European Community has not confirmed the 
hopes of ‘Europeanist’ politicians and ‘neo-functional’ theorists alike, 
for dynamic processes of deepening and widening functional integration, 
culminating in the creation of a full-fledged federal state; but the 
European enterprise has proven much more resilient than the ‘realist’ 
school of international relations and the political and scholarly promoters 
of an [s/c] Europe des patries would have predicted. Paradoxically, the 
European Community seems to have become just that ‘stable middle 
ground between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking in 
of a new one.’”31
31 F. Scharpf, “The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons From German Federalism and European 
Integration,” Public Administration 66 (1988): 241.
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Appendix
The Architect’s Compromise Model
To review the logic of the architect’s compromise model, we use the 
following equation to represent an expected utility function for Court decisions:
AEU(a) = 2 p(m)u[o(m,a)], 
all m
where: AEU(a)1 represents the expected utility the Court derives through 
pursuing action a;
p(m)2 indicates the probability that a particular state of nature (m), or in 
this case a particular modified preference by the Member States will 
prevail; and
u[o(m,a)] denotes the utility that would be derived if outcome o (a 
function of state of nature m and action a) is achieved.
Furthermore, all of the possible actions, or in this case decisions, 
available to the Court comprise the set A, which is composed of all the mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive possible actions available to the Court. Specifically, 
A = {ai, a2, a3}, and ai denotes a Court decision in favour of deeper integration, 
a2 represents a Court decision neither in favour of deeper integration nor in 
favour of disintegration and a3 indicates a Court decision in favour of
disintegration.
AEU(a) denotes “Architect’s Expected Utility of action a.” 
p(m) denotes “probability of modified preference.”
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Similarly, M is the set of all possible states of nature, or in this case, the 
attitudes the Member States, that characterise the political, economic and social 
climate in which Court decisions are made. Thus, M comprises the mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive set M, where M= {mi, m2, m3}, and mi indicates a 
condition in which the modified preferences of the Member States reflect pro­
integration sentiments, m2 denotes a condition in which the modified preferences 
of the Member States are ambivalent to integration and m3 represents a 
condition in which the modified preferences of the Member States reflect anti­
integration sentiments.
States of Nature (Modified Preferences)
mi m2 m3
ai Ol 04 O7
actions a2 O2 05 08
a3 o3 O6 O9
The elements of set O denote all possible consequences of Court decisions
taken under differing states of nature, where O = {oi, o2, o3, 04, 05, 06, 07, og, 
09} and the following table lists all the elements of O:
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Oi Member States accept the Court decision, integration 
deepens
o2 Member States accept decision
o3 Member States may either reject Court decision outright 
or alter the Court through Treaty revision
04 Member States accept Court decision but could limit 
the authority of the Court in the future
o5 Member States accept decision
o6 Member States may accept Court decision but may alter 
the authority of the Court in the future
o? Court decision rejected if not consistent with modified 
preferences, rejection in the form of cheating and/or 
altering the authority of the Court
og Court decision accepted
o9 Court decision accepted
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